

Being for the most part puppets: Interactions among men's labor, leisure, and politics

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**Interactions Among Men's
Labor, Leisure, and Politics**

**by William R. Torbert
with Malcolm P. Rogers**

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We wish to dedicate this work
to our parents
who were the first to play with us

. . . man is made to be the plaything of God, and this, truly considered, is the best of him: wherefore also every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present.

. . . He will go forward in the spirit of the poet:

Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of Gods.

And this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things their Genius and God will suggest to them — he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

*“An Athenian Stranger”
Plato, Laws*

Acknowledgments

Through the years, this work has received careful and helpful criticism, for which we are most grateful, from Gil Merks, John Robert Golembiewski, and Dick Hackman. At the same time, we thank Chris Argyris for repeatedly encouraging us in the scope of our study and challenging us by the theoretical relevance of his own thought.

Most crucial to this study, however, was the willingness of 209 men to share their lives with us. Many of them asked to see the results of our work. We hope some of them now will and will accept our effort as a sharing in return.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge our own responsibility for all interpretations of other's theories and our data.

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Introduction

We make sharp divisions in our society. That is why we have so many clocks: we need to know when it is job-time and when it is free-time. That is why we have so many cars: we need to get from the business-building to the school-building or the house-building. That is why we have so many books: we need some to entertain ourselves, some to induce an emotional experience, and some to challenge the intellect. That is why we have so many psychiatrists: we need to move between the conscious and the unconscious.

Curiously, we exhibit a tendency to regard those things which we divide as dissociated. We adopt the attitude that we can indulge our passion without affecting our capacity to love, that we can labor eight hours a day without affecting our freedom to do as we like afterwards. And yet there is a feeling too of a need to relate—to communicate. In an attempt to satisfy our need to relate, we install televisions, telephones, airplanes, and newspapers, as well as cars, books, and psychiatrists. Yet we rarely remark the striking contradiction between our feeling of a need to relate things within and without ourselves and our tendency to regard what we divide as dissociated. We do not recognize that what prevents us from relating is not an external situation but an internal attitude.

Following the tendency to divide and dissociate, we tend to dichotomize, polarize, and value a given pole of a spectrum at the expense of the other pole. Nowhere is this tendency better illustrated in American society than in the relative attention given to the study of labor and leisure. By comparison to the amount of research done on work situations, virtually none has been done on men's leisure. And to the knowledge of the authors no systematic empirical research has been done into the psychological relationships between work and leisure in our society. In fact, although the authors completed their research for the following study, relating work, leisure and politics among blue collar workers, in

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1964, their findings have not been superseded by any research since then.*

Reviewing previous research on "The Definition and Measurement of Leisure" in 1968, Ennis noted,

The most difficult question is "How well do we live as individuals? how humane and civilized is our society? . . ." All attempts to find such a calculus of happiness have failed.

Can the two modes (of qualitative description and empirical measurement) be conjoined? This is the challenge that has to be met if a continuing evaluation of the nation's leisure is to be a valid one.¹

The high value that Americans have attached to work may partially explain this lack of attention to leisure.

The lack of attention to men's leisure can also be explained partly by the fact that leisure belongs to no clear academic discipline, no clear field of study. Instead, according to the Greeks, leisure was the condition for all study. It is not surprising, then, that a culture which encourages dissociation and polarization of spectrums should overlook the background behind its own scholarly spectrum of disciplines—leisure.

Whatever the reasons for the previous lack of attention to leisure among social scientists, this study tackles the phenomenon of leisure head-on. In order to do so, the authors have first, in Part I, reviewed the previous literature in economics, sociology, and political science which touches the edges of the issue of leisure. Next, in Part II, we have examined the philosophical and existential background that flavors previous studies at the perimeter of leisure and explicitly propose a different model of man and the world for our own study. In Part III, we specify the kinds of observations we made of men's jobs and the kinds of questions we asked the

* After the book had gone to press an impressive study appeared, essentially paralleling and confirming our findings on the relation of job to leisure activities. See M. Meissner, "The long arm of the job: a study of work and leisure," *Industrial Relations* vol. 10, no. 3 (October, 1971).

same men about their leisure and politics. Finally, in Part IV, we present both the quality of men's comments about themselves and the statistical evidence about the relation of their labor, leisure, and politics.

We originally undertook this study after hearing a lecture by Herbert Marcuse in which he predicted that persons were becoming so passive that they would eventually ask the state and the media to regulate their leisure life, just as large organizations now regulate their work life. We were also aware, in the early 1960's, of many predictions that impending automation would reduce the job market and create conditions of enforced leisure—dangerous because unwanted and unvalued by its beneficiaries. At the same time, other commentators expressed concern at our trend towards a consumer culture not valuing the virtues of hard work. Why, we wondered, was leisure in all cases treated as such an empty, valueless, superficial phenomenon in American culture?

This study represents our efforts to focus that question more precisely and to find some answers. The answers we have found do not lead toward some large-scale corrective program. Instead, we hope they will lead to self-questioning by each reader of his private and his public life.

NOTES

1. R. Ennis, "The Definition and Measurement of Leisure," in *Indicators of Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 565, 568.

**Perspectives on Previous Studies of
Labor, Leisure, and Politics**

The Economics of Automation

In recent years many forecasters have predicted, both hopefully and fearfully, that automation is about to have a huge effect on employment and the length of the work-week. Some hope that machines will free men from inhuman toil, but many others fear that machines will deprive men of their livelihoods.

As conversation about automation and the possible uses of new free time increases in extent and in decibels, one crucial distinction is often overlooked. The *technological possibility* of introducing automated machinery into plants and offices is often confused with the *economic feasibility* of such a change. The economist Joseph Schumpeter long ago argued that it was important to distinguish among an original "invention," the discovery of an economic application for an invention, and, finally, the diffusion of this "innovation" throughout the economy, which he called "imitation." In these terms, many kinds of automated systems have been *invented* and in some specific instances they have been introduced as *innovations*, but many more innovations are still necessary before automation will be a practical reality for many industries, and there is as yet almost no *imitation* of automated equipment which replaces production jobs.

Despite all the talk about automation in the plant in the past decade and the many single examples of laborers being replaced by machines, Charles Silberman points out that "output per man-hour has increased more slowly in manufacturing than in the economy as a whole since 1947—i.e., by 2.8 percent a year vs. 3.2 percent for the economy. These recent gains in manufacturing are

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barely half as large as those realized during the 1920's, when a real revolution in manufacturing technology was taking place."¹

The view is the same in the microcosm. For example, one of the great fears has been that unskilled and semi-skilled blue-collar jobs are being eliminated so swiftly that unemployment will increase substantially. Silberman shows that while 1,700,000 production-worker jobs were eliminated between the first quarter of 1956 and the first quarter of 1961, since 1961 production-worker jobs have increased by 1,000,000.² Certainly then, automated machinery is not yet replacing workers at a prodigious rate.

These facts are interesting in themselves, but they also serve to emphasize the difficulty of predicting future trends. For example, a company intending to install automated production machinery must determine whether the demand for its product is stable as well as large. If the demand is large but unstable, it may be more economical for the company to continue to use laborers rather than to replace them by automated machinery. For laborers can be laid off when demand is slack, whereas machinery will continue to present a cost to the company (in terms of depreciation) and may cost a great deal to start and stop when not used 24 hours a day.

This example brings us to the general problem of the relation of demand to production. A change in the structure of demand could lead to changes in production which cannot be predicted by economic calculations. For the structure of demand involves decisions on the part of individuals and groups about the psychological value of different kinds of products.

What are the sorts of changes in the structure of demand which could have important effects on employment? One possibility is that people will no longer remain satisfied with the inexpensive but stereotyped goods of mass production, and that demand will shift to individually-crafted goods, thus enlarging the labor force to an extent not now foreseeable. Another possibility is that with growing affluence the demand for domestic service may increase greatly, while a change in social mores might make domestic service less objectionable than it has been in the past. Yet another possibility is that a demand will grow for an adult education program which occupies a significant portion of the work-week. Such

a program could employ up to five percent of the population as teachers and administrators alone, while the shorter work-week would increase the number of jobs.

The recent decades of American economic development suggest that such changes in the structure of demand are unlikely. As Carol Van Alstyne notes, "In contrast with the explosive increases in our ability to produce, total consumer demand, as well as its composition, has changed very slowly. Since the turn of the century only a slow evolution has occurred in the relative spending for nondurables, durables and service."³

It is not automation or other aspects of technological change which presents a problem for America today, but rather the structure of demand which meets this technology and the psychological values that underlie production and consumption decisions. There is no doubt but that the phenomenon of automation presents America with creative possibilities, but the way in which we value this phenomenon will determine whether we gain or miss the human benefits of automation.

For example, the producer in a capitalist economy has a given aim: to raise or at least maintain the profit-level or market share. The consumer has no such given aim: he must come to an aim for himself, or not come to one at all. If a man's free time is an aimless time, a respite from the production-aim imposed on him during the day, an empty period to be filled with recreation, then his consumption becomes susceptible to the influence of the production-aim. For, when faced with overcapacity, the producer has one obvious way of preventing his capital investment from going to waste. This way is to persuade the consumer to demand more of his product. One way of accomplishing this goal is simply to spread information about the product through advertising, so that more people will learn about it and (some of them) will buy it. Advertising and other means may also be used, however, to increase demand for a product by inducing or creating a demand where there was none before—that is, an aimless person may be persuaded to buy a product which he neither needs nor wants, but which he is attracted to by some quality (like the packaging) external to the product itself. We will not argue how prevalent such persuasion

is. We wish only to note that it is the result of the dominance of the production-aim and that its logical implication is that the structure of demand is a function of production possibilities. It follows that production comes to sustain itself rather than functioning to solve human problems.

If a man has no aim of his own, free time is valuable to him only for recuperation, the "re-creation" of energy for his job. If his free time continues beyond what is necessary for this recreation, he presumably becomes bored. It is interesting in this regard that Americans appear to attach high psychological value to job time relative to free time. These values often lead them to accept a second job or overtime work rather than free time. Harvey Swados noted such a situation in Akron, Ohio, among the rubber workers who for years have worked a 36-hour week. How do these men use their extra time? Do they become involved in it and value it, or do they seek to escape it? Swados discovered two notable features about Akron: 1) there have been an unusually high number of men holding part-time jobs in addition to their full-time jobs; 2) a disproportionately high number of women (60% of whom are married) are working. These findings seem to imply that extra hours of free time are not as highly valued by the rubber workers and their wives in Akron as are the benefits in extra hours of job time.⁴

These considerations suggest that the amount of free time available in the future and its cultural significance will not be determinable by economic forecasting, but will reflect the psychological value of work and free time to Americans.

Recently, Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute have attempted to forecast the shape of the American post-industrial culture in the year 2000.⁵ They foresee a four-day, 28-hour work week with 13 weeks of vacation each year in an automated, computerized economy in which the private, industrial sectors are secondary in importance to service and public sectors. Although this vision may indeed be accurate, the discussion of this chapter should alert the reader that its accuracy will depend not only on extrapolations from current trends in production, but also on assumptions about the evolving social psychology of consumption

and free time. As we have indicated, what is known about patterns of consumption and free time suggests that they change reluctantly.

We make an effort in this study to measure systematically and in depth the psychological value of free time to 209 American men who work on automobile assembly lines, in machine tool factories, and at an automated chemicals distillery. We hope by so doing to illuminate the quality and effects of men's free time, to describe how it is used or abused, and to understand why it is coveted or abhorred.

We also wish to discover whether the quality of men's work affects their free time activities. We present in the next chapter what previous material we have found bearing on this question.

NOTES

1. Charles E. Silberman, "The Real News about Automation," *Fortune* (January, 1965), p. 126.
2. Silberman, "The Blue-Collar Comeback," *Fortune* (February, 1965), pp. 155, 214.
3. Carol Van Alstyne, "Innovation: An Uneven Diffusion," reprint from *Challenge* (April, 1963).
4. Harvey Swados, "Less Work-Less Leisure," in *Mass Leisure*, eds. Larrabee and Meyersohn (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).
5. As summarized by Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le D fi Am ricain* (Paris: Densel, 1967).

The Relation of Job to Free Time

A prevalent viewpoint holds that free time can compensate for the alienating aspects of modern jobs. This belief is based on a broader assumption that underlies modern western civilization: namely, that one can neatly divide one's life into the time allotted for labor and time allotted for leisure. Robert Dubin states this position in an article on industrial workers:

Weber emphasized the impersonality and efficiency of modern bureaucratic organization. The efficiency can remain along with the impersonality, providing there are other points in the society where the primary social relations can be expressed.

The general conclusion of the Corning Glass Conference was that the problem of creating an industrial civilization is essentially a problem of social invention and creativity in the non-work aspects of life. Our great social inventions will probably not come in connection with work life; they will enter in community life.¹

In his research Dubin found that "for almost three out of every four industrial workers studied, work and workplace *are not* central life interests."² Furthermore, the informal group experiences and general social experiences that have some affective value for them occur outside of the job environments.³ This evidence seems to support the notion that socially important creativity will occur in the non-work aspects of life. But Dubin also notes that the industrial worker "has a well-developed sense of attachment to his work and workplace without a corresponding sense of total com-

mitment to it.”⁴ Paul Goodman comments on the paradoxical nature of this evidence:

In their choices with regard to technique, efficiency, quality of material, equipment, and cleanliness—all the things we would consider as part of man’s craftsmanlike and aesthetic capacity—again a good majority proved to be oriented, not to home economics and do-it-yourself, not to arts and crafts, but to the job at the plant . . .

Reflect on what these findings mean, unsurprising as they are, and you will understand the problem of our leisure. What the men are apparently interested in is the time off the job; they are just waiting for the whistle to blow so they can get to their “important” interests; but, strangely, these important life interests are *not* directive, controlling, rewarding; they are not the areas of learning how to belong and how to avoid being excluded. Such things are rather learned on the job in which, however, they are not interested.⁵

Those who believe that free time can compensate for the alienating facets of the job tend to minimize the importance of the working hours. This analysis may, however, lead us to hitch the horse behind the cart, as Robert Blauner points out:

It is fashionable to argue today that work has lost its former importance in our developing ‘leisure society.’ But the relative lack of opportunity for self-expression in so many jobs in rationalized bureaucracies is itself a major cause of the leisure emphasis . . .

The subtle ways in which the quality of one’s work life affects the quality of one’s leisure, family life, and self-feelings are not well understood.⁶

A study by Kornhauser on the mental health of industrial workers indicates that the working hours affect greatly the rest of a man’s life. Kornhauser applied an index of mental health, which was validated by an independent check with clinical psychologists and psychiatrists. His conclusions were:

(a) that mental health (as here assessed) is poorer among factory workers as we move from the more skilled, responsible types of work

to jobs lower in these respects, and (b) that the relationship is not due in any large degree to differences in pre-job background or personality of the men who enter and remain in the several types of work. The relationship of mental health to occupation, in other words, appears to be "genuine"; mental health is dependent on factors associated with the job.⁷

In addition to Kornhauser, several others have pointed to the importance of the relationship between the job and free time activities. George Friedman claims that job dissatisfaction, whether conscious or not, has a lasting influence on life lived away from the job. Job dissatisfaction leads to two forms of escapism. One consists of killing time by gambling, watching T.V., playing games of chance, etc.; the other consists of a partial means of self-expression through a more active use of free time, such as developing hobbies.⁸ Chris Argyris provides empirical evidence for the claim that job conditions are replicated, rather than reversed, in their free time.

The employees' descriptions of their "off-the-job" activities suggest a similarly impoverished interpersonal world. Seventy-two percent of the high-skill and low-skill employees spend the majority of their time looking at "T.V.," "reading a paper," "drinking beer," "doing jobs around the house," and once in a while "going to a movie with the wife" (never more than once a week). Another twenty percent, who are mostly highly skilled employees, spend time working in their shop on hobbies (for example, cabinet making, carpentry, radios.)⁹

Still another suggestive piece of evidence is found in Robert Lane's intensive study of fifteen industrial workers in "Eastport." Lane reports that "Everyone [but Costa] dreamed a little dream of some more perfect society that came closer to the heart's desire. Few desire great wealth, almost all desire good jobs with something left over for such modest luxuries as car trips and perhaps even a small outboard motor."¹⁰ Evidently, the quality of their jobs is even more important to these men than their ability to consume. This evidence seems to support Goodman's contention

that factory workers' most important values—such as a sense of belonging—are learned on the job.

These studies only touch upon the relation of jobs to leisure. In our study we attempt to ask more directly and more systematically how a man's job is related to his free time. But in order to understand more precisely what questions we can ask about "free time" or "leisure" we will look in the next chapter at some of the previous research concerning free time.

NOTES

1. Robert Dubin, "Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the 'Central Life Interests' of Industrial Workers," in *Work and Leisure*, ed. E. Smigel (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1963), p. 71.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
5. Paul Goodman, "Work and Leisure," in *Automation*, ed. Philipson (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1962), p. 450.
6. Robert Blauner, "Alienation and Freedom: The Manual Worker in Industry" (Ph.D. diss., Berkeley, Cal., 1962), p. 330.
7. Arthur Kornhauser, "Mental Health of Factory Workers — A Detroit Study," *Human Organization* vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring, 1962), pp. 43-46.
8. Georges Friedman, *The Anatomy of Work* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 112.
9. Chris Argyris, *Integrating the Individual and the Organization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 301.
10. Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 208.

The Sociology of Free Time

How much free time do Americans today, and how do they use it? At first glance, the increase over the past century in the average amount of free time has been dramatic. Since 1850, the average work week has been reduced from an average of 71 hours to an average of 40 hours. This reduction has increased our free time—beyond work, eating and miscellaneous necessities—from about 2.18 hours a day in 1850 to 7.48 hours a day in 1960.¹

Not everyone, however, agrees that we have so much free time. Sebastian de Grazia computes the average work week in the U. S. for the *fulltime* male worker running about 47 hours.² He feels that a major part of the error in the statistics has arisen from a failure to take into account the unequal distribution of leisure. Ernest Havemann agrees. He quotes 1963 Labor Department statistics which showed that 11 million factory workers regularly worked overtime, while three million men held two jobs, four million people held professional jobs, and another five million people held jobs which required them to keep going so long as anything remained to be done.³

Harold Wilenski also points to the disproportionate distribution of free time and concludes, "The uneven distribution of non-work time among those working and the incidence of involuntary unemployment and retirement strongly suggest that men who have gained the most leisure need and want more work. Here the 'leisure stricken' are not replacing the 'poverty stricken,' the two are becoming one."⁴

De Grazia's central attack on the "myth of free time" focuses on the nature of the free time activities themselves. He contends

that very little of the so-called free time is actually free from necessity. He calculates that on work days most of us have about two and a half hours of free time:

Work time, if we use the calculations made earlier, takes up an average of 10 hours and 40 minutes a day (job about 8 hours, journey to work 1½ hours, sphere of woman's work in housekeeping allocated to man about 20 minutes, do-it-yourself work about 40 minutes, moonlighting 10 minutes). Subsistence time takes up an average of 10½ hours daily (sleep 8½ hours, dressing, eating, cooking and shopping nearly two hours). For all the rest, including prayer, getting the car fixed, going to the barber, dentist, shoemaker, or laundry—which are usually overlooked—we can make a low guess of 20 minutes per day. This makes a total of about 21½ hours, leaving 2½ hours a day of free time.⁵

How are we to reconcile these conflicting statements about the amount of free time available? The estimate that gives us 7.48 hours of free time does not adequately reflect the unequal distribution of free time. On the other hand, de Grazia's exclusion of such activities as prayer, do-it-yourself work, and cooking from the category of free time seems somewhat arbitrary. It introduces the question, "What is free about free time?" How are we to determine which activities are free from necessity and which are not?

We find that we cannot simply collect facts and allow them to pattern themselves. The very nature of the facts is in question. Let us for the moment attempt to leap over this problem by looking at studies which have permitted people to determine for themselves what activities they will classify as belonging to their free time.

How do people use what they consider to be free time? A recent national survey yielded the following results. The ten most frequently mentioned free time activities, given in order of frequency, were watching television, visiting with friends and relatives, working around the yard and garden, reading newspapers, reading books, pleasure driving, listening to records, going to

meetings or other organizational activities, special hobbies, and going out to dinner.⁶

What factors determine the use of free time? Many studies show that one's social prestige level, as determined by occupation and income, is correlated with particular free time activities. For example, Alfred C. Clarke has compared the free time activities for five levels of prestige. A summary of his results is given in the following table (in which I represents Upper Class, II Upper Middle, and so on):

Activity	Prestige Level Participation Most Frequently				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Attending Theatrical Plays	X				
Attending Concerts	X				
Attending Special Lectures	X				
Visiting a Museum or Art Gallery	X				
Attending Fraternal Organizations	X				
Playing Bridge	X				
Attending Conventions	X				
Community Service Work	X				
Reading for Pleasure	X				
Studying	X				
Entertaining at Home	X				
Attending Motion Pictures	X				
Out-of-town Weekend Visiting		X			
Attending Football Games		X			
Attending Parties		X			
Playing Golf			X		
Working on Automobile				X	
Watching T.V.					X
Playing with children					X
Fishing					X
Playing card game (excluding bridge, poker)					X
Playing Poker					X
Driving in car for pleasure					X
Spending time in Tavern					X
Spending time at Zoo					X
Attending Baseball Games					X

In response to the question, "What would you do with an extra two hours a day?" he obtained the following results:

Activity	Prestige Level				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Relax, Rest, Loaf, Sleep	24.7	31.1	26.7	32.9	39.7
Read, Study	27.9	18.7	14.8	11.2	12.8
Work at Job	19.8	13.8	14.0	8.3	9.1
Work Around House	8.5	7.9	12.3	18.4	15.7
Spend time with family, play with kids	4.3	11.8	7.3	7.5	4.9
Watch T.V.	0.0	1.9	2.5	5.6	6.9
Other leisure activities	7.1	4.1	10.8	6.1	3.2
Don't know	2.3	5.8	8.3	6.4	3.9
No answer	5.4	4.9	3.3	4.6	3.8

In both tables, there is clear evidence of variations in free time activities according to social class.⁷ In a study of voluntary association membership Charles Wright and Herbert Hyman reached the same conclusion about the influence of social variables. Income level, education, and occupation were all shown to influence the number of organizations a man joined.⁸

The majority of the studies of free time do not offer any theoretical interpretation for these correlations. For example, when Wright and Hyman discover the effect of occupation on voluntary association membership, they offer no explanation of the data. What is it about a particular occupation that leads a person to a particular pattern of free time activities? What is the difference between attending a movie and attending a baseball game which leads the former to be preferred by Group I in Clarke's study and the latter by Group V? To answer these questions one needs to interpret the significance of different behaviors for the individual. The information that some men cook while others drink beer tells us little. For one person cooking may be a frustrating necessity, while for another it may be a pleasurable learning experience to which he looks forward.

So, we see that we encounter difficulties both in the empirical task of establishing how much free time Americans have and in the theoretical task of providing a systematic framework which

relates free time to its correlates. How shall we resolve these difficulties? Perhaps we should concentrate, not on the *time* aspect of free time, but on the *free* aspect of free time. We can start with a cursory look at a theory of free time which denied the very possibility of designating a certain chunk of time as "free time." This denial is implicit in the Greek theory of leisure.

Today, the word "leisure" is often used interchangeably with the term "free time." Historically, however, leisure does not refer to a *period of time which is free from* daily, necessary tasks, but rather to an *attitude which is free for* another kind of task, a task so different from a *daily, necessary* task that we may designate it as an *eternal, optional* task. The Greeks conceived of leisure as a "state of being, a condition of man, which few desire and fewer achieve."⁹ Aristotle cites only two activities as being worthy of the name "leisure"—music and contemplation.¹⁰

Contemplation requires more than time free from necessities. Most people merely experience boredom when they have "nothing to do." They are likely to describe themselves as "killing time" or daydreaming. To contemplate one must wish to measure the value of one's experience. Such assessment itself is valuable only if one has an aim of one's own. (By contrast, if one can accept the aims which the outside environment offers, one can also accept its measure of value.) For the Greeks, then, leisure had a positive meaning, referring to the development of one's individuality.

The positive, Greek meaning of leisure will be helpful in leading us to a theory relating men's job, off-the-job, and political activities to one another. The "free time" concept is negative and, upon examination, empty. Leisure refers to a definite activity which necessarily has measurable characteristics. "Free time," by contrast, is defined by job-time and so has no characteristics of its own.

But the idea of leisure is still unclear. What is it to be free for an eternal, optional task? Are Americans free in this way? "Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* suggests, by implication, that Americans are *not* free in this way. He maintains that our subjective reluctance to change is colliding with increasingly rapid objective, external changes to generate the pathology of "future shock." But

external changes are disorienting only to the extent that we identify ourselves—our stability—with particular external conditions. Or, to press one step further, external changes are disorienting only to the extent that we have not come to terms with our unique and persisting individuality.¹¹ Thus, an implication of Toffler's thesis is that Americans have not tended to use their free time as leisure, as the opportunity for developing one's individuality. Staffan Linder provides theoretical backing to this implication by describing America's emphasis on economic growth as resulting in an increasingly hectic tempo of life and a declining competitive position for time devoted to the cultivation of mind and spirit.¹²

Is the implication we draw from Toffler, with Linder's backing, empirically true? Do Americans show evidence that they are or are not free for eternal, optional tasks?"

We shall face these questions in the following chapters, but first we wish to explore in a preliminary way the relation of leisure to politics. Since leisure is the activity of finding one's individuality—one's eternal, optional task—in relation to others, it may be expected to have political consequences.

NOTES

1. Harold Wilensky, "The Uneven Distribution of Leisure: The Impact of Economic Growth on 'Free Time,'" in *Work and Leisure*, ed. Smigel (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1963), p. 107.
2. Sebastian de Grazia, *Of Time, Work and Leisure* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1962), pp. 64-65.
3. Ernest Havemann, "Too Much Leisure," *Life* (February 14, 1964), p. 79.
4. Wilensky, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 137.
5. de Grazia, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

7. Alfred Clarke, "Leisure and Occupational Prestige," in *Mass Leisure*, p. 208.
8. Wright and Hyman, "Occupational Status and Voluntary Membership," in *Mass Leisure*, p. 200.
9. de Grazia, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 14.
10. ——— *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 14.
11. Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970).
12. Staffan Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

4

The Politics of Democracy

What kinds of political activity maintain and strengthen a democracy? Aristotle answered—and we reinforce his answer—that only the participation of men of leisure in politics could ensure the health of a state, for only they would seek solutions based on the common good, rather than on a short-sighted individual or factional good which would slowly sap the energy of the *polis* as a whole.

Today the possibility and meaning of concern for the common good is little explored by political scientists, and we can find no studies whatsoever which attempt to relate a man's leisure to his politics (which is not so surprising since the understanding of the term *leisure* has been equally abandoned).

Nevertheless, the studies of numerous political scientists indicate the limitations of political activity springing from concern for the individual good and concern for the factional good. William Kornhauser speaks of the danger to democracy of concern for the individual good when he describes the activity of "non-elites" in a mass society. When an individual sees himself against the world, trying to get what he can from it—when he is *concerned for his own individual good*—Kornhauser regards him as resentful, tense, alienated (and he supports this view with evidence from studies of seamen and coalminers). Such an individual, says Kornhauser, is most likely to let others use him for their purposes indiscriminately if it affords him the opportunity to escape from his tensions by losing himself in violence. As he puts it:

Mass society is a situation in which an aggregate of individuals are related to one another only by way of their relation to a common

authority, especially the state. That is, individuals are not directly related to one another in a variety of independent groups. . . . Social atomization engenders strong feelings of alienation and anxiety, and therefore the disposition to engage in extreme behavior to escape from these tensions.¹

If extreme behavior is a likely eventual result of concern for the individual good, concern for a group or faction does not necessarily assure social harmony. When Robert Dahl proposes that "the more conflicts [among groups] are cumulative, the less likely is peaceful adjustment,"² he is touching upon the problems which are posed for a democracy by a *concern for the factional good*. Seymour Lipset analyzes a number of countries in Europe and concludes that, "Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create the basis for ideological politics, democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such politics does not include the concept of tolerance."³ Democracy has been unstable in France, for example, because the three deepest conflicts (cleavages) are cumulative rather than cross-cutting. That is, the religious division between Catholics and anti-clericals corresponds with the political division between rightists and leftists, and both those divisions also correspond with the economic division between business and labor.⁴ Thus, identification by individuals with a given group or faction can lead to intolerance and violence just as can social atomization.

On the other hand, "cross-cutting cleavages," or *concern for the multi-factional good*, encourage a far greater degree of stability in a democracy, as illustrated by Lipset's following description:

Multiple and politically inconsistent affiliations, loyalties, and stimuli reduce the emotion and aggressiveness involved in political choice. For example, in contemporary Germany, a working class Catholic, pulled in two directions, will most probably vote Christian-Democratic, but is much more tolerant of the Social Democrats than the average middle-class Catholic. Where a man belongs to a variety of groups that all predispose him to the same political choice, he is in the situation of the isolated worker and is much less likely to be tolerant of other opinions.⁵

Or, as Dahl points out more formally, "If most individuals in the society identify themselves with more than one group, then there is some positive probability that any majority contains individuals who identify themselves for certain purposes with the minority."⁶

In what way, then, can concern for the common good be more effective than concern for the multi-factional good in maintaining democracy? The multi-factional good leaves a number of people dissatisfied: those people who, for one reason or another belong to no faction. In America, for example, concern for the multifactional good has often not included concern for such identifiable groups as Indians, migratory workers, and people condemned to the electric chair. Any national or international system which relies for its stability upon concern for the multi-factional good is threatened by elements which it does not recognize as legitimate factions. Consider the irony today of Western nations dividing China into "spheres of influence" during the nineteenth century, or the irony of wealthy Romans turning their thumbs down in order to witness the spectacle of the death of members of a certain strange, religious sect.*

There is a great gulf between concern for individual, factional, or multi-factional good and concern for the common good. A basic characteristic of the attitude of the person who is concerned for the individual, factional, or multi-factional good is that he is concerned for others *in so far as they are like him*. This characteristic comes through most clearly in Dahl's statement about a multi-factional situation when "any majority contains individuals who identify themselves for certain purposes with the threatened minority because of shared characteristics." Thus, in so far as two people (the majority and the minority) are satisfied, they are satisfied, not because they accept their relationship to one another—not because they accept their differences as well as their similarities—but because they are the same. By contrast, an important

* This argument contains within it a grave difficulty: from the point of view of the multi-factional good it has no validity because what is not a faction does not exist.

characteristic of concern for the common good is the establishment of relationship among different people or things for the benefit of all (a shared purpose beyond similarity and difference).

But this belief—that different entities can be seen as related—goes very far. It bespeaks the ultimate faith of man—the faith that the world is ordered, with the result that man fulfills himself by opening himself to the world and thus discovering his relationship to other things and his function with them. This faith is radically different from that which leads to concern for the factional good—the faith that the world is chaotic, with the result that man needs to protect his security along with those “like” him by gaining power over the world so as to impose order on it.

Retrospect and Prospect. In our introduction and first four chapters we have repeatedly noted two different ways of viewing the world.

In the Introduction we noted the disjunction between the tendency to dissociate and the need to relate. In “The Economics of Automation” we noted the disjunction between the external production aim and the possibility of an internal psychological aim.

In “The Relation of Job to Free Time” we saw the disjunction between the view that job and free time are diassociated and that the positive value of free time can outweigh the negative value of a job, and the view that the value of a man’s job and free time are intertwined. In “The Sociology of Free Time” we saw the disjunction between a period of time which is free from a daily, necessary task and an attitude which is free for an eternal, optional task. In “The Politics of Democracy” we saw the disjunction between concern for an individual, factional or multi-factional good and concern for the common good.

Ironies spring from these disjunctions, for psychological aims surely include production, just as an eternal task must include all daily tasks, and the different things to which a person concerned for the common good relates include those people who are concerned for the factional good.

Facing these ironies, and remembering in particular our ques-

tion, what it is to be free for an eternal, optional task, we shall attempt in the next chapter to describe some aspects of the two different ways of viewing the world (though much must be left unsaid). We will choose one of these two views of the world as the fundamental hypothesis of our own empirical study and then enlarge it in following chapters by drawing upon other studies and theories of human behavior.

We regard as indispensable this process of clarifying our assumptions and value decisions and treating them as the widest hypotheses of our study. Are there not always implicit value judgments in any attempt to find order in phenomena, and may we not, if we really wish to be scientific in our work, elucidate these judgments, try to be sure they are inwardly consistent, and test their validity by proposing them as hypotheses?

NOTES

1. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 39.
2. Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 78.
3. Seymour Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1963), p. 74.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
6. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 104-105.

II

**The Model of Man in the World
Underlying This Study**

Interlude

*Noise and silence:
Connected as the branch tip
To the trunk of the tree.*

(WRT)

The right of nature . . . is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Hobbes, *Leviathan*

'Love is enough,' the poet has said; it carries its own explanation, the joy of which can only be expressed in a form of art which also has that finality. Love gives evidence to something which is outside us but which intensely exists and thus stimulates the sense of our own existence. . . . We can make truth ours by actively modulating its interrelations. This is the work of art; for reality is not based in the substance of things but in the principle of relationship.

Chakravarty (ed.)
A Tagore Reader

5

Freedom as a Worldly Possibility

How can a man's activity be free? What is it to be free for an eternal, optional task? Man is a part of the world—at least, he acts in the world. If we say that man can act freely, we are equally saying that the world is a place where freedom is possible. We wish in this chapter to note the most general characteristics of alternative views on the nature of the world (and, hence, on the nature of freedom).

There are, so far as we can see, only two ways of imagining the world in the most general terms. These two are represented in the quotations from Hobbes and Tagore at the head of the chapter. The world may be seen as essentially atomistic and chaotic, its parts separate and interacting with one another at random. So Hobbes sees it in the *Leviathan*. Or the world may be seen as dynamically, organically ordered, with its parts and energies related to one another in definite ways because they perform interrelated functions. Tagore points in this direction when he speaks of love—the principle of relationship—as the basis of reality.*

In intellectual terms the choice of one of these two views of the world would be the most fundamental hypothesis of any study were it consciously proposed. In terms of action, the choice of one

* All dualistic views of the world which separate man's freedom from nature's laws, mind from matter, the spiritual from the carnal, can here be subsumed under the atomistic worldview, since the elements of the dualism interact with one another arbitrarily. Many people with whom we have spoken adopt a dualistic view in casual conversation.

of these two views would be the most fundamental faith of any man were it consciously recognized.*

The World as Ordered. In the West, both science and religion have traditionally rested upon the faith that the world is ordered (although some philosophers of science maintain that science imposes order on fundamentally random activity, thus adhering to an atomistic world view). Curiously, this common faith in order has rarely been explored. Instead, religion and science have done battle with one another or disregarded one another. At different periods each has attempted to subsume the other. During the Middle Ages religion was the aggressor, the theology propounded by Aquinas and the Scholastics ruling as the queen of the sciences. By the beginning of the twentieth century many secular systematizers had attempted to subsume the phenomenon of religion within their sciences: Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau in their political thought; Hegel in philosophy; Comte in sociology; Marx in economics; Frazer in anthropology; and Freud in psychology.

When science and religion have attempted to disregard each other, they have done so in the belief that each deals with a relevant but independent dimension of the world. This belief, a heritage of Cartesian dualism, is a characteristic of the view of the world as chaotic. In precisely what respects the ways of science and religion can be conceived as different has never fully been established. Are they dealing with the same order from different points of view? Then each is incomplete and awaits the kind of coalition which Teilhard de Chardin has proposed in *The Phenomenon of Man*. Does religion reveal the relationships among the different levels of the world—man to nature, man to society,

* Since this choice is not always consciously made, some works clearly represent elements of both world views. Even when the choice is made consciously in the sense that we explicitly state our choice below, it is rare that the writer is sufficiently conscious of the implications of his choice to be fully consistent in what he writes and how he writes it.

man to God—and science deal with the relationship of the parts on any one level—one nation to another, the heart to the lungs, the fertilizer to the soil? If so, the borderlines between the two are arbitrary, for the different levels of the world clearly intrude upon one another—a man's hunger may affect his political activity, while his relationship with other men is taken to reflect his relationship with God. Is science a precise, rational investigation of phenomena and religion a general, intuitive encounter with reality? Again the division is unsatisfactory because it does not account for the intuitive, creative theory-building of great scientists, while it leaves religion with no clear relevancy to daily decisions.

The vague division of science and religion has persisted into the twentieth century. Today we discover ourselves in a civilization where the oughts and holies of ethics and religion have become abstract and empty in the face of the concrete technological offspring of science. Possessed of the power to control birth, thought, destruction, and soon genetic inheritance, some men may wish to reopen the ancient search for wisdom—the understanding of the beneficial use of knowledge. But wisdom is a meaningful term only in an ordered world, for a genuinely chaotic world lacks standards of benefit and meaning.

If the world is ordered, man must have a function to perform within that order, to use mechanical terminology; he must have a role to play in the drama of creation, to use humanistic terminology. In performing that function, in playing that role, man fulfills himself. Man gains meaning and value in relation. For meaning is a movement which requires two extremes, and value is a measure, requiring both that which is to be measured and its measure. Try as he may, man cannot separate himself from the world and then posit values as he sees fit. The result is arbitrary, unconvincing, meaningless. For man in that case is both the measure and the measured. The values he posits express no relationship. Man finds himself always alone—"a useless passion,"¹ in Sartre's terms.

The World as Chaotic. A lack of relationship—a separation—when it is seen as destroying, not just certain values, but the very

possibility of value and meaning, expresses the other view of the world, the world as chaotic. Each part seeks to maintain itself by gaining power in order to secure its comfort, in order to destroy itself—or for nothing at all. It makes no difference. There is no order. Man is a collection of atoms, not organism; society is masses, not men related to one another for the common purpose of finding the “good life.”

One of the few men who have attempted to develop the logical consequences of the hypothesis of chaos was Thomas Hobbes. (Other men, like the Russian nihilists of the late nineteenth century, have attempted to live out the consequences of the faith in chaos). In his *Leviathan*, Hobbes pictured the authority of the state as resulting from a defensive contract among men, who, although they have no common purpose, are so fearful of death in the chaotic state of nature that they wish to set up an artificial order.² This artificial order, the state, the Leviathan, will provide them with a certain security within which they are free to pursue whatever private, atomistic ends they may have.

In essence, the world as ordered differs strikingly from the world as chaotic. In actuality, however, order may wear the mask of apparent chaos, while chaos may clothe itself in arbitrary order. Evidence for either fundamental hypothesis will not derive from study of the ideals of order and chaos alone, nor from study of the actual, outside world alone, but rather from study of the interaction between ideas and appearances.

Having briefly characterized the alternative views of the world, we choose the view of the world as ordered as the most general axiomatic framework for this study.* Our introduction already

* We realize that different people will draw a great variety of implications from the word “ordered”: such has been our experience in conversation. On the one hand, if the world is ordered, order can only be fully understood by a movement on the part of the reader. On the other hand, the confusion of world views extends very deeply within us. For example, when words like “order” “theory” and “experiment” are applied to people, they carry, for many, negative connotations of determinism, coldness, calculatedness, inhumanity,

expresses this view in proposing that the economics of automation is related to the psychology of consumption, that the sociology of free time is related to the philosophy of leisure, and that the politics of democracy is related to the ultimate faith of a man.

We will define man as free when he is actualizing himself—when he is fulfilling his role in the world and when he engages in activity which will lead him to an understanding of his role. Understanding and freedom are, thus, not characteristic of all men. They are possibilities only. No man can be given understanding and freedom; he must gain them for himself. However, a man's environment can either help to awaken him to the possibility of effort, or disguise the possibility, so that he will not recognize it.

Here we can begin to see a vague, abstract framework for our conception of leisure as freedom for an eternal, optional task. A man's eternal task is to fulfill his role in the world. The task is optional in that it is voluntary. Just as one cannot be given freedom, so one cannot be forced to be free.

In order to learn more about this freedom we may now look back over the first four chapters to see how the two world views manifest themselves in the disjunction each chapter develops. We can also question whether freedom for an eternal, optional task can begin in a man's economic, social, and political life. Or we may move on to the next chapter to look more closely at the psychology of this freedom.

and excessive intellectuality. These connotations derive quite logically from an atomistic (or dualistic) view of science as the manipulation and domination of matter by man's mind. Hence, when applied to man himself in the behavioral sciences, science remains an instrument of manipulation and domination. But the function of science in the view of the world as ordered is other: it is more an instrument for the understanding of relationships in the world. Understanding has freedom, not determinism, as its by-product. Theory readopts its root definition of participation in the Mysteries, losing its connotations of coldness and excessive intellectuality. Experiment becomes an active involvement in relationship, not the inhuman, calculated use of another.

NOTES

1. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 615.
2. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 84 et seq.

Interlude

A Moment and Its Remainder

*And then in the midst of the green
I came running up the trees, and leaves
Fell all about, softly, so I did not see
The floor my legs loped above.
For each branch: a line between the clear light
And the shadow: yet not dividing
In that always.*

*But no. All that was inside:
A shiver above the bowels; the beating blood
Wandering with my working breath.
The water then that fell was slow.
It did not leave, but was a part and meant
I was a part of All.*

*My fortune is high: I have no wounds.
I may run and leap, or tarry
To listen to the stealthy whispers
That beckon my confused ear.
For I have yet to find that silence
From which I can listen to myself
And sing and dance to the rhythms
Of the Most All-Healing.*

(WRT)

*Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there
stands a powerful master, an unknown wiseman—who is
named Self. He lives in your body, he is your body.*

*In the authentic man there is hidden a child:
it wishes to play.*

Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

6

Freedom as a Human Possibility

We have said that man is free when he fulfills his role in the world and when he engages in activity which will lead him to an understanding of his role. We would like to maintain that this activity represents his eternal, optional task—that it is the activity of his leisure.

In the next two chapters we will introduce some evidence for this fundamental hypothesis or axiom as well as some similar hypotheses by other writers.* Specifically, this chapter will concentrate on the mode of human activity which leads to understanding and, hence, to freedom. The next chapter will examine the modes of human activity which represent and sustain misunderstanding.

This emphasis on *coming to* understanding implies that human activity can contain a developmental quality. We call the process by which a child develops mature understanding the process of *play*. Play is the exploration of one's self in relation to the world.

We wish to show that a child has the potential for growing into an understanding of himself through play, but that children are not usually encouraged to play. Instead of playing through their adolescence toward their maturity, they are led by external "necessities" and expectations to be dominated by their personalities—

* Since axioms are self-evident truths framing theory and data, their confirmation results, not from data alone, but rather from opening to an intuitive self-based vision; that is, from a process of self-verification of the interplay of ideas and empirical evidence. We have attempted to construct this book so as to encourage this kind of self-verification.

identities—pseudo-selves—which acquire goals, values, and modes of behavior from outside the self.

The Self. What evidence have we that self behind personality could be more than a metaphysical wisp? The implied challenge is formidable, but we cannot do other than dare giving some general form to the available materials. Take the narrowest focus first: Carl Rogers reports an interview with a client in which she indicates a specific feeling: that she and older people in general have lost something which children have.

Client: Every once in a while a sort of pleased feeling, nothing superior, but just—I don't know, sort of pleased. A neatly turned way. And it bothered me. And yet—I wonder—I rarely remember things I say here, I mean I wondered why it was that I was convinced, and something about what I've felt about being hurt that I suspected in—my feelings when I would hear someone say to a child, "Don't cry." I mean, I always felt, but it isn't right; I mean, if he's hurt, let him cry. Well, then, now this pleased feeling that I have. I've recently come to feel, it's—there's something almost the same there. It's—we don't object when children *feel* pleased with themselves. It's—I mean, there really isn't anything vain. It's—maybe that's how people *should* feel.

Therapist: You've been inclined to look almost askance at yourself for this feeling, and yet as you think about it more, maybe it comes close to the two sides of the picture, that if a child wants to cry why shouldn't he? And if he wants to feel pleased with himself, doesn't he have a perfect right to feel pleased with himself? And that sort of ties in with this, what I would see as an appreciation of yourself that you've experienced every now and again.

Client: Yes. Yes.

Therapist: I'm really a pretty rich and interesting person.

Client: Something like that. And then I say to myself, "Our society pushes us around and we've lost it." And I keep going back to our feelings about children. Well maybe they're richer than we are. Maybe we—it's something we've lost in the process of growing up.

Therapist: Could be that they have a wisdom about that that we've lost.

Client: That's right. My time's up.¹

This quotation is not intended as idolatry of the infantile; rather, it is an intuitive, subjective report, pointing to something in children that can develop, but is instead repressed. The idea is hardly new, but clearly it is important only insofar as one discovers it and experiences it for himself.

Some people presumably emerge from childhood with a stronger sense than other people of this "something" which might develop in them through further play towards their individuality.* These people would theoretically be less dependent than others on their environment for goals, values, and modes of behavior.

If people do differ in their sense of the "something" which can develop toward their individuality, we believe a useful way of thinking about them derives from Maslow's research which differentiates between people who are "deficiency-motivated" and those who are "growth-motivated." His categories provide support for the possibility of moving beyond dependency on the environment to self-direction.

When one is deficiency-motivated the needs for safety, belongingness, love relations and for respect can be satisfied only by other people, i.e., only from outside the person. This means considerable dependence on the environment. A person in this dependent position cannot really be said to be governing himself, or in control of his own fate. He *must* be beholden to the sources of supply of needed gratifications. Their wishes, their whims, their rules and laws govern him and must be appeased lest he jeopardize his source of supply.

. . . In contrast, the self-actualizing individual, by definition gratified in his basic needs, is far less dependent, far less beholden, far more autonomous and self-directed.

* This "something" must be difficult to observe in oneself, since many confuse the rigidity of their personality with individuality.

. . . To the extent that growth consists in peeling away inhibitions and constraints and then permitting the person to 'be himself' to emit behavior—'radioactively,' as it were—rather than to repeat it, to allow his inner nature to express itself, to this extent the behavior of self-actualizers is unlearned, created and released rather than copied.²

The above passage presents two problems which are worth noting. On the one hand, we can see some danger that Maslow will be interpreted to say that the self-actualizer stands apart from others, aloof. This is not Maslow's meaning. The self-actualizer is, in fact, more involved with others than the deficiency-motivated man, for he can move toward genuine exchange, valuing what he hears and what he says for itself rather than as a covert expression of his "belongingness."³ The self-actualizer may be apart from others, but when he is with others he is not merely among them. Now, having protected Maslow, we hasten to our own defense. We do not know how to take Maslow when he speaks of growth as "peeling away inhibitions." He may be emphasizing the "negative" side of growth in contrast to the ordinary idea of "positive" growth by inculcation and addition of information. If so, we prefer to emphasize the way in which true growth occurs through relationship (within ourselves and with others) in which active, "positive" encouragement and passive "negative" permission are intertwined.*

Second, Teilhard de Chardin uses very different words in a very different context to express an idea similar to ours about the interaction of the self, the personality, and the outside environment. In *The Phenomenon of Man* he maintains that "all energy is psychic in nature; but . . . in each particular element this funda-

* Once again, as we approach an understanding of the union of what ordinarily appear to be opposites, we find difficulty in expressing ourselves in a way that we can be sure will seem successful to the reader. For, the point is not the answer, nor that there is no answer, but the process of asking the question. So long as we continue to value the answer as distinct from the question, the behavior as distinct from the motivation, the concern as distinct from the detachment, we are likely to experience this writing as distinct from this reading.

mental energy is divided into two distinct components: a *tangential energy* which links the element with all others of the same order (that is to say of the same complexity and the same centricity) as itself in the universe; and a *radial energy* which draws it towards ever greater complexity and centricity—in other words forward. From this initial state . . . the particle thus constituted must obviously be in a position to increase its internal complexity in association with neighboring particles . . .”⁴ We see the self as a specific example of radial energy in relation to the tangential energy of the personality (or expressive behavior). If the self is directly expressed in a person’s behavior, he will move towards greater internal complexity and centricity by virtue of the dialogue between the two. As Teilhard emphasizes, the individual cannot make this effort alone, but only “in association with neighbouring particles.” “To jolt the individual out of his natural laziness and the rut of habit, and also from time to time to break up the collective frameworks in which he is imprisoned, it is indispensable that he should be shaken and prodded from the outside. What would we do without our enemies?”⁵

Is there any evidence that one can move from personality-direction to self-direction—towards the direct expression of radial energy? Again the challenge is formidable and our approach again scuttles toward truth rather than reveals it. Carl Rogers describes his personal experience during his years as a psychotherapist in terms of this kind of movement:

. . . I find I am more effective when I can listen acceptantly to myself, and can be myself. I feel that over the years I have learned to become more adequate in listening to myself; so that I know, somewhat more adequately than I used to, what I am feeling at any given moment—to be able to realize that I *am* angry or that I *do* feel rejecting toward this person; or that I feel very full of warmth and affection for this individual; or that I am bored and uninterested in what is going on; or that I am eager to understand this individual or that I am anxious and fearful in my relationship with this person. All of these diverse attitudes are feelings which I think I can listen to in myself. One way of putting this is that I feel I have become more adequate in letting myself *be* what I *am*. It becomes easier for

me to accept myself as a decidedly imperfect person, who by no means functions at all times in the way in which I would like to function.

This must seem to some like a strange direction in which to move. It seems to me to have value because the curious paradox is that when I accept myself as I am, the I changes. I believe that I have learned from my clients as well as within my own experience—that we cannot change, we cannot move away from what we are, until we thoroughly accept what we are. Then the change seems to come about almost unnoticed.

Another result which seems to grow out of being myself is that relationships become real. Real relationships have an exciting way of being vital and meaningful. If I can accept the fact that I am annoyed at or bored by this client or this student, then I am also much more likely to be able to accept his feelings in response.

I can also accept the changed experience and the changed feelings which are then likely to occur in me and in him. Real relationships tend to change rather than to remain static.⁶

Perhaps the most important point of agreement among these excerpts from Rogers, Maslow and Teilhard is that there is a self—a central energy—to be listened to. As a result, one's maturity is reached not by the active establishment of identity—not by cutting out a piece of the world for oneself—but in a more passive manner by coming to accept oneself and by this very work transforming oneself. Change is a strangely passive phenomenon: "We cannot change, we cannot move away from what we are, until we thoroughly *accept* what we are. Then change seems to come about almost unnoticed. And, yet, there is another sense in which conscious acceptance is a far more active phenomenon than our flight from awareness of how we are limited and manipulated by our environment.

The Identity or Pseudo-Self. By contrast to conscious free acceptance of oneself, people form identities in reaction to the pressures and expectations of their social environment—in response to the alternative roles which society offers them.

Some children are brought up in families which exert tremendous pressures upon them to fulfill certain roles. For example, in "The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat" Vogel and Bell show how parents who have severe problems with one another and with their relations to their community—and are afraid of dealing with these problems openly—can live together by venting their frustrations on one of their children.⁷ Vogel and Bell describe the induction of a child into the role of scapegoat as follows:

If the child is to be a "satisfactory" scapegoat, he must carry out his role as a "problem child." The problem behavior must be reinforced strongly enough so that it will continue in spite of the hostility and anxiety it produces in the child. This delicate balance is possible only because the parents have superior sanction power over the child, can define what he should or should not do, and control what he does or does not do. This balance necessarily requires a large amount of inconsistency in the ways parents handle the child.

The most common inconsistency was between the implicit (or unconscious) and the explicit role induction. In all cases, certain behavior of the child violated recognized social norms. In some instances stealing, fire-setting, expressions of hostility, or uncooperativeness affected the child's relationships with people outside the family. In other instances, bed-wetting, resistance to parental orders, or expression of aggression to siblings affected relationships in the family. But in all instances, while the parents explicitly criticized the child and at times even punished him, they supported in some way, usually implicitly, the persistence of the very behavior which they criticized. This permission took various forms: failure to follow through on threats, delayed punishment, indifference to and acceptance of the symptom, unusual interest in the child's symptom, or considerable secondary gratification offered to the child because of his symptom. The secondary gratification usually took the form of special attention and exemption from certain responsibilities.⁸

For other children the family does not construct such rigid roles. They may play and question. But they too will come to situations which reward predictability, habitual patterns, in short, con-

trolling roles—whether at school, within their peer group, when they get a job, or when they achieve fame. In *Young Man Luther* Erikson suggests some of these stages of development of the pseudo-self, in different terms:

Psychoanalysis realized early that all memories must pass through a number of screens; because of these screens, earlier years appear in a haze which distorts form and modifies color. The period of language development forms one screen; going to school (the post-oedipal period) another. To these we must add the period of the completion of identity development at adolescence, which results in a massive glorification of some of the individual's constituent elements, and repudiation of others. In the life of a man like Luther (and in lesser ways all lives), another screen is strongly suggested: the beginning of an official identity, the moment when life suddenly becomes biography. In many ways, life began for Luther all over again when the world grabbed eagerly at his ninety-five theses, and forced him into the role of rebel, reformer and spiritual dictator. Everything before then became memorable only insofar as it helped him to rationalize his disobedience.⁹

The passage of memories through different screens, the adaptation of one's self-concept to different rules, to us indicates the construction of pseudo-self. Why do we not interpret these changes as merely representing the increasing fulfillment of oneself? The answer is presented by Erikson when he speaks of "the completion of identity development at adolescence, which results in massive glorification of some of the individual's constituent elements and repudiation of others." It is this process of glorification and repudiation which leads to the pseudo-self. The pseudo-self repudiates, represses, forgets those parts of itself which are not of value to its social role. Thus, the self is not fulfilled through its identity. One's identity does not accept oneself altogether—only certain aspects of oneself—just as Carl Rogers' client could not accept her "pleased feeling" about herself.

The Negative Identity. The aspects of oneself which one's identity does not accept form what Robert Lifton calls a negative

identity. This negative identity rarely comes to the surface, for it represents those aspects of oneself which the pseudo-self considers unacceptable for public display. But the negative identity can be exposed and renders the person in whom it is exposed susceptible to manipulation, since his positive identity has no means of controlling the negative identity.

The Chinese Communists have taken advantage of negative identity in brainwashing their prisoners.

[The prisoner's] sense of evil, formerly vague and free-floating, is now made to do specific work for reform. He takes this step, as Vincent so clearly described, by learning to see evidence of personal evil and destructiveness in specific past actions. What was most prosaic, or even generous, must now be viewed as "criminal."

This reinterpretation of events, as absurd as it may sound, has a strong impact because it stimulates forces within the prisoner himself which support the contentions of his environment. He has, like everyone else struggled with feelings of curiosity, hostility, and vindictiveness not acceptable for public display, but retained as part of his own secret world. Now the awareness of these feelings within himself, and especially of the secretiveness which accompanies them, makes him feel like the 'spy' he is accused of being. It is a relatively easy step for him to associate this image of himself as a conspirator with the past events under consideration.¹⁰

There seem to be no easy explanations of the effects of brainwashing. Of course, the prisoners' survival depended upon their signature of false confessions. Hence their signatures alone could be interpreted as merely reflecting their decisions that their lives were more important than the honor of their signatures. If this were the case, one would expect that they might afterwards be concerned about the meaning and implications of their decisions. But one would not expect to find these men experiencing broad psychological confusion in regard to the quality of their personalities and social relations. In point of fact, however, the men *did* experience broad confusion, revealing the power which their manipulable negative identities conferred upon thought reform.

In contrast to most of the prisoners Lifton interviewed, one man conducted himself in a way which left him free from the effects of brainwashing. Lifton portrays this man:

Vechten depended upon an additional quality which was described by Bauer as "echt," a term by which he suggested purity and authenticity: "He is not an imitation. He doesn't pretend to be what he is not . . . he is one of the few people I have met in life who at least realizes what he is." What Bauer meant by this statement was Vechten's unusual integrity, his ability to lead the life to which he claimed to aspire. At moments when Vechten felt himself overwhelmed by anger, guilt, and doubt, he would draw upon an unusual blend of the supernatural and the human: 'Praying brings you back to the reality of what you are. Talking with the group of foreigners (Europeans), had a similar effect.'

. . . His was the gift of the creative man: the capacity to make use of inner struggles to evolve a new form which can both express personal emotions and strike deep chords of feelings in others.

. . . Vechten's preservation of autonomy both of the group and of the individual under conditions such as these was one of the most unusual human achievements I met with during the course of this study.¹¹

Father Vechten appears from this description to be unusually self-accepting. His views after his imprisonment were remarkably undistorted: "Father Vechten, even after his arrival in Hong Kong, remained the group's leader and guardian. Still speaking as if responsible for it, he gave the most thoughtful and comprehensive picture of his function. He was in fact remarkably balanced in all of his expressed opinions, and yet he spoke of feeling confused over many issues."¹² This confusion, however, resulted primarily from one specific decision he made: "He felt he had done his Church a great disservice in making certain confessions about religion."¹³ In other words, Vechten was not manipulated, as were some of the prisoners, to adopt (however temporarily) the Communist world-view, nor did his resistance to such manipulation force him to become more rigid in his own opinions and self-

concept, in contrast to others who also resisted. He was still free to question his motives.

This example of self-acceptant behavior reveals a quality of *interaction with* the environment different from dependence upon and *reaction to* the environment. We believe that the contrast between Father Vechten and those prisoners with more dichotomous positive and negative identities is evidence for our thesis that the development of an identity or pseudo-self is not the equivalent of self-development.

Play. The possibility for self-acceptance leads us back to our interpretation of the meaning of *play*. The process of accepting oneself is equivalent to the process of play, as we have defined it. Play, we said, is the process by which a child develops the understanding of a mature man, the exploration of one's self in relation to the world. Play is self-accepting and self-developing, not self-rejecting.

Play is a process of relating to the world different from the two methods of adjusting to the world which most textbooks on personality mention. The textbooks concentrate upon *accommodation* to, or *assimilation* of, conflict. "In accommodation, a person can subordinate one of the conflicting pressures and choose to express and gratify the other . . . (For example,) a person may alter himself and reject the personal goal in favor of the social direction . . . Assimilation, the other solution to conflict, requires mastering, or eliminating, or rejecting, the social demand rather than giving up the personal need. In this process a person assimilates the world to his own requirements, using people and social situations about him most advantageously for attaining his own ends."¹⁴ Both of these methods of adjusting to conflict (as well as the phrase "adjusting to conflict") imply a response to stimuli which is intended to diminish their force. In other words, one eats in order to reduce hunger, or one does not eat if one is a monk in a monastery during a period of fasting, in order to reduce the need for social approbation by other monks and the abbot, or the need for God's grace.

Play, on the other hand, is not the result of any overt stimulus. In fact, Koestler shows that many kinds of animals exhibit curi-

osity and exploratory behavior, even when specific stimuli to reduce explorations are introduced. For example, experiments by Hudson, Berlyne, and Walley, in which rats were punished for approaching some novel visual pattern, led them to conclude that "objects that have become associated with danger are often explored before they are shunned."¹⁵ On the basis of studies such as this, Koestler argues:

. . . the organism functions not merely by responding to the environment, but by asking it questions. The main incentive to its exploratory activities are novelty, surprise, conflict, uncertainty. The exploratory drive may combine with, or be instrumental to, other drives—sex, nutrition, anxiety. But in its purest form—in play, latent learning, unrewarded problem-solving—'stimuli' and 'responses' are undistinguishable parts of the same feedback loop along which excitation is running in a circle like a kitten chasing its tail. . . . We must 'take play seriously,' as an activity with a definite 'primary biological function'—viz. to give free rein to the exploratory drive. But such a view can only be held once it is recognized that the exploratory drive itself originates in a 'primary need' equal in importance to the others.¹⁶

In direct expression, one's playful energy affirms, questions, explores, and verifies relationships between self and world. Play is the phenomenon of fully conscious self-world exchange, in which the full interdependence—mutual feeding—of self and world is recognized. If either self or world appear dominant, as in assimilation or accommodation, or if conflict occurs, it is a sign of incomplete consciousness, incomplete play. Further playful questioning and exploration—suffering the apparent imbalance or conflict—will reveal the underlying harmonious organization.*

* Such revelation is of course a possibility dependent upon one's choice to play under circumstances where social custom and personal training and inclination may encourage total identification with one side or the other rather than continued play. And such choice depends in turn upon one's unpreconceived recognition of one's playful energy, a process which requires the work of developing a discriminating attention. Most of us, in other words, are distant from such continuing revelation.

Life-energy-in-development rather than tension—these different terms expressing, not different phenomena, but rather different relationships between energy and attention—becomes the central motivator in play. Its organization is inherently dynamic from the point of view of any given time.

Constructs such as “external force” and “tension” reveal lack of awareness of relationship on the part of their users. They suggest a way of life which avoids the work of play, misuses playful energy in violence, builds resistances to violence through the unused qualities of playful energy, and gradually becomes so encrusted as to appear fundamentally static.

Faced with resistance, play becomes ironic rather than manipulative. It retains its orientation towards a relational or common good rather than an egoistic good.

Play as a Political Phenomenon. We reach the proposition that the man who plays has concern for the common good. On the basis of the foregoing pages, we can list some of the characteristics of the man who plays:

1. Self-acceptance.
2. Acceptance of others.
3. Self-direction, open to relational rather than external authority.
4. Openness: seeking to understand differences.
5. Search for the values in others rather than subordination of others to the pseudo-self.

We should emphasize that if the characteristics of the man who plays are the characteristics of many people, this does *not* mean that they are alike in an ordinary outward sense. Rather these characteristics permit people to share their differences.

The above characteristics are similar to a list of personal traits which help maintain democracy, presented by Alex Inkeles, drawing on the work of Harold Lasswell:

1. *Toward self.* A belief in the dignity and worth of one's self.
2. *Toward others.* A belief in the dignity and worth of others.

3. *Toward authority.* A stress on personal autonomy and a certain distance or even distrust of powerful authority; in contrast to the authoritarian, the absence of a need to dominate or submit.
4. *Toward the community.* Openness, ready acceptance of differences, willingness to compromise and change.
5. *Toward values.* A pursuit of many values rather than a single all-consuming goal, and a disposition to share rather than to hoard or monopolize.¹⁷

Also consistent with our hypothesis that the man who plays protects democracy through concern for the common good is Robert Lane's discussion of "the pathologies of democratic man" in which he lists personal characteristics dysfunctional to democracy and opposite to those of the man who plays.¹⁸ He speaks of the "impoverished self" as including low self-acceptance and low self-esteem:

A person who rejects his impulse life and feels constantly guilty about it cannot have the low moral tension we argued was important for a democratic system . . .

Created by the oppressive character of the social environment, low-self-esteem encourages hedonism in some, rebellion in others, neurotic symptoms in still others.

The Primary Function. We interpret these ideas as compatible with and supportive of our own play theory. It is our hypothesis, however, that play is not only *a* primary biological function as Koestler suggests above but *the* primary function for man. In other words, we maintain that play is even more fundamental than Koestler concludes. But our hypothesis finds support in Koestler's study and seems to be a consistent extension of it. Koestler speaks of play and exploration only in terms of a person's external environment. But a person may also play in relation to his internal environment. Koestler does not seem to consider the possibility of such internally-directed play. He makes the following differentiations:

A small child, kicking a ball about, plays; a professional football 'player' works hard for a living. When the monkey takes a puzzle apart and puts it back together again, he 'plays'; when there is food inside the puzzle he 'strives.' Two chess masters may *play* a friendly cafe game; in a tournament they *compete*. The examples show how fluid the borders are, yet the principle is clear: the degree of 'playfulness' in an action decreases in proportion as the exploratory drive is adulterated by other drives.¹⁹

Koestler does not consider that a man competing in a chess tournament could be playing internally—observing his own emotional and physical reactions to changing situations. Yet in another place he notes the undeveloped potential for such observations: "there are moments when a person perceives what he is doing from a bird's eye view as it were; from a 'parallel' level of consciousness which is not at all involved in the activity at hand."²⁰

Jerome Bruner also hints at the primacy of play when he speaks of learning as the most characteristic human quality. He examines curiosity, a desire for competence, aspiration to emulate a model, and responsiveness to joint enterprises as distinct aspects of this intrinsic, exploratory motive.²¹

Actually, we do not wish to maintain that play is solely a human activity, but rather that it is a fundamental life activity for which the human being possesses a singularly high potential. This potential can realize itself directly in a high level of consciousness of the contact of the organism with the environment, increasing the level of effectiveness of the interaction, or it can contradict and exhaust itself by neurotically dividing the organism from the environment.*

* "Envisaging an animal freely roaming in a spacious and various environment, we see that the number and range of contact-functions must be vast, for fundamentally an organism lives in its environment by maintaining its difference, and, more importantly, by assimilating the environment to its difference; and it is at the boundary that dangers are rejected, obstacles are overcome, and the assimilable is selected and appropriated. Now what is selected and assimilated is always novel; the organism persists by assimilating the novel, by

Play, finally, is not exploration of the external environment or of the internal environment, but of their interrelationship. In man, play expresses itself directly as study, not primarily of discrete matter, but of exchange. Thus, it should not surprise us that, while there is a sense in which play is highly practical, there will be people to whom it simply doesn't matter.

When people are led to attach value to this or that, they do not attend the exchange of the present moment. They give themselves up for something in the past or future or inside or outside. The form of this process of alienation is described in the following chapter.

change and growth. For instance, food, as Aristotle said, is what is 'unlike' that can become 'like'; and in the process of assimilation the organism is in turn changed. Primarily, contact is the awareness of, and behavior toward, the assimilable novelty; and the rejection of the unassimilable novelty. . . . *All contact is the creative adjustment of the organism and environment.*" Perls, Hefferline, Goodman, *Gestalt Therapy*. p. 230.

NOTES

1. Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 88.
2. Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1962), pp. 32-33, 36-37.
2. See Eric Berne, *Games People Play*, for examples of how far and how deeply these covert motives determine the quality of human relations.
4. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 64.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
6. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.
7. Vogel and Bell, "The Emotionally Disturbed Child as Family

- Scapegoat," in *Interpersonal Dynamics*, eds. Bennis (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1964), p. 80.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
 9. Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1962), p. 54.
 10. Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 75.
 11. *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 182, 183.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
 14. Richard S. Lazarus, *Personality and Adjustment* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 10, 11.
 15. D. E. Berlyne, *Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity*, p. 115. Quoted from A. Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 502.
 16. Koestler, *op. cit.*, p. 507.
 17. Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," in *Psychology and Anthropology*, ed. Francis Hsu, as quoted by Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, p. 91.
 18. Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 410-411.
 19. Koestler, *op. cit.*, p. 510.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
 21. Jerome S. Bruner, *Toward a Theory of Instruction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966).

Interlude

*They are just words to say
that I want my restlessness
to make me move.*

*I thought about loving myself
and then tried to feel
what it was like to love myself
and it felt very strange.*

*Gusts of wind
When they blew
Shattered with shivering
The comforting warmth of the sun—
Fragile stillness broken by the dialogue
Or a distant
And a more distant
Bird of the same call
Wondering why they had come so early—
Three withered leaves curled and crinkled
Had held on all winter.*

(MPR)

In man . . . the potentiality for awareness of his functioning can go so persistently awry as to make him truly estranged from his organismic experiencing. He can become self-defeating as in neurosis, incapable of dealing with life as in psychosis, unhappy and divided as in the maladjustments which occur in all of us. Why this division? How is it that a man can be consciously struggling toward one goal, while his whole organic direction is at cross purposes with this?

Carl Rogers in *Nebraska*
Symposium on Motivation, 1963

The reason why scientists can tell us about the "life" in the atom—where apparently every particle is "free" to behave as it wants and the laws ruling these movements are the same statistical laws which, according to the social scientists, rule human behavior and make the multitude behave as it must, no matter how "free" the individual particle may appear to be in its choices—the reason, in other words, why the behavior of the infinitely small particle is not only similar in pattern to the planetary system as it appears to us but resembles the life and behavior patterns in human society is, of course, that we look and live in this society as though we were as far removed from our own human existence as we are from the infinitely small and immensely large which, even if they could be perceived by the finest instruments, are too far away from us to be experienced.

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

The Meaning of Alienation

Play is the activity of men when they use the energy of their exploratory drive to develop an understanding of themselves in relation to the world.

When people do *not* understand themselves in relation to the world, they experience themselves as separated from the world. They and the world appear without common cause. The world becomes something "out there," to manipulate if possible, or from which to endure manipulation. The separation is reflected by a separation within the individual between, as Rogers puts it, the "potentiality for awareness" and "his organismic experiencing." The separation is also reflected within organizations (and the rest of the world "out there") by the distance between their purposes and their practices. It is in the interactions of these two moments of separation, the personal and the social, that we find the meaning of alienation.

We wish to begin this chapter by naming and describing two modes of alienation—labor and recreation. But the agony of witnessing alienation cannot be borne without the hope of reunification. So, we discover in this chapter that the closer we move towards seeing the separation within ourselves and within social organizations, the more we struggle to understand how these moments of separation may be overcome.

Labor and Recreation. When people do not understand themselves in relation to the world, they are pushed here and there by internal whims and external pressures. They are led to strive for goals which do not express their exploratory impulse—goals to

which they are related, not by their selves, but by their pseudo-selves, their personalities. This condition we have called *labor*. Labor involves self-estrangement. Self-estrangement can be measured, says Melvin Seeman, by the "degree of dependence of given behavior upon anticipated future rewards," upon rewards lying outside the activity itself. This measure can help us to analyze the chessmaster Koestler mentions above (page 57). Insofar as he is competing for a prize in the tournament (an anticipated future reward), he is indeed *not* playing, but laboring. Future or external rewards can be of a more subtle nature too. For example, the personality of the chessmaster may rely for its stability on his ability to overcome competition. In this case, all of his behavior patterns which relate to competition are fundamentally dependent upon the future reward of victory.

People labor not only at jobs but also at schools, within the family, or at dances, depending upon the extent to which in any of these situations they strive for goals which do not directly express their exploratory impulse.

Tension characterizes labor, for labor involves the repression of the rhythm of the self and a rechanneling of the self's energy—the energy of the exploratory drive—to the service of external rewards. Such rechanneling—such repression—itself consumes energy. Hence, a man laboring expresses less energy in activity than a man playing.

In complement to the mode of labor stands *recreation*. Recreation is a reaction to the tension of labor. Recreation serves to diminish that tension, but not by the playful expression of the exploratory drive. Rather, some of the social goals which are most obviously unrelated to the self are temporarily removed, thus reducing the tension. Or, in other words, the laborer need no longer strive to obey the decisions of other in recreation, but neither is he extending his consciousness in his own decisions. Instead his decisions are made without effort, that is, by habit. Recreation, as much as labor, reflects self-estrangement—a lack of understanding of oneself in relation to the world.

Recreation does not relieve or diminish the tension of labor beyond the immediate moment of recreation. It is not time used, but

time out. It does not explore the world and increase a person's understanding of it (or of himself). Consequently, it perpetuates labor. It does not solve the human problem posed by labor—the problem of the lack of fulfillment of man's primary biological function, to play. Chris Argyris demonstrates this lack of fulfillment in concrete terms.

Ball parks, athletic teams, company picnics, and company lectures are programs that fulfill the skin-surface needs of the workers. Company newspapers, slogan schemes, and pep talks are also in the same category. If so, increased benefit and communications programs will not tend to decrease the company's human problems. Moreover, since these programs tend to focus on skin-surface needs, they tend to leave the employee's important needs unfulfilled (for example, the need to be led by effective leaders). The employees, not truly satisfied and therefore still requiring fulfillment, ask for more. Soon management begins to feel that the quality of employees is going down. "All the employees want is more. How much do they expect us to give them?" According to this analysis, the management *trains* the workers to focus on material satisfactions (ball teams, pictures in the newspaper, and so on) and then complains when the workers want more.¹

The Problem of Evil. We spoke repeatedly in the last chapter of the discouragement of play. We must ask where the responsibility lies for this discouragement which introduces misunderstanding and labor. How can the circle of the discouragement of play be broken? Where can play begin? We must search for an answer, else we have words only and no referent when we speak of play as a mode of human activity.

A passage from Erikson's *Young Man Luther* can serve to sum up examples of the discouragement of play and introduce our questions about the origin of evil. The author is generalizing from the relationship of Hans Luther to his son, Martin:

The device of beating children down—by superior force, by contrived logic, or by vicious sweetness—makes it unnecessary for the adult to become adult. He need not develop the true inner superi-

ority which is naturally persuasive. Instead, he is authorized to remain significantly inconsistent and arbitrary, or in other words, childish, while beating into the child the desirability of growing up. The child, forced out of fear to pretend that he is better when seen than when unseen, is left to anticipate the day when he will have the brute power to make others more moral than he ever intends to be himself. . . . Some day, maybe, there will exist a well-informed, well-considered, and yet fervent public conviction that the most deadly of all possible sins is the mutilation of a child's spirit; for such mutilation undercuts the life principle of trust, without which every human act, may it feel ever so good and seem ever so right, is prone to perversion by destructive forms of conscientiousness.²

Erikson speaks of sin. But this sin seems inevitable, passed from father to son. It is difficult to see where the evil resides. Sin is a meaningful term, one would think, where there is freedom of choice. The behavior of the father seems determined.

How and why should a man accept the responsibility of dealing with himself as a sinner, when he has been trained to behave as he does throughout life? So long as the individual must establish his value by being competent in terms set up by himself, other people, or society, he will destroy his value if he accepts responsibility for the negative, incompetent, evil parts of himself.

The events of the New Testament give an example of the corresponding kind of inner movement a man must make in order to appropriate responsibility. The New Testament records that God so loved mankind that he sent His son to reconcile us to Him, to atone for the evil in us. If an individual can find in himself a corresponding possibility, coming to the beginning of a certain belief in God, he recognizes that through Christ he has already been given value—he has already been accepted—by God. As a result, he need not establish his value—he need not make himself acceptable—he may take responsibility for what he is, including his sins, and begin the playful learning process of discovering his value. When he is able to begin to see himself understandingly, the individual can begin to change as he recognizes what actions are essential to him and what behavior is merely intended to defend the positive identity of his pseudo-self. Paradoxically, the

acceptance of one's sins does not devalue one, or lead to ineffectiveness, or release new evil on the world. As Carl Rogers puts it,

(A) common reaction to the path of life I have been describing is that to be what one truly is would mean to be bad, evil, uncontrolled, destructive. It would mean to unleash some kind of monster on the world. This is a view which is very well known to me, since I meet it in almost every client. . . . But the whole course of his experience in therapy contradicts these fears. He finds that gradually he can be his anger, when anger is his real reaction, but that such accepted or transparent anger is not destructive. He finds that he can be his fear, but that knowingly to be his fear does not dissolve him. He finds that he can be self-pitying, and it is not "bad." He can feel and be his sexual feelings, or his "lazy" feelings or his hostile feelings, and the roof of the world does not fall in. The reason seems to be that the more he can permit these feelings to flow and to be in him, the more they take their appropriate place in a total harmony of his feelings. . . . His feelings, when he lives closely and acceptingly with their complexity, operate in a constructive harmony rather than sweeping him into some uncontrollably evil path.³

We conclude that man can overcome evil, if, in our terms, he can play in the faith that he is a part of an ordered world—if he searches for order rather than trying to impose it—if he realizes he need only accept his inherent value and need not establish one. The effort of accepting responsibility for evil does not presuppose freedom of choice, nor does it establish the conditions for freedom of choice; it is itself the expression of freedom of choice.

But we have talked around the question of *how* a person can accept sin and come to value play. We have offered a theological interpretation of this movement and examined its possible psychological consequences. The movement itself, however, is toward experiencing oneself more closely, paying attention to oneself, accepting oneself. There is a risk here. What if there should be nothing worth experiencing when I pay attention to myself? And, of course, when I look, I, in fact, find nothing—only a vague, purposeless turmoil within me. I will somewhere have to find the strength necessary to pay attention to myself again and again, if I

am to revalue these moments, to recognize that I have in fact found *everything*: the higher possibility of understanding through playful attention, the truth about the chaos (sin) within me, and the exchange between the two which is the process of learning (or, to continue the Christian analogy, the process of atonement and redemption).

We have not yet looked to the second part of our question: *why* should a person accept his lack of understanding? Such a movement implies, after all, a risky, difficult process of coming to understanding. Moreover, there are no external pressures to push one through this process. Hence, a reason *why* must come from within a person. But if we lack understanding of how our parts can function together in relation to the rest of the world—if we are fragmented, chaotic—no complete reason *why* can come from within us. A reason *why* must come from a completeness or understanding which we do not possess, from a completeness which is an aim. A person must have an aim if he is to accept his sin and come to value play.

The Social System. Now we turn from the individual person to the social system. We are reversing the figure-background relationship: just as social organizations loomed in the background of our discussion of man, now man's psychological organization will provide a springboard for our discussion of society.

We have shown in the previous chapter and in this one that man does have the potential to overcome evil by finding and accepting the self behind the pseudo-self. Yet we have given a number of examples in which the social environment discourages play and, hence, self-acceptance. The question we must now face is whether one may speak meaningfully about changing the social environment so that it will *encourage* self-acceptance and play. Or will only a few individual men of good fortune be able to accept themselves despite institutional discouragement? For if social organizations are structured in their present fashion of necessity and cannot change, then it is meaningless to discuss play as a "human potential" at such length. Play becomes not a possibility for *Homo sapiens* but for only a few men at best.

The question, then, is whether social organizations may change

to encourage play. We shall focus our attention on jobs in industrial organizations since our empirical study deals with the relation of men's jobs to their leisure and political attitudes. We believe that similar analyses can be made in regard to other organizations such as schools, families, or churches.

What is it about a job that encourages play? To determine this, we can make use of two concepts very much like our concept of play. These two are Robert White's concept of competence and Kurt Lewin's concept of psychological success or failure. White gathered evidence to show that animals and human beings need a sense of competence—they strive to deal with their world effectively.⁴ Lewin conducted experiments to show that people experience psychological success when they achieve self-set goals which test their capabilities in a new way—when, in our terms, they explore.⁵

On the job a crucial variable determining the amount of psychological success a person can experience (i.e. the sense of competence he can achieve, or the extent to which he can play) is his opportunity to make decisions. If the decision about what goals he will strive for and what paths he will take to achieve these goals are made for him, he will obviously have very little opportunity to explore and to experience psychological success. At the present time in our society organizations are almost always pyramidal in form, with authority radiating down from the top. Hence, the opportunity for psychological success through exploratory decision-making is greatest at the top level of the pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid one's behavior is dictated by decisions from above. The extreme example of this lack of creative choice is traditionally considered to be the assembly line job. Here the laborer is limited to a small number of very specific motions which he must perform at a definite rate, in a definite length of time without interruption. It is the aim of the empirical study we conducted to lend evidence for the proposition that when play is encouraged on the job—the job-holder becomes more committed to his job, more energetic in his leisure, and a more effective contributor to the society in that his political activity and ideology express democratic values of concern for the common good and tolerance.

If this proposition is true, many people will probably be inter-

ested in making jobs more playful. There is a good deal of evidence from research now being conducted which points to the possibility of permitting a greater degree of playfulness—a greater control over decisions—for the lower levels of the present hierarchy.

Chris Argyris offers a model of decision-making and organizational structure which is intended as a possible supplement (not replacement) for the pyramidal structure. From a review of the biological, psychological, sociological, and anthropological literature, he develops a general, abstract definition for organization which includes the following essential qualities:

1. There is a pattern to the parts.
2. The whole is maintained through the interrelatedness of all the parts in the pattern. No one part (or subset of parts) completely controls or dominates the whole. The “interrelatedness of parts” refers to the mechanisms by which parts contribute or receive help from the other parts.
3. Goals or objectives of the whole are achieved.
4. The parts and their interrelationships change to cope with, and adapt to, new stimuli influencing the internal organization.
5. The organization has sufficient control over its environment to maintain its own discreteness.⁶

On the basis of these dimensions Argyris sets up a “Mix” Model according to which real life social organizations may be described.

Pyramidal organizations, Argyris shows, often behave in ways characteristic of the left end of the continuum, that is away from the essential properties of organization. For instance, the left end of the continuum of dimensions (1), (2), (3), and (5) are explicitly exhibited in the following example, as we shall indicate:

Executives may speak of “needling the boy” once in a while, “‘raising hell’ to keep them on their toes,” and so on. If these conditions continue, it is not long before the “hot” decisions of the organization are administered by the use of emotions. This is the state commonly known in industry as “management by crisis.”

THE "MIX" MODEL

Away from the Essential Properties	Toward the Essential Properties
1. One part (subset of parts) controls the whole.	The whole is created and controlled through interrelationships of all parts.
2. Awareness of plurality of parts.	Awareness of pattern of parts.
3. Achieving objectives related to the parts.	Achieving objectives related to the whole.
4. Unable to influence its internally oriented core activities.	Able to influence internally oriented core activities as "it" desires.
5. Unable to influence its externally oriented core activities.	Able to influence externally oriented activities as "it" desires.
6. Nature of core activities influenced by the present.	Nature of core activities influenced by the past, present, and future. ⁷

As management by crisis increases, the subordinate's defensive reaction to these crises will tend to increase. One way of protecting himself is to make certain that his area of responsibility is administered competently and that no other peer executive "throws a dead cat into his yard." The subordinate's loyalty will tend to be centered toward the interests of his department (3). As the department centeredness increases, the interdepartmental rivalries will tend to increase (2), thus decreasing the organization's flexibility for change (5) as well as the cooperation among departments. This decrease, in turn, will tend to be adapted to by the top management by increasing their directives which, in turn, begins to recentralize the organization (1).⁸

Argyris introduces the possibility of developing alternative organizational charts which locate power and authority in the person or department most competent to deal with any single situation. He illustrates this principle by citing a number of studies which have shown the effectiveness of developing an employee decision-making structure.⁹

Efforts to study "organizational behavior" are of recent origin, and the directions for organizational change which Argyris and

others have outlined represent tentative avenues of exploration rather than established guidelines. At the same time, we interpret the exploratory aspect of this school of organizational science not merely as a by-product of its immaturity but also as an essential feature of its practice. When we speak of "this school," we are referring to those social scientists who have been interested in the relevance of experiential learning to organizational change. So-called T-Groups, a medium of group education, are intended to encourage participants' awareness of what values their behavior reflects and how their behavior affects others.¹⁰ In an organizational context, a T-Group can focus on the ways in which formal patterns of authority affect the honesty, commitment, and decision-making effectiveness of the organization's members in relation to its central aim. When the T-Group is successful in encouraging the exchange of information among its members, and they increase their awareness of the process of mutual encouragement, they may discover that their formal system of rewards and penalties of their informal interpersonal values contain self-defeating aspects which have been hidden from view because the relevant information has not been shared or valued. The group members may consequently wish to change their organizational framework and their behavior choices, so as to relate to one another more effectively. Thus, change is initiated from within, as a concomitant of the self-study and self-acceptance of the organization, rather than imposed from without.

An essential element in this process is a coming-to-value what one discovers, with the faith that the discovery will enhance the effectiveness of the operation of the organization. As with an individual who seeks to "overcome" his "sinfulness," this movement toward valuing what it learns rather than what it imagines itself to be requires great effort on the part of the organization. A careful verification of the usefulness of this process is necessary before an organization will make a genuine and lasting commitment of its resources to it.

The organization must be prepared to bear fundamental questions about itself with the conviction that the question itself can be constructive and whatever response emerges can also be constructive. Thus, for example, a school must be prepared to face,

accept, and use the information that its members do not have a clear or common understanding of the nature of the exchange of teaching and learning—that is, of its central aim, education. A church must be prepared to face, accept, and use the information that worship is not central to its practice, nor its practice to the lives of its members. A family must recognize that it does not understand the meaning of childhood and adulthood. An industry must recognize that it places no value in its work. A hospital must relate its organizational frustrations to its lack of understanding of how to care for human beings. For the dissatisfaction accompanying the knowledge of failure is necessary to the awakening of the hope which underlies the search for better understanding.*

Alienation. These brief excursions into the problems of individual sin, acceptance, and organizational effectiveness suggest that it is possible to integrate individuals and organizations in such a way that the individuals may obtain the freedom and power to explore the limits of an organization in a decision-making context, while at the same time organizations maintain and even increase their effectiveness.

Since these possibilities are real (however difficult they may be to realize) it is meaningful to speak of people who have not realized these possibilities as “alienated.” Understanding is a concrete possibility for people—the only fulfilling possibility. The laboring pseudo-self is something different from the playing self. But labor is not a necessary mode of human activity. It is not perpetuated by economic necessity or by any other necessity but misunderstanding.

Alienation, a term much used during this past century, now

* It is difficult for us to know how much to say along this line. The reader may well already resist strongly the question-assertions we have brought to the organizations of which he is a member. We would predict this resistance insofar as it is our question of the reader's organization rather than a question which he accepts as his own. Thus, this resistance measures our failure up to this point in the book to alert the reader to the value of exploratory play.

gains definite content in the relation of its subjective and objective manifestations. Subjectively, alienation appears to refer to the state of self-estrangement of people who, wishing to play, live in a world they do not understand. Objectively, alienation appears to refer to social powerlessness—the inability to explore knowledge—the lack of an organizational commitment in the direction of encouraging the individual to deal effectively with his environment. The meaning of alienation occurs in the exchange between these two manifestations.

NOTES

1. Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 46.
2. Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, pp. 69-70.
3. Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, p. 177.
4. Robert W. White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," *Psychological Review* vol. 66 (1959), pp. 297-333.
5. Lewin, Kurt, et al., "Level of Aspiration," in *Personality and Behavior Disorders*, ed. J. M. V. Hunt (New York: The Ronald Press, 1944), pp. 333-378.
6. Chris Argyris, *Integrating the Individual and the Organization* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 150.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.
10. We will not attempt a more adequate description of T-Groups here, but refer the reader to an excellent exposition of T-Group design and goals and the research evaluating their effectiveness in Edgar Schein and Warren Bennis, *Personal and Organizational Change Through Group Methods: The Laboratory Approach* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

III

Translation of the Model into Specific Research Measures and Methods

Play on the Job

The most inclusive empirical proposition of this study, as we have already stated, is that when play is encouraged on the job, the jobholder becomes more committed to his job, more energetic in his leisure, and a more effective contributor to the society in his political activity and ideology.

We have chosen to concentrate on the job as the most important factor in the encouragement or discouragement of play for several reasons. First, evidence suggests that the worker himself focuses upon the job as the source of important life values (see p. 14). Second, several investigators have pointed to the apparent influence of the job upon free time activities, (see pp. 18-20). Third, the simple magnitude of time spent on the job suggests its importance. Fourth, psychology has often looked to factors in childhood to account for massive personal orientations, so it will be of interest to see whether the whole configuration of a man's leisure and politics can be systematically influenced by his job in adulthood without reference to his childhood. And finally, it is relatively easy to measure the various qualities of the job which may encourage or discourage play. In connection with the last reason, we will now consider these various qualities of the job* in detail.

Melvin Seeman has distinguished five dimensions of sociological thought about alienation, which we use to develop our job measure. The five basic ways in which the concept of alienation has been

* We have examined the nature of factory jobs for the purpose of this study. However, we see no reason why our analysis, with slight variations, could not be extended to managerial jobs as well.

viewed are powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.¹ Robert Blauner extends the discussion of these categories. *Powerlessness* is the state of being a controlled object rather than a free subject. *Meaninglessness* occurs when one sees oneself as an isolated part and therefore cannot see the purpose of action. *Normlessness* refers to a lack of consensus on the standards of behavior. The dimension of *isolation* places the emphasis on the lack of a sense of membership in social groups. *Self-estrangement* represents a lack of involvement in one's activities.²

For the purpose of measuring the alienating (or if reversed, playful) characteristics of men's jobs, we shall distinguish between objective characteristics of the environment and subjective reactions to them. Although he fails to emphasize the distinction, Blauner does say at one point that, "Self-estranged feeling states are the subjective *consequences* of objective alienation . . ."³ We shall measure externally determinable job characteristics by a *job rating* and subjective responses by a *job involvement rating* on the basis of men's interview responses. In so doing, we will be cutting across the above categories of alienation, since all of the first four imply both external conditions and internal attitudes. Our results may shed light on the relationship between objective and subjective characteristics of alienation. Do they complement one another or compensate? Which influences leisure and political activity more clearly?

We shall begin by describing our job rating measure and its application to the jobs we actually observed.

The Job Rating. Blauner is very helpful in elaborating these objective characteristics of the environment—the separation of the worker from ownership of the factory and its finished products,⁴ the lack of security in his job,⁵ his inability to influence decisions of the enterprise,⁶ and his lack of control over the technological environment.⁷ Largely from these characteristics listed by Blauner we have developed our own rating scale, which we give below. All of our dimensions are modes of playful expression in the job. Numerical values, usually from 0-2, are assigned to the different

degrees of playful expression in each dimension. The greater the number the greater the degrees of playful expression. The scale ranges from 0 to 10.

1. *Amount of ownership in the enterprise.* 0 if there is no ownership; 1 if there is some sort of profit sharing; 2 if there is full ownership.
2. *Proximity to the finished products.* 0 if can't see the whole process and not responsible for assemblage of parts to produce the whole; 1 if only one of the first two conditions exists; 2 if neither of the first two conditions exists.
3. *Ability to make major decisions.* 0 if no major decisions; 1 if decisions concerning technique or policy implementation but with recourse to superior; 2 if complete responsibility for major decisions.
4. *Control of the pace of the work.* 0 if there is a pace such as an assembly line; 1 if there is no such pace.
5. *Control over the quantity of work—lack of quotas.* 0 if there is a rigidly specified quantity of output to be produced, or if there is piece work; 1 if neither.
6. *Amount of technique on the job.* 0 if no skill required. 1 if some routine skill; 2 if skill that requires full attention, and finds different and innovative expression in each new product.

We have divided Blauner's characteristics of "separation of the worker from ownership of the factory and its finished products" into two separate dimensions in our rating (1 & 2). They are independent of one another and, we feel, important enough to be measured independently. We have included the two dimensions of pace and quota. Quota is distinct from pace because a worker can have control over the specific pace of his work and still be assigned quotas. However, if he has no control over the pace as on the assembly line, then he has no control over what he shall produce.*

* The importance of these dimensions is made clear in several studies of the assembly line by Charles Walker for the Technology Project at Yale University.

We have excluded Blauner's dimension of "lack of security" in the job, only because of the difficulty in measurement, not because we deny its possible importance. All of our dimensions can be measured without questioning the workers themselves. In fact, all except number 1 (which requires objective verbal information) can be measured by simple observation.

The greater his stake in the ownership of the enterprise the more the worker will be able (at least theoretically) to *define his own goals* by influencing the goals of the organization. The ability to make major decisions, the control over quota, and the use of skill are all specific areas of decision-making on the job. These are the ways in which the worker is able to *define the paths to his goals*. The proximity to the finished product in a sense measures the *closeness between the paths and the goals*. For example, assembly line workers' paths—one or two routinized mechanical procedures like tightening bolts—are far removed from the total process of producing automobiles, which is the goal of the organization. Seemen's concept of meaninglessness as arising from isolation expresses this condition.

While all of these dimensions seem to be important modes of playful expression in the job, the relative importance of each one is not clear. Hence we have no way of knowing the relative weight to give each one in the rating scale. So we have considered them of equal importance and added them together as a composite measure of the job characteristics which encourage play.

Looking at the Jobs. Our empirical study really begins at this point. The methodological details will be included in a later chapter; at this point we wish only to describe the jobs we rated and how we rated them. In our study we conducted interviews in three different companies in three different areas—an automobile company in Detroit, a machine tool company in Columbus, Ohio, and a chemical products company in the Chicago area. We chose three different companies for the purpose of interviewing large numbers of workers in markedly different job situations. In terms of our rating scale, we wanted one group very low, one medium, and one very high on the scale. We expected to find this distribu-

tion in assembly-line workers, skilled machine operators, and operators in an automated plant, in that order. This is essentially what we found. However, there were considerable variations in job ratings within the automobile and machine tool companies and thus some overlap in job ratings among the companies. This development was fortunate in that it permitted us to substantiate that systematic variations in job and leisure involvement ratings really reflected a relationship between jobs and leisure and not the effect of some other unmeasured difference among companies or cities on men's leisure.

The Automobile Company. Here the cars flowed continuously, sometimes on the ground, sometimes in the air; always they were met with a shattering noise. They came through old factories and new factories, wide spaces where the assembly-line invariably passed itself going the other way. The men moved with the cars and added to them in the ten or fifteen yards which were their territories. As soon as they finished with one car the next one appeared. The open halls of the plants were broken only by small enclosed offices for the foremen, the canteen center, and the wash-room. We visited seven different plants of the automobile company, but found the atmosphere and jobs very similar throughout.

The largest proportion of the men we interviewed were regular assembly-line workers who received *zero* job ratings on our scale. Their body movements and work pace were set by the moving line; they labored at small, repetitive tasks without seeing the whole process or the finished products; they had no decision-making power (except insofar as they could "accidentally" stop the line by some "mistake"); certainly, mistakes were not the result of too much challenge or incompletely mastered skills, for no skills were necessary other than the ability to perform routinized, mechanical motions. Some men received a *one* job rating on our scale because they worked off the main assembly line and could work at their own pace so long as they kept a slight backlog of parts built up. Others received a *one* job rating because they had a job requiring a special technique such as fitting out windows, each of which required special adjustment. Men with some seniority were as-

signed to "relief" work, relieving any man under a given foreman for short periods of time. These men's jobs were rated as *two* because they witnessed a more coherent development of the finished product (proximity) and because they used various different pieces of equipment (technique). A job with still greater range was repair work. Repair men repaired defects in the final products, dealing with the car as a whole. They were bound by neither pace nor quota, and their job required various small skills. Their job rating was *four*. Finally, two men were part-time relief and part-time repair men, receiving a job-rating of *three*.*

The Machine Tool Company. We visited three plants of the company, two of which produced only parts. The main plant produced parts and assembled them into machine tools. Each wing of the main factory housed a different process. In one wing baskets of parts were rolled in at one machine tool station and rolled away after new edges had been ground in them. In another wing large machines, weighing several tons, were set up by the men running them to do specialized tasks. Elsewhere men assembled the tool presses which were the final products of the company, alternately fixing the machine and chatting with their neighbors. One is left with a vision of irregular lines of men, goggled against the danger of their machines, working and moving freely in a busy but congenial plant.

Most of the men at the main plant were machine operators. Their machines were preset by another man, so they had no major decisions to make. They did, however, operate the machines manually (except for one man whose machine was automatic) and

*	Number of Subjects	
Job Ratings	0	25
	1	14
	2	14
	3	2
	4	17
		<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/> 72 total

close precision work was required. Thus, a definite skill, but of a routine sort, was necessary. Because of the nature of the plant all the men could see the whole process of production easily and move about freely. The men worked under neither pace nor quota. They were told how many parts to make, but the time limits were informal and flexible. These men received job ratings of *four*, one for proximity, one for lack of pace, one for lack of quota, one for technique.

In the two part-producing plants, men with the same type of jobs could not, of course, see the whole process of production. Such men consequently received *three* job ratings, the point for proximity having been subtracted. A *five* job rating was assigned to men such as those who worked in the part producing plants, but did their own set-up work on the machines they operated. Setting up and running the machine involves a total process (one for proximity) and requires an innovative use of one's skill for each new set-up job (two for technique). A *six* job rating represented assembly jobs at the main plant (two for proximity). Since about 50% of the products these assembly men work on are "specials," they are continuously finding new applications for their skills (two for technique). A still higher *seven* job rating was assigned to men who also made major decisions in relation to the products. For example, a few men on assembly often worked from original and rarely fully applicable blueprints, requiring their judgments on aspects of basic design in assembly. Another small group of men worked in the tool-making unit, often deciding what tool would be most useful for a certain production process and then making such a tool.*

* Number of Subjects	
Job Ratings	3 19
	4 26
	5 7
	6 12
	7 8
	<hr/> 72 total

The Chemical Company. The plant was divided into separate buildings or units which were connected by long overhead pipes. Each unit synthesized one or two major chemicals and passed on its waste products as raw materials for the next unit. Pipes were everywhere, horizontal, vertical, bridged by catwalks—they dominated the scene. Initially the strong, almost unbearable sulfuric smell added to an impression of inhuman surroundings. Later the surroundings became simply an unusual background to the men we met within the coils of each unit.

Inside each unit there was a small room panelled with innumerable meters and control dials which were watched by three or four men, who were seen variously standing, writing on their clipboards, sitting at the table, having a snack, talking, but always looking with at least one eye at the control panel.

The actual products are not visible to the operators. The chemicals are contained in pipes, and only occasionally, when chemical tests are performed, do the operators actually see the materials they are working with. However, these men must have a clear understanding of the process of synthesis in their own units. In case anything goes wrong, they must know the effect of the different ingredients on the final product. They must sometimes make major, immediate decisions, and the resultant responsibility is probably the most striking feature of their jobs. Their decisions deal with extremely large amounts of chemicals. Single errors in judgment can cost around \$5,000. The potential explosiveness of the chemicals requires extra care for their own protection.

By contrast to such emergencies, their job is ordinarily relaxed. Outside of hourly readings they are free to work at their own pace. Quotas as such do not exist, for chemical production in an automated plant is a continuous process. The operators simply attempt to establish a proper balance between the amount and the purity of the yield. As a result, the special skills called into play are invisible, mental skills rather than physical ones. In automated jobs such as these there is no need for manual dexterity in the sense of skilled machine operators. Their technique, although different, is in many ways more impressive. It involves such things as accurate reporting of observations, systematic orderliness, constant attention, and

special methods and combinations for producing yields of maximum purity and quantity. Fluctuations in the purity of the raw materials require constant readjustment in these methods.

Most men's jobs met the above description and received job ratings of *seven*, one for proximity, two for major decisions, one for lack of pace, one for lack of quota, and two for technique.

One man received only a *one* for major decisions and thus a *six* job rating. His position is unique in that he is the assistant to the supervisor of the power plant. He spends most of his time carrying out the orders of the supervisor.

Relief operators were given an extra point for proximity because they rotate among the various production units in the plant. They are acquainted with the sequence of chemical production from one unit to another, and thus are more aware of the total process of the plant. Their total job rating consequently amounted to *eight*.*

Table I portrays the numbers of men at each job rating and their distribution among the three companies.

Job Involvement. Unlike the conditions of the job, which can be measured simply by observation, the worker's subjective reactions to these conditions cannot be effectively determined without asking him to describe them.

The following are the questions we asked to elicit his thoughts:

1. Would you describe your job as being mostly monotonous or as having a lot of variety, or a little of both?
2. Do you find the job challenging enough to bring out your best abilities?
3. Can you do the job and keep your mind on other things most of the time? If not, would you like to be able to?
4. Apart from the salary itself, is there anything which gives you special satisfaction in your work?

*	Number of Subjects	
Job Ratings	6	1
	7	59
	8	5
		65 total

TABLE I

	Number of Subjects			
	automobile	machine	chemicals	totals
Job Ratings	0	25		25
	1	14		14
	2	14		14
	3	17	26	43
	4	2	19	21
	5		7	7
	6		12	13
	7		8	67
	8		5	5
Totals		72	72	65
				209

5. During the past few months can you think of anything which gave you special satisfaction in your work?
6. Do you feel that there's enough chance to be with, and talk with, other guys on the job?

The answers were rated according to the following scale, which ranges from 0 to 8:

1. *Variety*. 0 if monotonous; 1 if a little of both; 2 if variety.
2. *Challenge*. 0 if too simple; 1 if about right.
3. *Mind on other things*. 0 if can't think about other things but want to; 1 if can; 2 if can't think about other things but don't want to.
4. *Interest and special satisfaction*. A combination of questions 4 and 5. 0 if neither general interest nor special satisfaction; 1 if one or the other; 2 if both.
5. *Talk*. 0 if can't; 1 if there is a chance or he doesn't mind if there isn't.

The basis for most of these ratings is self-evident. To clarify a possible confusion with rating number 3, we felt that concentration

would reflect involvement in the job, as long as the worker was concentrating on a job which interested him. If he wasn't, we felt that forced concentration would create dissatisfaction.

We did not ask simply, "Are you satisfied with your job?" because we felt this would not draw out their true feelings. George Friedman provides an explanation:

There are in fact different mental levels at which dissatisfaction remains unexpressed. First, in our competitive and conforming societies, where people apparently happy and contented are often considered "well-adapted and successful", while anyone expressing dislike in his job is regarded as a failure, many of those who feel dissatisfied hesitate to admit it to themselves, much less to others.⁸

By focusing on specific reactions to the job, we have attempted to measure their deeper feelings about the job, hopefully avoiding as much as possible the culturally acceptable response. We wished, moreover, to reveal feelings about the job which cannot well be subsumed under the rubric of "satisfaction." One can imagine that variety in a job could make it demanding in a way that might be experienced simultaneously as invigorating and frustrating. Or, a man with a challenging job could develop a higher level of aspiration and be less satisfied in relation to his level of aspiration than a man with a less challenging job and lower level of aspiration. Thus, while on some imaginary "objective" scale of satisfaction the first man would score higher, he would report himself as less satisfied than would the second man. Satisfaction, insofar as it is a stable phenomenon at all, seems more a characteristic of deadness than of liveliness. In the case of a lively, playful person, we would expect his satisfaction level to change constantly as he learns anew, checks his performance, adjusts his goals, and increases his level of aspiration.

Why do we measure these men's degree of involvement in the job? Our fundamental hypothesis has been that "when play is encouraged on the job, the job-holder becomes more committed to his job, more energetic in his leisure, and a more effective contributor to the society in his political activity and ideology." How-

ever, we cannot be certain that a job-holder's commitment to his job will be directly proportional to the amount of play which it encourages. Perhaps his level of aspiration is influenced by previous experiences and in turn influences his level of commitment. Should discrepancies between job rating and job involvement occur, it is not clear whether the job itself or his reactions to it will be the more potent determinant of his leisure and politics. In the chapter on methods of inquiry, we will discuss in further detail the variables, such as age and education, which might cause these discrepancies. For the moment we can say simply that such variables no doubt condition men to aspire to a given level of playful expression in their jobs, and that when the background variables differ, it is logical to suppose that their expectations may differ. Thus, two men who have quite different levels of aspiration may react in different ways to the same job. In such instances a measure of job involvement may be better correlated with their leisure than a measure of job rating.

In a general sense, our measure of job involvement, if accurate, may provide a control for all of the background factors which influence a job-holder's reaction to the degree of playfulness in his job.

In the next chapter we shall turn to our ways of measuring men's leisure and politics.

NOTES

1. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review* (1959), pp. 783-791.
2. Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom: The Manual Worker in Industry*, p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
8. Georges Friedman, *The Anatomy of Work*, p. 111.

Play in Free Time and Politics

In this chapter we wish to describe the dimensions we used to measure the degree of playfulness in men's 'free time' and in their political behavior and outlook.

A measurement of leisureliness cannot be made in a directly observable and quantifiable manner, for there is no one kind of behavior which necessarily expresses leisureliness. For different people the same piece of behavior can serve varied and even multiple functions. Thus, a trip to the supermarket can be a laborious necessity, a recreation from housework and a chance to gossip with friends, or an opportunity for inward play, exploring one's habits, visceral reactions, and bodily movements.

Not only is leisureliness not reducible to particular sorts of behavior; it is also not reducible, as our earlier definition of leisure implied, to particular amounts of time. In leisure we address our eternal, optional task—that of accounting for our lives, that of asking how the many small times of our lives are related to form one lifetime and how that lifetime is in turn related to its source. Such a process of accounting and questioning is not a reflective process, but rather an active, immediate experiential consciousness of relationship. Small time, lifetime, and eternity occur at once. Playful exploration is possible only now. "Man comes to himself only when the transcendence is conquered—when eternity has become present in the here and now."¹

Is there a way of measuring leisure, other than in terms of specific activities or chunks of time? We believe that there are three qualities of play which can be used to measure how leisurely a person's free time is. One of these qualities is the exploratory

nature of play—learning—the extending of the limits of one's consciousness. The second quality of play is the amount of energy it releases relative to labor and recreation. Play releases more energy than labor because none of the energy is consumed by friction between striving for rewards *outside* one's activity and one's drive toward self-expression *within* one's activity. Play also releases more energy than does recreation because the aim of recreation is to conserve energy by merely eliminating labor's striving for external reward.

The third measurable quality of play derives from its result. Play extends one's understanding of oneself in relation to the rest of the world. One works and acts in relation to the rest of the world. The self is sustained and grows through its relationships. Hence, it focuses upon these relationships and seeks to maintain them. It *commits* itself to them.*

According to our theory, then, a person who uses his time to explore, learn and extend himself, who manifests great energy, and who can commit himself to central concerns and persons is more leisurely than a person who uses his free time for recreation, who has no special interests or deep relationships, who does not have the energy to do anything.

Leisure Involvement. Our next task is to derive a way of measuring a person's leisure along the dimensions we have just mentioned. How can we measure a man's desire to learn, or the extent of his energy, or his commitment to his relationships? Rather than asking questions about these three areas specifically, we attempted to gain a perspective on all a man's free time activities by a variety of straightforward questions and then judge the quality of his leisure afterwards. We made these judgments by rating each man's answers according to several categories, representing aspects of exploration, energy, and commitment. In this way the respondent was not asked to evaluate his own activities according to criteria which might be foreign and/or threatening to him. Had

* That commitment is endemic to relationship is obvious from the definition of its Latin derivative *committere*: to connect.

we asked the respondents to evaluate their activities in terms of our theory, we might have missed much relevant data, and the men would have been likely to have interpreted our questions in various ways. The result would have been incomplete, discrepant, and unreliable data.

The questions we asked in relation to men's leisure were:

1. Do you like T.V.? How much do you watch? What sort of programs do you like best?
2. How much reading do you do? What sorts of things do you read?
3. Do you belong to any organizations? Which ones?
4. Do you do anything else for entertainment?
5. Do you do anything special in your free time?
6. What do you like to do best in your free time?
7. Would you want more free time if you could have it?
8. How do you feel about retirement?
9. Is there much community spirit around where you live?
10. Are you yourself interested in the community?
11. How much influence would you say you had in the community?

We also asked the men questions about their political activities and beliefs, but they are reported below and are gathered under the umbrella of a rating of political activity. However, since political activity is itself an aspect of leisure, we added a composite rating of political activity to five other ratings to determine a numerical score for a man's leisure involvement.

On the basis of the eleven questions on leisure we rated five different dimensions. Learning and exploration is central to two of the ratings. One rating concerns whether a man is *discriminating about watching TV*. Our view is that TV can be an educational medium if a person is proactive in relation to it—if he knows what and why he watches, rather than simply sitting in front of the screen for hours at a time. If a person watched TV a great deal (one and a half hours or more a night) and indiscriminately (without choosing the programs or having some sense of what he

was watching for), he was rated 0. If he watched either relatively little or relatively discriminately, he received a 1. If he watched both relatively little and discriminately, he received a 2.

The second rating with an emphasis on exploration also touches on extent of energy and degree of commitment. This rating concerns the *expansion and improvement of oneself or one's community*. Culling primarily from answers to questions 2, 3, and 10, we would assign a rating of 0 when we could find no evidence of such activity, 1 when such activity was either self or community directed, and 2 when it was directed towards both self and community.

To measure the extent of a man's energy available for outward expression, we devised a rating of *amount of activity*, in addition to the composite rating of political activity. Mainly from answers to questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 we would gain a view of a man as having either a very low activity level, an average level, or an intense level of activity. By permitting 'average' to cover a broad range and rating extremely low levels of activity 0, average levels 1, and extremely high levels 2, we found it very easy to rate this dimension reliably. Since we would tend to explore beyond the formal interview questions, we found that some men would become repetitive but without enthusiasm about one or two activities, whereas at the other extremes some men would seem to have a treasure chest of interests, concerns, activities, associations, projects.

A distinct rating, more directly measuring a man's commitment to his activity, was developed to ascertain the *presence of a dominant interest* in a person. We reasoned that a person's activity can lead to learning and usefulness only as it has some focus, enduring purpose, and unity—only as it is informed by a sense of commitment. If we gained no sense of focus in a man's free time activities, whether they were many or few, we rated him 0. If he could specify something he liked to do best in his free time, but this activity was not mentioned in relation to any other questions, or was infrequent and disconnected from other aspects of his life, we rated him 1. If his favorite free time activity seemed to influence and inform his leisure as a whole, he received a 2.

Finally, we rated questions 7 and 8—what a man might do with

more free time and retirement—according to whether a man’s view of what he would do under such circumstances was altogether out of accord with the level and quality of his present activity (0), or whether it was derivable from present interests and activities (1). Our reasoning was that to project expressed energy, commitment, and exploration into the future rather than into the present moment was the antithesis of the man of leisure—the man who recognizes eternity in the present moment. This rating then, refers to all three aspects of play.

We summed the six ratings to obtain a total leisure involvement score for each man. The scores could range from 0 to 11 and in fact did so in our study, as the following table indicates:

TABLE I. Distribution of Leisure Involvement Scores

Leisure Involvement Score	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Number of Respondents	1	5	14	27	46	33	24	21	21	8	8	2

Political Activity. Since our attempt to measure a person’s leisureliness is itself new, there is no past evidence from which to build hypotheses about the relation of leisure involvement to political activity. (On the other hand, the relation between occupational status and political activity *has* been studied, showing correlated increases.² Consequently, we predict that political activity will rise as job rating rises in our study.)

Our theory that high leisure involvement generates concern for the common good does not necessarily imply a correlation between high leisure involvement and high political activity. For, concern for a factional good could also lead to high political activity. But a concern for the common good would seem to indicate some political participation, at least in terms of political discussion aimed at understanding political problems and in terms of ensuring that all citizens be able to express their common concerns through the procedures of the political system.³ We may be able to discern these attitudes in our analysis of political beliefs of the men we interviewed.

But a playful person may not be as politically active as an unplayful person. The latter may fulfill unconscious needs by projecting his personal problems, which he does not understand, into the political arena;⁴ or he may become very active in order to derive some substantive, factional good from the government. Lane phrases the general problem of analysis as follows: "Any one political movement will be attractive to persons whose needs differ from each other, and any one person participates in politics in order to gratify a variety of personal needs."⁵

Another way of viewing this problem is in terms of a person's sense of political efficacy or political alienation. A person is said to have a sense of political efficacy when he believes that his participation in politics affects the course of events.⁶ By contrast, a person is said to be politically alienated if he tends to "think of the government and politics of the nation as run *by* others *for* others according to an unfair set of rules."⁷ The politically alienated person regards himself as powerless, and his powerlessness (as well as the powerful) as in some sense illegitimate. As in the case of amount of political activity, there is no *a priori* reason to believe that a person concerned for the common good is any more likely to feel politically efficacious than a person concerned for the factional good. This is so because a political system may be devised which deprives the leisurely man of political power. In such a case, he who is concerned for the common good is likely to feel politically alienated.

So, we find that neither high political activity nor a sense of political efficacy will necessarily be correlated with a concern for the common good—neither will necessarily indicate playfulness and high leisure involvement. We are, however, able to generate a more complex hypothesis relating leisure involvement to political activity and efficacy as follows. Since neither the political activity nor the political efficacy ratings refer to revolutionary activity or influence but rather to activity and influence within the current political system (as our questions reproduced below will show), a person with a low sense of political efficacy but a high level of political activity must *not* be acting from a playful concern for the common good. Since such a person does not feel his political

activity is efficacious in terms of having a political influence on others, he must be politically active from motives other than the enhanced welfare of the public. Or, to put this another way, he would not be active within a political framework which diminished his sense of political efficacy if he were concerned for the common good. The limitation of this specific, complex hypothesis is that it will be testable only for a small portion of our sample, i.e. for those men with a *low sense* of political activity and a *high level* of political activity.

The principle reason why it seems to be so difficult to establish a simple and direct relationship between a person's leisure involvement and his politics is that the political system, at least at the level of the national state, is several steps removed from the vast majority of citizens. Its decisions are not directly influenced by the vote or discussion of the citizen. The citizen can merely vote for or write to the officials who make the decisions. As a result of this distance between the citizen and governmental decision, a person does not have to be so directly responsible for his political activity as he does for much of the rest of his activity. In the short run, particularly if a country is politically stable, he need not feel the consequences of his political activity. Even on the local level, he can vote against a school bond issue, perhaps only to cover over an anxiety about his own intelligence with which he has not come to terms, without immediately (or perhaps ever) being confronted with the consequences that the defeat of the bond issues have for the schools in his community. Hence, a person need not learn anything in order to be able to continue voting and discussing politics. He need not explore, extend his consciousness, play. He may, without short-run penalty, externalize his own problems in his opinions without much reference to external facts. This kind of irresponsibility is possible in very few areas of a person's life besides politics because in most interpersonal, group, and organizational activities there are immediate personal penalties for failure to contribute effectively to common solutions (which is not to say that all irresponsibility is averted by such penalties, for persons can blind themselves to the penalties).

This chain of reasoning leads us to several indirect ways of re-

lating leisure involvement to political activity. We would expect that only a person of relatively high leisure involvement would actually involve himself in ongoing activities of a semi-political nature in his own community and that such close-to-home manifestations of social and civic concern would in turn point to political activity derived from a concern for the common good. Thus, we would hypothesize that a person's participation in non-work organizations and his feelings of influence in his own community would be related to high leisure involvement and to high political activity.

Another indirect relationship between leisure involvement and political activity concerned for the common good can be hypothesized to exist through a high sense of political efficacy. This relationship connects a high sense of political efficacy to high leisure involvement and to high political activity.⁸ The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that the U.S. is in fact a democracy. If this were not true, we would not expect a sense of political efficacy to occur among persons of high leisure involvement. (Of course, it may be that persons of even higher leisure involvement than those included in our sample would *not* show high sense of political efficacy. Thus, the limitations of our sample prevent us from concluding that the U.S. is in fact a democracy, even if the hypothesized relationship among leisure involvement, sense of political efficacy, and political activity is borne out by the data.)

Of course, none of the above hypotheses linking leisure involvement to political activity through intermediate variables can prove that the kind of political activity associated with the intermediate variables is in fact political activity in the service of the common good. However, if we find that leisure involvement and political activity are not directly correlated to one another, but are correlated indirectly through the mediating variables, we can infer that the different combinations yielding such results have been generated by the factors we identify in our theory.

Finally, the consideration of mediating variables affecting the political attitudes and activities of men in relation to the national state leads us to still another hypothesis, slightly to one side of our main inquiry. This hypothesis states that a person's political alienation from the national government will derive, at least in part,

from his experience of his local political culture, rather than being a direct derivative of personal alienation, i.e., low leisure involvement.

We will not argue that the extent of political alienation among citizens is *solely* dependent upon the quality of political culture at the local level, but our very inclusion of any consideration of politics in determining political alienation sets ours apart from most other studies of alienation. On the one hand, a philosophical tradition including Hegel and Fromm has tended to regard political alienation as a symptom of personal alienation. On the other hand, Marx regarded political alienation as a symptom of economic organization, and recent large scale empirical studies, using easily qualifiable dimensions such as income or educational level, have tended to regard political alienation as occurring among "socially and economically deprived segments" rather than among "the better educated citizens who are less removed from, and consequently more restrained by, political convention."⁹ And still another non-political source of political alienation has been diagnosed by Lane in his intensive interviews of 15 men.¹⁰ This source might be characterized as a lack of interpersonal support within one's immediate milieu. Lane terms it "homelessness"—a lack of intimate companionship, a failure of community to provide warmth and a sense of rightful place, no sense of fulfillment of purpose within one's work, and confusion about one's social role.

The extent to which any of these factors is responsible for a given person's political alienation probably depends upon still other aspects of his cosmic time and place which have yet to be specified. Our interest in the variable "local political culture" will merely contribute one more factor to the pot, if borne out by our data.

What we mean by "local political culture" is itself not well defined, nor even defined prior to our interviews, but derives rather from our encounter with Chicago, where we interviewed the chemical workers. Its political culture, as reflected in the newspapers and in conversations with both businessmen and laborers, is widely acknowledged to be corrupt. That is, to our casual, un-systematic observation, there was a very high level of concern in

Chicago and its environs that the local government was not serving the needs of the people. (The reader is reminded that these observations date from the summer of 1964.) The question we asked ourselves then and can now test is, does this feeling about the local government express itself in terms of alienation from politics at the national level, irrespective of job level, educational level, or level of leisure involvement? Our hypothesis is that we will find the level of political alienation higher in Chicago than in Columbus and Detroit, irrespective of all other measured factors.

Our Questions on Politics. The actual questions we asked concerning politics attempted to cover the three areas of political activity, political information, and political ideology. Our questions were modeled on Lane's far more detailed interview schedule, generally touching upon topics to which he would devote a whole series of questions with but one question. Our scoring procedures for political activity, political efficacy, and political alienation will be described following the questions themselves. The amount of personal influence a man felt in his community and the number of organizations he belonged to were determined from the leisure involvement questions.

To gauge men's level of political activity we asked:

1. Do you talk politics? How much? With people who disagree?
2. How often do you read the editorial page?
3. Do you vote? In all elections?
4. Have you engaged in any party activities? During elections, between elections?

We asked the following questions about specific political information:

5. You remember that quite a few men were being mentioned last spring (this was 1964) as possible Republican candidates for the Presidency. Can you remember who some of them were?
6. Do you happen to know how long the term in D.C. is for a Senator? A Congressman?

7. Do you know the names of the two Senators from your state?
8. Do you know the name of the President of France? The Prime Minister of England?

The reader will note that most of these questions concern political personalities. We felt that such questions would be the easiest to answer quickly and that personalities are generally more familiar to people than issues and procedures. Because we were interested in finding a large range of differentiation in a short time, we did not wish to include questions that virtually none of our respondents would be able to answer. This particular measure would, of course, have been inadequate for measuring differential amounts of political information at more sophisticated levels.

Finally, we asked some more open-ended and discursive questions dealing with respondents' political ideologies:

1. What is your understanding of the word *democracy*? Do you think the U.S. is a democracy?
2. Are there any groups in the country which you think have too much power?
3. When you think of government, what do you think of?
4. What sorts of things do you think the government ought to do? Some people think it does too much nowadays, while other people think it ought to do more: how do you feel about that?
5. Who would you say runs the government?
6. What do you think a perfect society would be like—one you would like to live in?

Our scoring procedure for political activity was straightforward. The respondents' answer to each of the four questions was rated 0, 1, or 2 depending upon whether it was essentially "No, not at all," "Some," or "Yes, a great deal" (of course, the actual answers were often more discursive). In addition, a rating of 0, 1, or 2 was determined for political information and added to the ratings of political activity to determine the total political activity score. Of thirteen possible correct answers on political information, 0-4 cor-

rect was converted to 0, 5-9 correct was converted to 1, and 10-13 correct was converted to 2.

The political activity rating could range from zero to ten, and in fact did so in our study, varying as indicated by the following table:

TABLE II. Distribution of Political Activity Scores

Political Activity Scores	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Number of Respondents	2	5	12	34	33	34	38	30	13	5	3

We mentioned above that a composite political activity score was determined and added into the leisure involvement score. For this purpose the 0-10 political activity scale was reduced to a 0-2 range by translating 0-2 scores to 0, 3-6 scores to 1, and 7-10 scores to 2.

The political efficacy scale ranged from zero to four, one point for a positive response in relation to the following four areas: (1) willingness to discuss politics with those who disagree with one; (2) a feeling of influence in community affairs; (3) a belief that the government is responsive to the people (as culled from answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 on political ideology); (4) a belief that the government is actually run by the people (as culled from the answer to question 5 on political ideology).

The scale of political alienation ranges from zero to three on the basis of respondents' answers to questions in the political ideology section. Political alienation, we have noted, is the tendency to think of the government and politics of the nation as run *by* others *for* others according to an unfair set of rules. If a person believes (1) that the U.S. is *not* a democracy (not just that it falls short or could be improved), it seems likely that he is implying that the "rules of the game" are not being followed. If a person thinks of illegitimate groups when he thinks (2) of government or (3) of who runs the government, he is saying that the country is run by others for others. Each of these three beliefs is given a score of one in our scale of political alienation.

NOTES

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1962), p. 110.
2. V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 196.
3. R. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 111.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 115 ff.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
6. Key, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
7. Lane, *Political Ideology*, p. 177.
8. The connection between a high sense of political efficacy and high political activity has been found before in the U.S. by Key, *op. cit.*, p. 193, and Lane, *Political Life*, p. 149.
9. Thompson and Horton, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, p. 488.
10. Lane, *Political Ideology*, pp. 177-186.

Methods of Inquiry and Interpretation

The two previous chapters have delineated the two basic methods of inquiry we used in our study—behavioral observation and the open-ended interview. Job ratings were determined by observation and the rest of the information was obtained in interviews. Interviews were considered preferable to questionnaires for several reasons. The first stems from the nature of the subject matter. The specific details of the information sought—whether opinions on politics or the extent of a person's dominant interest—had to be supplied by the respondents themselves. Questionnaires would therefore have required much written description from each subject. According to Nathan and Eleanor Maccoby, "Presumably it is more difficult for many people to write out their thoughts than to speak them, and the more writing required for adequate expression, the more superior the spoken interview should be; especially for respondents with little education."¹

Secondly, as the Maccobys also state, an interviewer has an advantage in that he "can answer the respondent's questions about the purpose and sponsorship of the study, thus presumably improving rapport."² At the start of each interview we clearly stated that we were students from Yale doing a study for a senior thesis, and that the study was sponsored by Yale. The explanation that we wished to ask "some questions about your reactions to the job" and "some questions about your free time" was generally sufficient. We emphasized that the respondent's name was never taken. In sum, we made it clear that we were not "in a position to control sanctions affecting the respondent."³ Probably more important than any formal declarations, however, was our youthfulness and

our status as students, on the one hand, and our attitude of having some important questions which they could help us to answer, rather than of subjecting them to some professional and undivulgable judgment. These qualities dissolved any initial suspicions and generated open exchange.

Interviewing also gave us more flexibility. The questions could be rephrased when necessary so that they became completely intelligible to each subject. We found, contrary to our initial fear, that the men seemed to appreciate our taking notes while they talked. It seemed to convince them that we were taking them seriously. We would maintain eye contact as much as possible and did not ask them to slow down for our sake. Instead we would leave a phrase unfinished and fill it in after the interview.

The two of us conducted separate interviews; the interviews all occurred during working hours in the plant. The questions were as nondirective as possible, so that the length of the interview, while generally three-quarters of an hour, depended upon the subject's desire to talk. Notes were taken during and immediately after the interviews. With a few exceptions, the vast majority of the subjects was extremely cooperative and seemed to enjoy the interview, perhaps initially because it meant a change from the routine or, as others have suggested, because "people will talk to an interviewer who is a complete stranger more freely than they would to a personal friend or a fellow-worker."⁴

But there was something else—probably the most important benefit of the interview—the private encounter between one of us and one of our subjects which generated a mutual desire for communication. We as interviewers felt rather strongly the emotional impact of these encounters. Very often we loved, sometimes we felt sympathetic, sometimes we hated the men and lives we encountered; and the few times when we could feel none of these we felt empty. To emphasize the importance of our personal involvement as a vehicle for communication in these interviews, we recall one occasion, the only one, in which we were interviewing in the same room. We were at opposite ends of the room, and the noise of the factory had given each interview a measure of privacy. Until the noise stopped. Then each of us heard the other asking

the same questions. An uneasy smile appeared on the face of one respondent; the spirit had changed—he had become one of an assembly-line of subjects in a scientific study—and the interview moved in a forced and mechanical way to its end.

It would be important and accurate to say that our involvement was balanced by a necessary restraint, determined by the limited and specific purposes and time-span of our encounters. But what we are emphasizing here is that it was precisely through the subjective involvement of the encounter that the objective information was elicited.

To say it again in different words, our subjects had to trust that we wanted to know about them as individuals, and that we wanted to know just because we were interested. To give an example, there was in the interview, as we have detailed in Chapter 9, a sequence of questions which tested the level of respondents' political information, rather than sought their opinions. It took extreme care on our parts, which often meant treating these questions humorously, to prevent them from destroying the trust which had been established in the first part of the interview. In the other questions we were speaking to the respondents as interested friends, equal participants in an exchange of thoughts and emotions, but in these questions we sounded like smart college kids judging them in their ignorance.

We emphasize these points because it is the position of many field and laboratory researchers that the scientist must remain emotionally neutral and must not disclose information about his study if he is to collect valid data. Otherwise, it is argued, the subjects' responses will be influenced by the scientist's feelings or by what is expected of them. To us, on the contrary, subjects of studies appear to be as likely to be influenced by emotional neutrality as by emotional investment on the part of the investigator. Still more strongly, emotional neutrality denies relationship, breeds distrust in the subject, and this distrust may introduce distortions into the information he gives the researcher. By contrast, emotional investment in a common exploration on the part of the researcher encourages the subject to make a genuine, trusting commitment to the enterprise at hand.

As to disclosing information about the nature of the study, it is clear that subjects of studies try to guess the studies' objectives anyway, and sometimes structure their answers according to such guesses (whether to confirm or confuse the presumed objectives). Thus, lack of trusted information about the objectives of a study simply breeds arbitrary answers which may disconfirm tenable hypotheses. For example, we were told at one point during the interviews that one man was convinced the entire interview was a cover-up for a test of political intelligence (once again, interestingly enough, the reference was to the political information questions). He was spreading this point of view around the plant. The reaction to this rumor was resentment of us and unwillingness to answer our questions freely. We were able to counteract the effects of this rumor, however, by speaking specifically with the two men who mentioned it to us about why we had come to this study—what we were trying to learn and why it seemed important to us. These two and the others for whom the interview had been a positive experience detoxified the atmosphere at this plant by communicating their feelings about and understanding of our study. Moreover, our explanation of the basic purposes behind our study could be made without reference to our theory of play and our hypothesis that when play is encouraged on the job, one will be more playful in his free time. In several instances our thinking about the theoretical aspects of the study was sharpened by such exchanges, and always we gained insight into the kinds of connections these men made between different parts of their lives, the quality of which we have attempted to convey in our final chapter.

Interpreting the Data—the Validity of the Relationship Between Job Rating and Leisure Involvement. If we are to relate our job rating measure to leisure involvement in this study, we must first show that it is not some other difference in men's jobs, which happens to be associated with differences in our job rating, that accounts for differences in leisure involvement. For example, someone might maintain: "A higher job rating is probably associated with higher income. It is not the higher job rating but the

higher income that accounts for higher leisure involvement, for the more prosperous men can afford to buy the diverse materials necessary for varied activities." We can counter this particular hypothesis quite easily because all the workers we interviewed received almost identical incomes. The skilled machinists received \$3 per hour at the time of our study; the assembly line workers at the automobile plants received between \$2.90 and \$3.10 an hour, with some added variance in income due to occasional layoffs and occasional overtime work; the chemicals operators received \$3.40 per hour.

However, other possible differences among the companies must be accounted for too. The reader will recall that, in general, job ratings varied by company, the lowest being associated with the assembly line, medium ratings with the machine tool company, and high job ratings with the chemicals company. Even if we show that a higher job rating leads to higher leisure involvement, how can we be sure that the differences in leisure involvement are not due to other inter-company differences?

For example, one difference among the companies was what shift men worked. All the men we interviewed worked a day shift, except for the chemicals operators who rotated shifts every ten days. We included the chemicals workers because shift rotation is a normal characteristic in automated plants where 24-hour operation is economically necessary due to the high cost of starting and stopping the automatic process. We wished to know whether such automated work and strange shift schedule affected men's leisure involvement in a different way than we predicted from our job rating. The ten-day shifts from day to evening to graveyard hours, with three days off in between, meant that these men were at leisure (and sleeping) at highly irregular times. It could be argued (as several men we interviewed did) that such an irregular schedule would lower leisure involvement despite the relatively high job rating by sapping energy and preventing participation in regular activities, whether recreational, educational, or political. Or, it might be argued, the nature of automated work, even when it involves decisions by a man, is inherently anti-playful because the man's creativity leads to no product. His work and decisions

only repair an automated process which, once repaired, again robs him of creative work and contact with the results of such work. To work in such a perverse climate, it might be maintained, would render a man less playful in his leisure than, say, an automobile repairman who, despite his lower job rating, enhanced his product directly through his work.

There were other differences among jobs which differentiated all three companies from one another. The most obvious was their location in different cities. Another was the varying positions and powers of the unions in each company. In the automobile company, the presence of the UAW was constantly felt: personnel managers consulted with union officials about our entry into the plants, and union stewards cornered us to discover what, why, and for whom we were asking questions. The union at the chemicals plant was also reputed to be powerful, but it was less obvious. Toward the end of one of our longer philosophical digressions into the relation between job quality and leisure involvement with one exploratory respondent, we learned that he was the union chief of the local. His deep concern for the workingman's future had communicated itself unobtrusively and persuasively and seemed to us during our short visit to symbolize that union's relation to its members. The machine tool company provided still another contrast, having been unionized only a year. There union membership was by no means universal, and direct bonds to the foreman, supervisors, and company as a whole seemed stronger than union bonds.

The hiring procedures of these companies also differed. The automobile company would hire hundreds of workers at a time, almost indiscriminately. On the other extreme, the chemicals company would hire only one or two men at a time, after a mechanical aptitude test and two personal interviews. The machine tool company's procedures lay somewhere in between.

For whatever reasons, differences in men's leisure involvement might be attributable to these differences among the companies rather than to different job ratings. However, there is considerable overlap of job ratings between companies: both the automobile and machine companies have numerous jobs rated 4, and both the chemicals and the machine companies have jobs rated 7. If we can

TABLE I. Cross-Company Comparisons of Leisure Involvement, Holding Job Rating Constant

	Company	Number	Average Leisure Inv.
Job Rating 4:	Machine Tool	26	4.6
	Automobile	17	4.6
Job Rating 7:	Machine Tool	8	5.6
	Chemicals	59	5.8

show that the relationship between a particular job rating and leisure involvement is constant across each pair of companies, while the different job ratings simultaneously differentiate men's leisure involvement, we will have shown that all the other variables mentioned above are either unimportant for explaining leisure involvement, or at least cancel each other out in this study. Otherwise, we would expect them to cause differences in leisure involvement across companies despite similar job ratings.

Table I shows that these unmeasured differences among the companies do *not* influence the relationship between job rating and leisure involvement. This finding does not permit us to conclude that our principal hypothesis is correct—that higher job ratings are correlated with greater leisure involvement—for but half of our sample is here represented. This finding *does* permit us to exclude other cross-company differences as explanatory variables.

The Influence of Mediating Variables. In addition to observing our subjects' jobs and then exploring their reaction to their jobs, their leisure, and their political situations, we sought to understand these reactions against a background of the subjects' previous experiences. It was necessary to do so in order to recognize other factors which might cause, mediate between, or confuse the primary relationships we sought to study. Gender, race, age, educational experience, respondents' previous job experience, and their fathers' previous job experience were background variables which were practical to control for and which seemed likely to affect the relationships between their jobs, their leisure, and their politics.

Gender was controlled for by excluding all women from our sample. In other cases, the necessary information was recorded at the time and controlled for in the analysis of the data. Had we decided to explore our subjects in depth, in interviews lasting many hours, we would also have considered their childhood experiences and in each subject would have begun, perhaps, to understand something of his individual psychology. But our approach, as we have already suggested, has been to interview more men in less depth, hoping that our resulting impressions will be more persuasive and have more general validity.

Granting that we could only scratch the surface of our respondents' backgrounds (or is there an ineradicable contradiction between surface and background!), how did we choose where to scratch? Our experience suggested that a subject's age is one important variable to control. From pilot interviews conducted in New Haven during the spring before we journeyed to interview the machinists, auto workers, and chemical workers, we felt that workers tended to become less involved in the community as they approached retirement. Robert Lane supported our impression:

. . . the less prosperous have few group memberships as they grow older. Perhaps something like this is at work in feelings of citizen duty; apparently as people grow older there is a slight tendency to move from a moderate sense of civic duty toward either a feeling of greater duty or a feeling of almost no duty at all. For the successful and the unsuccessful, aging may have substantially different aspects.⁵

Judging from this evidence we should look for a drop in leisure involvement and political activity among older blue collar workers. Turning to our data, we find in Table II that this prediction is not borne out. Instead, we find no significant relationship between age and either job or leisure involvement and—directly contrary to the prediction—a strong, significant correlation between increasing age and increasing political activity.* Within the scope of our study

* Neither the correlation of age with job involvement or with leisure involvement is significant. However, the correlation between age and political activity is high (.97) and significant beyond the .01 level (F 5.93).

TABLE II. Age Correlated with Job Investment, Leisure Involvement, and Political Activity

Age Group	Number	Avg. Job Inv.	Avg. Leisure Inv.	Avg. Pol. Act.
Under 30	24	4.9	5.5	3.9
30-34	26	4.3	4.8	4.2
35-39	31	5.1	5.4	4.7
40-44	41	4.4	5.4	5.2
45-49	26	4.9	5.3	5.6
50-54	31	4.7	5.2	5.4
55-65	30	5.4	5.1	5.7

and our sample, it is difficult to interpret the latter finding. Since the older men in our study have held their jobs for many years, it may be that their attitudes and bank accounts, if not their yearly income, qualify them for Lane's "successful," "more prosperous" group. Or it may be that there are sectional differences in the relationship between age and political activity which make our sample biased for this comparison. Or, again, it may be that our measuring instruments and method are sufficiently different from door-to-door surveys or questionnaires to account for the different results.

In any event, we can observe that superficially our findings relating age to political activity diverge from expectations based on past studies. In terms of the relationship between our two major dependent variables—leisure involvement and political activity—it seems unlikely that age plays a determining role, since it is not systematically related to leisure involvement. Only if we should discover a significant *inverse* correlation between leisure involvement and political activity—contrary to our expectation—might age become an explanatory mediating variable.

Checking our data for other possible mediating variables, we found that race had no consistent effect on our dependent variables. Although the twenty Negroes we interviewed predictably tended to have slightly lower job ratings and levels of education than the rest of our sample, for a given job rating or level of education their average job involvement, leisure involvement, and political activity ratings were neither consistently higher nor consistently lower than the average for the rest of the sample.

A further conceivable mediating variable, deriving from a person's background, is job mobility. We asked respondents about their previous job experience and their father's job experience and then compared these jobs to the respondent's present job in terms of our job rating scale. Since our information about the other jobs was second-hand, we rated only extreme differences as differences. We reasoned that a person whose present job was considerably lower on the job rating scale than his previous job or his father's job or both could be considered downwardly mobile, whereas a person whose present job was an improvement could be considered upwardly mobile.

A person's job mobility would be likely to be one of the factors influencing his expectations of, level of aspiration for, and involvement in the job. A present job worse than previous experience would seem to imply a low level of job aspiration, expectations based on previous experience unmet, and, consequently, low job involvement. On the other hand, a present job better than previous experience would seem to imply a relatively high level of aspiration, expectations based on previous experience surpassed, and, consequently, high job involvement. As in the case of our job involvement rating, we would expect a person's mobility to interact with his job rating in influencing his leisure involvement, rather than being directly correlated with it. In fact, since we devised the job involvement rating in the hope of tapping the effects of respondents' previous experience, a high correlation between upward mobility and increasing job involvement will serve to validate the job involvement measure. The relation between job mobility and political activity should be the least direct and the least clear of the three. Table III bears out these hypotheses quite precisely.* As we proceed to the discussion of the central variables of the study, we shall return to a consideration of the effect on a person's leisure

* Job mobility is moderately (.58) but significantly (beyond .01) related to job rating, perfectly (1.0) and significantly (beyond .01) related to job involvement, moderately (.58) but significantly (beyond .01) related to leisure involvement, and not related to political action.

TABLE III. Job Mobility Associated with Job Rating, Job Involvement, Leisure Involvement, and Political Activity

Job Mobility	No.	Avg. J.R.	Avg. J.I.	Avg. L.I.	Avg. P.A.	
Down	Both previous better	15	2.8	4.3	4.5	4.7
	One of previous better	61	4.2	4.5	5.2	4.6
STABLE	117	4.4	4.9	5.3	5.3	
Upward	One of previous worse	11	5.4	5.0	6.3	5.5
	Both previous worse	5	5.2	6.4	5.2	3.6

involvement of his previous experience, as indicated by our associated measures of job involvement and job mobility.

The remaining background variable that we measured is level of education. In analyzing our data we have found that education has such complex mediating effects upon our leisure involvement and political activity ratings that we will examine its influence along with our central variables in later chapters.

The Overall Validity of our Findings. In addition to validating the relationships among our central variables by recognizing the influence or lack of influence of possible mediating variables, we must ask how valid are our findings for the broader population beyond our immediate sample. If the sample of men we interviewed is non-random, peculiar, and unrepresentative in various ways, then our conclusions may apply only to them and will not be of general concern. Our writing of this book indicates our estimate that this is not the case.

In the first place, very few of the men we contacted refused us an interview. Because of the degree of cooperation required of our respondents, we found in a pilot study in New Haven that calling persons at home and making appointments to visit them resulted in a high refusal rate (40%) which could have biased our sample. Consequently, we decided to approach companies about interviewing workers while on the job. (We had gained entry into the companies through high officers of each company who were friends of

one of our fathers.) This approach resulted in a very few refusals (below 2% of our sample), since the forty-five minutes or so required by our interview was a break from the job. Refusal rates are not regarded as biasing samples until they reach a level of 10 or 15%.⁸

In the second place, we must note that our sample was limited to the three companies and three cities in the Midwest described earlier in the chapter about the jobs. However, we covered eleven individual plants in these companies, and the men's homes ranged from farms to suburban houses to center-city apartments. We can think of no reason why region of the country should have a strong effect on our leisure involvement rating. Some regional differences have been found in relation to job satisfaction and political attitudes, but our ratings of job involvement and political activity measure constructs different from satisfaction and attitudes, so we cannot be sure how seriously this regional limitation of our sample limits the validity of our results.

Within the companies we chose men pretty much at random (subjectively, not scientifically), or else interviewed all present. More specifically, in the machine tool company we went to three different plants. In two of the plants we were simply introduced to the foreman, and were able to move freely about the plant. At first the foreman would introduce us to the worker we wished to interview, but after a while they became used to our presence and we simply introduced ourselves. As it happened, we interviewed almost everyone who worked the day shift in the main assembly plant and in one of the part-producing plants. In the third machine tool plant, we were given an office and men were sent to us every forty-five minutes. The personnel manager had prepared a list which he told us "contained a real cross-section of men from all units in the plant." After the interviewing we observed the specific jobs to determine our subjects' job ratings.

We went to a total of seven different plants in the automobile company. Here the assembly line's requirements affected the selection of men for our interviews, since it was sometimes difficult to find men who could be relieved from production long enough for an interview. For the relief breaks, when a man could go to the

john or get a drink of water, were uniform time periods, far shorter than our interviews required. At five of the seven plants the subjects were selected by the personnel directors or the supervisors and sent to offices where we interviewed them. We did not control the selection of these men, but we did emphasize that we wanted an unbiased sample. We could not detect any bias in the sample. However, the hierarchy of staff and line managers, plus company and union men, through which each communication ran leaves us least certain about how these respondents were selected. In the remaining two plants we interviewed men right on the line. We would be taken to a specific unit on the assembly line, introduced to the foreman, and then would interview men at random, while they continued to work.

In the chemicals plant we interviewed all of the men on one shift and about five on the next shift. We interviewed all the men right at their jobs, usually following an introduction from the foreman.

In sum, our sample seems to be limited in validity only by its representation of but one region of the country. However, we do not believe that this limitation is likely to be significant.

The Reliability of our Ratings. In the process of attempting to account for prior or mediating variables which could conceivably affect our study, we have already presented several tables with data from the study itself. Our arguments based on these tables are valid only if our ratings (for example, in the case of job mobility) are reliable rather than arbitrary and subjective. We checked and rechecked the reliability of our ratings in a two-step process.

Each of us rated the interviews he conducted. In our first check of reliability, we each re-rated ten of the other's interviews without looking at the first rating. Results showed that we agreed on 83% of all the ratings that required some degree of judgment. These included the two on mobility, all the job involvement and leisure involvement ratings, and all the political activity ratings except for political information. This check helped to clarify some of our rating criteria, and using these clarifications we revised all of the rating sheets, each correcting his own original ratings. In a second

reliability check, we re-rated ten of the other's interviews as before. We also explained our rating system to a third person and had him rate five of each of our interviews. The average rate of agreement among the three re-ratings and the original ratings was 88%. In other words, there was agreement on nine of every ten ratings, a high level of reliability.

The Interpretation of Statistical Results. There is one further methodological issue central to the interpretation of this study. Several times now we have referred to our job rating as an independent variable and to our leisure involvement and political activity scales as dependent variables, or have simply implied that a correlation between job rating and leisure involvement can be interpreted as showing that a given job rating *causes* a given level of leisure involvement. We state our central hypothesis in such terms: that when play is encouraged on the job, the job-holder becomes more committed to his job, more energetic in his leisure, and a more effective contributor to the society in his political activity and ideology.

But we do not study men whose jobs are changed to encourage more play. As a result, we do not see whether such men become more playful in their leisure and politics. Instead we interview men who have jobs which encourage varying degrees of play, in the hope of discovering a correlation between their level of play on the job and in their leisure and politics. Consequently, the methodology of this study strictly limits us to the conclusion, in the event of a significant correlation between job and leisure playfulness, that one's playful energy will tend to manifest itself to an equivalent degree throughout one's life activities—that one's play is the strand of unity which runs through one's life, whether or not one's thought recognizes and traces it.

If play tends to manifest itself equally throughout a man's life, then increased encouragement of play in any single area, such as his job, should lead to a general increase in play throughout his life-activities. This additional theoretical proposition bridges the gap between the methodology of our study and the hypothesis we claim to be testing. But it should be noted that this proposition

might equally be stated: increased encouragement of play in any single area should be resisted and dissipated by one's general level of play. In short, we cannot tell from this study how stable and how resistant to change is a person's level of play—if indeed we find such a general level. Or, to put it another way, our empirical study does not investigate the dynamic process by which a person is educated to play. This process remains a mystery and a gap between any conclusion we can draw and recommendations for practical changes in jobs.

We cannot be sure how big a task encouraging play on the job is. We know theoretically that such encouragement cannot occur through forced manipulation, for that is not a playful process. And this study may show that a change in one's level of play will have subtle (perhaps not self-conceptualized) effects on the texture of one's whole life. So, the task of encouraging play on the job may be qualitatively different from the tasks we are generally accustomed to. It may be an aspect of one's eternal, optional task, inaccessible so long as one can conceive of no more than daily, necessary tasks.

In any event, the reader is warned against immediate translation of our conclusions into practical recommendations for social change unless he has mastered the art and limits of playful action in his own life.

NOTES

1. Eleanor and Nathan Maccoby, "The Interview: A Tool of Social Science," *Handbook of Social Psychology* vol. I, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1954), p. 483.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
5. Lane, *Political Life*, p. 219.
6. Maccoby, *op. cit.*

IV

Interactions Among the Labor, Leisure, and Politics of 209 Men

Case Studies—Three Men's Leisure

Men are not statistics—not when they describe themselves. Some are bored with themselves and their worlds, true, but even they are somehow alive in a way that statistics about them are not. We will begin our description of our findings, therefore, by introducing the reader into the lives of three of the men we interviewed, although a three-quarter hour conversation can hardly yield more than a sketch of a man at best.

After these sketches and reflections, we will proceed in the next chapter to call upon various analytical tools—tables, models, statistics—to help us interpret what factors influence these men's lives and the lives of the other 206 men we interviewed.

Robert Morton*. Robert Morton began working on the automobile assembly line sixteen years ago. He is now 35, married, and has no children. He grew up in Detroit, graduated from high school and spent 22 months with the Navy in the Pacific. During that time he received further education in various fields. His father was a pullman conductor. Morton is a Negro.

* The names we shall use in our case studies will all be fictitious. When we insert quotes without names, we will note the number of the interview in parentheses at the end of the quote. Quotes are virtually direct. That is, we were able to get most of the words down as they were spoken. Usually, only articles, pronouns, or conjunctions are reconstructed. Number 1-72 are skilled machinists, 101-173 are on the automobile assembly lines, and 201-265 are operators in the automated chemicals plant. Robert Morton is #147.

Morton considers his job "at times challenging. Then again, I think it could be upgraded." He finds his job interesting because of the quality of the product—"I like the product we are producing. What we build is durable. We're getting good reports on what we're turning out from the customers."

In his free time Morton watches quite a bit of television. He likes it very much, especially sports and quiz programs and others such as Jack Benny, Ed Sullivan, Steve Allen and Jack Paar. His wife, he says, is a TV-friend who watches it every night. Morton lives in the city, "where there are so many clubs, you could go to something every night." He himself belongs to the neighborhood Block Club and to the church, which he attends twice a month. He reads novels, "nothing in particular," and *Popular Mechanics* magazine on electronics. His other forms of entertainment are a little bowling, occasional movies, and visiting relatives. Three times in the past five years he has taken trips during his vacation, going to Canada and Washington, D.C. His favorite free time activity is, he says, "mostly getting around with my brothers and nephews." He has made no plans for his retirement.

Morton was one of relatively few men who even mentioned other people—except in terms of competition against other family members for the TV—in discussing his free time. Even in his case though, as his phrasing suggests, his relationships are oriented towards filling time rather than towards challenge and growth. This suspicion was verified when we pursued what he did with his brothers: "We visit relatives—this and that—spend time together." There was no indication that Morton was reticent about his activities. On the contrary, he discussed them with verve. In this case, he was not more specific simply because the specifics were trivial. This pattern of low interpersonal contact and/or challenge fulfills Argyris' observation of workers' "impoverished interpersonal world. (See p. 15.)"

Asked whether there were any famous person whom he very much respected or admired, he began on a list which included, "JFK, Jackie Robinson, Martin Luther King, Willie Mays, John Wayne, Bobby Layne, Ted Williams, Norm van Brocklin, Gordie Howe, Edward G. Robinson, Glenn Ford, Sammy Davis . . ." The

interviewer interrupted him at this point to ask him why he chose these men: "No particular reason. I just like the things they do."

We include the above interchange because it typifies a bubbly spontaneity that we also found rare in the men we interviewed. Of course, our own seriousness may have discouraged humor or light digression on the part of the men we interviewed. On the other hand, the only references to humor we heard were complaints by some men about the tiresome repetitiveness of dirty jokes, which they found to be the staple of their on-the-job conversational diet. Morton, by contrast, kept up what can only be described, in the language of the baseball diamond, as a steady stream of chatter up and down the assembly line. His emphasis on camaradery is reminiscent of Blauner's discussion of the warm subculture of Southern textile assembly line workers, which seemed to increase their job satisfaction above the level predictable on the basis of the kinds of jobs they held (see references to Blauner, Chapter 8). Morton communicated a similar sense of positive satisfaction with his job and leisure life, despite a job rating of 0 and a leisure rating of 3.

This same sense of satisfaction and emphasis on personal relations is visible in his discussion of his community. Talking about the amount of influence he had in his community, Morton appeared satisfied: "As far as being quite influential, yes, and with the kids I try to tell them what they should do. My influence is about normal with grown-ups."

Jake Darnen*. Jake Darnen was raised on his father's farm in Ohio and went to school only through the eighth grade. Before coming to work for the machine tool company in Columbus, he was a construction worker. Darnen is now 53 years old, is married and has two grown children. He feels close to the company's finished product, since he assembles the machines. He considers it "the best job in the shop. I'm not tied to one spot. I'm building the machines completely. I like to build them from start to finish."

In the winter Darnen watches television two or three hours each

* Darnen is #16.

evening, concentrating on panel shows and news shows. He doesn't read, "not with my bad eyes. I see the local paper." After hearing this lament about bad eyes from a number of men, most of whom were not wearing glasses, we began to infer that, although serious reading is actually rare among these men, there is nevertheless some sense of guilt and defensiveness about not reading more—some unwillingness to recognize lack of reading as a voluntary choice. This kind of response may have been precipitated by the fact that we were self-announced college kids. But it also seemed to derive from a connection these men made between reading and self-education. Lack of reading seemed to imply to some of them a giving up on themselves in terms of further growth.

Darnen belongs to no organizations, takes no interest in the community, and feels that he has "hardly any" influence. His predominant free time activity is to "work around the house." "I do all the painting and electrical work—also work on cars: I keep up my own car." This is also what he likes to do best in his free time. In fact, he owns three houses, all of which he keeps up, renting two of them. He feels he has all the free time he needs. As to retirement, "I'm not ready for it; I won't be ready. I'd like to buy a couple more houses."

Although Darnen's work around his house(s) probably would not be called an official second job, it is certainly job-like work rather than a diverting hobby. In this he typified a number of the men we interviewed, who turned a work-hobby into the equivalent of a second job. What little time remains Darnen devotes to television, his only indication of recreational activity, and a non-activity at that. Given this avoidance of leisure, it is no wonder that he won't be ready for retirement, with its endowment of total free time. This pattern of job-like work during free time is reminiscent of Swado's study of Akron rubber workmen's tendency to take on second jobs in their free time (see page 10).

One is also reminded of the stories of men who become utterly bored upon retirement, their lives no longer directed by the requirements of their jobs, and the ability to orient and involve themselves through play utterly unknown to them. Some have harbored a life-long desire—probably treasured and glamorized—

to do something, such as fish in the Rockies, which they have never "found the time" to do before, but which carries them through the first months of retirement. Then they begin to recognize a dissatisfaction in themselves. A person accustomed to re-orienting himself through play might take such dissatisfaction as a sign that this one activity was not everything to him, that a time of search and suffering was at hand, a time of working through to a fuller means of self-expression. But according to our theory it would follow that a person who has forgotten his potential for play will respond to such dissatisfaction with boredom or despair. A number of the men we interviewed, when we asked about their retirement, mentioned stories of men who die shortly after retirement. And a few predicted this would be their own fate.

Bill Carpenter*. Bill Carpenter has six children and thirteen jobs. That is, he is a relief man at the chemicals plant outside Chicago and, as such, relieves a different man each day, thus coming into contact with the distilling process at thirteen different points. Carpenter has been at the chemicals plant 17 years, since he was 22. Before that he finished high school and served in the army in Europe. Then he worked on an assembly line briefly before getting a job at the chemicals plant. His father had been employed at an oil refinery.

Carpenter used few words to answer our questions about his involvement in the job. He feels it has a lot of variety, is challenging "at times," provides no chance for promotion. "The only thing we have (to be interested in) is the salary." He feels he has enough chance, though, to be with, and talk to, other men on the job.

His free time activities are not so easily described. As to television, "I wouldn't say I watched too much—occasionally stage plays, college quizzes, or science fiction. Most nights I watch the news, then give it to the kids." He reads about a book a week "on a choice of subjects: I'll skim a book, then read it if I'm interested." He also subscribes to *Mechanics Illustrated*. He belongs to the Knights of Columbus and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, each

* Carpenter is #217.

of which generally require four hours a month, except when he devotes extra time to a committee. He also belongs to the Democratic Club, which makes it possible for him to "keep up with all the problems." Several of the local representatives belong to the club and they and others are asked to speak at it during campaigns. Carpenter, through the club, has taken part in campaign rallies and, in local campaigns, has gone from door to door to talk in favor of his man. This degree of political involvement, including actual organizational work, was quite rare among the men we interviewed.

At home Carpenter likes to work with his hands. He has a wood shop. "Because of the army I'm interested in cars; I rejuvenate some." He takes the family on outings, or, during the summer, to go swimming. And on vacations they "camp-travel: it's the only way that's financially feasible." What does he like to do best in his free time? "It's according to mood. I have several irons in the fire at once. Now I'm planning a camping trailer for the family's trips."

In Carpenter's case, it was clear from the number of detailed specifics he could name that his "according to mood" was no mere escape clause to cover an empty life, but rather the sign of a man who was constantly turning to new things and exploring them pleasurably and productively. His central interest was, thus, not narrowly definable in terms of a single passionate activity. Nonetheless, each of his activities seemed to be carried on with a commitment that lent them depth, rather than permitting no more than superficial mention. For example, when we pursued his reading and his political work, he launched into a discussion of the relevance of some basic Marxist economic tenets to America, while preferring our political system to those of the Communist states now existent. He was responsive to us rather than clichéd and dogmatic. He gave the impression of wishing to test rather than to protect his views.

These traits emerged from the process of our encounter as much as from the content of what he said. We found that these process-indicators of play were common among the men who scored high on leisure involvement. These indicators often translated them-

selves onto our interview sheets in terms of the density of our writing—suddenly a man's thoughts would seem alive and vital to us, and we would try to jot down not only *that* he had made a comment about such-and-such, but precisely *what* he had said about it. Later when we reviewed our interview sheets, which were identified only by number, we generally found ourselves more easily able to remember personalities of men who scored high on leisure involvement than others. Some of them were quiet rather than loquacious, but there was an immediacy and sense of exchange within interviews with them that seemed to occur far less often with men of low leisure involvement.

In light of Carpenter's many activities, it is not surprising to find that Carpenter would like more free time. "I don't think I have enough; I run out of time." Such a wish for more free time was far from being unanimous, as Darnen's earlier views about retirement indicate. Many of these men felt quite clearly that more free time would be either boring or onerous. We heard the story (which we cannot verify) that one union's membership had voted down a proposal to consolidate all occasional holidays such as Memorial and Independence Days into three-day weekends, on the basis that watching TV for three days straight was more boring than watching it one day in the middle of the week and two on weekends.

A number of the men we talked to referred to weekends as "honeydews." After having heard this phrase several times, we eventually asked what it meant. We found that the phrase was actually "honey-do's," which was short for "honey, do this; honey, do that"—their view of their wife's attitude toward them on the weekend. More "honey-do's" were obviously to be avoided not welcomed.

Beyond such oblique and negative references to family life, there were few references to wives and children at all. Carpenter is unusual in suggesting that the family does a variety of things as a group. Of course, we asked no questions directly about the family, but this was partly to see whether it would emerge of its own accord in a man's discussion of his leisure. Another factor which might account for the no more than tangential references to family

was the concern some men expressed at the outset of their interview that it not become "personal." By this they often meant that they did not wish their specific opinions and behaviors concerning sex probed. We would assure them that most of our questions were open-ended, permitting them to choose their responses. Perhaps these men felt that discussion of their family life as a concern of their leisure was too intimate a topic to explore with us. However, we doubt that this was the case because we very rarely received the impression that these men were weighing what to tell us. Also, their comments about why they did not discuss politics or religion with other people (see Chapter 15) suggest a pattern of avoiding deep sharing with others in general. Moreover, their catch phrases suggested that if intimacy was either taboo or a subject of humor, it was so with their buddies and their families, not just with us. For example, sometimes when we asked, "Are there other things you do in your free time?" and a man thought for a minute to see what he might have left unsaid, he would reply with a broad smile, "Well, of course, I sometimes jump on the wife, you know." The humor was light, the embarrassment nil, the phrase pat. The emphasis on the physical and the omission of the emotional did not seem calculated particularly for our interview.

Our sense of the alienation within families was heightened by our memory of one man we interviewed in our pilot study, whose emphasis on his family in his leisure remained a lonely example of the ingenuity, learning, and joy that a man's play could generate in his whole family. This man was the father of ten children, whom he named and described in some detail to us with obvious pleasure. He dwelled on their differences in personality, the ways they interacted with one another, the stages of growth they seemed to pass through, the different ways they enhanced one another and learned, and the dilemmas and decisions which he and his wife faced as parents. He told us also of a tradition which had developed within the family whereby each week he would go to the public library and choose a book for each member of the family. All the books would somehow deal with the same subject, but each would

meet the particular reading level and interest of the family member for whom it was intended. Then, he would return home with the books and hide them around the house. That evening there would be a book-hunt. There were three challenges: to find all the books, sort them out to the proper people, and decide what the common topic was. As the week proceeded, the books would be read, shared in discussion, sometimes exchanged. And at the end of the week the family would gather for a conversation about the topic, sharing the discoveries that most interested them, and asking questions which their book had not answered.

We were amazed and delighted by the originality of this ritual, its collaborative and cohesive quality, and its non-dogmatic, exploratory purpose. Here was a family playing, inventing, discovering a better life together, at least in one sphere, rather than merely passing time in the same house clutching at, avoiding, or frustrating one another. It seemed obvious that a different family might well invent social forms for their life together which, while equally playful, would differ in any or all particulars. It still seems obvious that a family's common leisure could be enhanced by such playfulness. But we never encountered another example comparable to this one among the 209 men we interviewed.

A Comparison. Let us return to the three men of this chapter—Morton, Darnen, and Carpenter—to compare them to one another. A brief comparison of these three men should serve to warn the reader that in the analysis to follow no simple, single relationship between job rating and leisure involvement will be found. Here is a table of the variables which we will try to relate to one another in the next chapter:

	Age	Job Mobility	Educa- tion	J.R.	J.I.	L.I.
Morton	35	Stable	14	0	5	3
Darnen	53	Down	8	6	6	3
Carpenter	39	Up	12	8	5	11

Is it Darnen's age, his downward mobility, or his low level of education which has so discouraged playful exploration that his leisure involvement rating is only 3, despite his relatively high job rating of 6? Certainly age, job mobility, and education, even when taken together, do not appear to be the sole factors which influence leisure involvement. For Morton is younger than Darnen, has more education, and is not downwardly mobile, yet his leisure involvement is the same as Darnen's.

If we try to identify the influences which have permitted Carpenter to express himself so much more energetically in his free time than Morton and Darnen, we again find no obvious answer. His job rating is far higher than Morton's, but not much different from Darnen's. He is upwardly mobile, but we would be surprised if this were the sole reason for his high leisure involvement rating, since the difference between downward mobility and stability has no apparent effect on Morton's and Darnen's relative leisure involvement.

We gain no clue whatsoever about the relation of job involvement to the rest of these men's lives, since it remains virtually constant.

We obviously need to analyze how all these factors are related in the lives of many men, if any pattern is to emerge. We shall devote the next chapter to such an analysis.

The Link Between a Man's Job and His Leisure

The preceding chapters have laid the groundwork for an examination of the quantitative results of our study. The primary hypothesis we wish to test in this chapter is that the degree of playfulness of a man's job is directly related to the degree of playfulness of his leisure, irrespective of other background factors.

The reader will recall that in Chapter 10 we examined a number of background variables which differed among these men and concluded that none of them had a systematic effect on the relationship of job to leisure, except possibly for job mobility. Differences among the companies and localities, as well as differences in race and age, were found to have no systematic effect on the relationship between job and leisure.

We have reached the point where we can ask, is there in fact a strong, significant relationship between job rating and leisure involvement? Table I shows the direct comparison between the two variables.

TABLE I. Job Rating Related to Leisure Involvement

Job Rating	No. Respondents	Avg. Leisure Inv.
0-2	53	4.8
3-5	71	5.0
6-8	85	5.8

We see from the averages that as job rating increases so does leisure involvement. But the averages alone do not tell us whether this relationship is strong and significant. The arrangement of the

averages may have occurred merely by chance. In this case, the relationship between job and leisure would only be apparent—it would not actually have any significance. It would neither permit nor prove any interpretation, for the next sample would be just as likely to show leisure involvement *declining* as job rating increased.

We can administer a statistical test to determine whether the relationship is significant. This test—called analysis of variance—does not unequivocally prove that the relationship exists. Rather, it tells us how unlikely it is that the relationship has occurred by chance. A relationship is generally regarded as significant if it achieves the .05 level, that is, if such a combination would occur less than once every twenty times if the two variables were not related to each other. Obviously, such a finding would indicate that it is likely that the two variables *are* related to one another. Likewise, if analysis of variance reveals a relationship significant beyond the .01 level, this result means that it would occur by chance less than once every hundred times.

The application of analysis of variance to the correlation of increasing job rating and increasing leisure involvement shows it to be significant beyond the .05 level. Thus, we can have confidence that the relationship does exist as we hypothesized. There would be less than one chance in twenty that such a distribution would occur if the relationship did not exist.

But we have yet to show that the relationship is a strong one. Various family relationships can illustrate what we mean by a strong relationship. Third cousins are certainly related, but the relationship is rarely a strong one—they rarely influence one another in any direct way. Knowing one of the two would be of little help in predicting the behavior and attitudes of his third cousin. On the other hand, we would expect the relationship between father and son to be far stronger, in the sense that one would influence the other in a fairly large number of circumstances. We can determine by another statistical test the extent to which change by one variable (say, the father) accounts for change in the other (say, the son). This test tells us what percentage of the variance of either variable is accounted for by their mutual relationship. That is, if a correlation between two variables ac-

counts for 50% of their variance, we know that half of the changes in each will be accompanied by changes in the other.

In the case of the relationship between job rating and leisure involvement, we find that their correlation accounts for 46% of their variance. Loosely, this can be interpreted to mean that we can predict a man's leisure involvement from his job rating just under half the time, or that job rating accounts for just under half of all the influences on any man's leisure involvement. In short, the relationship between job and leisure is very strong indeed.

Although we can now affirm that there is a strong, significant relationship between job and leisure, we cannot say that either one *causes* the other. Some third factor may cause both. We know that none of the background variables examined in Chapter 10, except possibly job mobility, causes the related changes in job and leisure. But when we examine the relationship between education, on the one hand, and job and leisure, on the other hand, we find, in Table II, that education is significantly related to both. (And, al-

TABLE II. Education Related to Job Rating and Leisure Involvement

Education	No. Respondents	Avg. Job Rating	Avg. Leisure Inv.
Under 12th	87	3.5	4.7
12th grade	96	4.9	5.4
Over 12th	26	4.5	6.1

though at first glance it may seem surprising, the relation to job rating is more certain than to leisure—significant at the .001 level as compared to the .05 level.) This finding suggests the possibility that men are pre-selected for their jobs by their level of educational attainment and that, consequently, a man's level of education can be said to cause different levels of job rating and of leisure involvement.

Certainly education accounts for some percentage of the variance of leisure involvement and of job rating. But it does not necessarily account for the same part of the variance of leisure as job rating

does. Whether job rating accounts for variance in leisure involvement independent of the influence of educational level can easily be determined by holding education constant and seeing whether job and leisure are still significantly correlated. Table III suggests

TABLE III. Job Rating Related to Leisure Involvement with Education Held Constant at the Twelfth Grade


Job Rating	No. Respondents	Avg. Leisure Inv.
0-2	17	4.7
3-5	27	5.0
6-8	52	6.0

that, even with educational level held constant, increasing job rating still tends to predict increasing leisure involvement. Our statistical tests show this correlation to be significant at the .05 level and to account for 34% of the variance. This result indicates that the effect of education on leisure involvement only partly underlies the effect of job rating (as illustrated in Figure I). Our finding that education systematically predicts changes in both job rating and leisure involvement diminishes the percentage of the variance of a man's leisure which is accounted for solely by his job, but by no means negates the job's influence altogether. The job situation remains an independent determinant of a man's leisure involvement.

Job Mobility and Job Involvement. While the job situation is established as a determinant of leisure involvement, it is not yet clear what aspects of the job situation are crucial. Is it solely the objective, present job rating that influences leisure involvement? Or does past experience of different jobs, as measured by job mobility, underlie the influence of present job rating? Or does a man's subjective reaction to his job, as measured by his job involvement, more directly predict leisure involvement?

We know from Chapter 10 that a man's previous job experience (as well as his father's) is *one* of the determinants of his present

FIGURE I. Variance in Leisure Involvement Independently Accounted for by the Job



leisure involvement, since upward mobility and increasing leisure involvement were shown to be significantly correlated. Table IV shows, however, that the influence of job mobility on leisure involvement does not wholly underlie and account for the correlation of present job rating and leisure involvement. For increasing play in the present job is associated with rising leisure involvement even when previous job mobility and education are both held constant. The correlation is significant at the .05 level and accounts for

TABLE IV. Job Rating Related to Leisure Involvement with Job Mobility Held at Stable and Education Held at Twelfth Grade

Job Rating	No. Respondents	Avg. Leisure Inv.
0-2	9	4.3
3-5	17	4.9
6-8	34	6.2

23% of the variance. Again, the present, objective job situation remains an independent determinant of a man's leisure involvement, although past job situations also affect his leisure involvement.

The reader will recall that we showed in Chapter 10 that a man's previous job experience influences his sense of involvement in his present job. This finding supported our belief that a man's job involvement would reflect his previous life experience. Since job mobility plays a part in determining a man's leisure involvement, we would expect his present job involvement to be correlated to his leisure involvement, at least to the extent that both are influenced by job mobility. Moreover, we hypothesized in Chapter 8 that job involvement would tend to reflect all of a man's previous experiences and would, consequently, mediate between job rating and leisure involvement, accounting for differences in leisure involvement of men with similar job ratings.

Table V shows that a man's job involvement does tend to mediate between his job rating and his leisure involvement. For

TABLE V. Leisure Involvement as a Function of Job Rating and Job Involvement*

Job Rating	Job Involvement			Cells Show
	0-3	4-5	6-8	
0-2	4.8	4.4	5.1	Average
3-5	3.4	4.9	6.0	Leisure
6-8	5.4	5.6	5.9	Involvement


* The association between increasing job involvement and increasing leisure involvement is significant at the .05 level. Leisure involvement averages increase as expected in 13 of 16 cases. Correlating these averages diagonally

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{the expected order being:} \\ 1 \quad 2.5 \quad 5 \\ 2.5 \quad 5 \quad 7.5 \\ 5 \quad 7.5 \quad 9 \end{array} \right),$$

we find a correlation of .90, accounting for 81% of the variance of leisure involvement.

a given job rating range, increasing job involvement tends to be associated with increasing leisure involvement (in eight out of nine cases). Moreover, taken together, job rating and job involvement account for a very high percentage of the variance in leisure involvement (81%). Job involvement not only seems to reflect the influence of job mobility on leisure involvement, but also seems to account for still another part of the variance of leisure involvement. It does not diminish the strength of our main finding that objective job rating and leisure playfulness covary, but rather adds a further facet to that finding. Figure II illustrates the full variety of subjective and objective, present and historical factors influencing a man's leisure which we have documented, although the relative proportions can only be approximated from our data.

FIGURE II. Influences on Leisure Involvement Documented by This Study



We have, thus, found the principal empirical hypothesis of our study supported by our empirical data in various ramifications. *The job situation—present and past, directly and through its effect on a man's expectations and aspirations—strongly influences leisure involvement.*

Interpretations, Significations, Implications. Our efforts to define leisure as a positive quality, following the Greeks, led us to develop first a theory of play and then some measures based upon this theory. Our application of these measures, in turn, has supported our first major empirical hypothesis, which relates the quality of a man's job to the level of his leisure involvement.

It is important, however, that the reader recall our caveat in Chapter 10 to interpreting this result. It is conceivable that leisure involvement is the stable factor in this equation, remaining virtually constant from childhood through adulthood and influencing the level of education and the kind of jobs a person achieves. Strictly, our conclusion must simply be that *there is a common level of play that tends to express itself in a man's job and leisure life.*

Even such a limited interpretation of our finding raises a serious question about the efficacy of proposals such as the one we reviewed in Chapter 2. The reader will recall that the Corning Glass Conference concluded that the "problem of creating an industrial civilization is essentially a problem of social invention and creativity in the non-work aspects of life. . . . The efficiency (of modern bureaucratic, technological organization) can remain along with the impersonality, providing there are other points in the society where the primary social relations can be expressed . . ." But our findings suggest either that we will not become socially inventive in our leisure so long as jobs remain unplayful; or that leisure inventiveness will be the business of a few and will only affect the many superficially without increasing their leisure involvement; or that as social inventiveness expresses itself in men's leisure they will create social conditions for encouraging more play on the job.

The first outcome would be a great disappointment to social engineers and congenial optimists who regularly forecast rosy futures for our society. The second outcome would be reminiscent of the bread and circuses which Roman emperors increasingly doled out to keep the plebeians passive and pacified. Certainly these entertainments were inventive, but they did not require

energy, commitment, or exploration on the part of the spectators (except, of course, for the emperor, whose thumb up or thumb down decisions were awaited and imitated). The third outcome may be occurring on some fringes of our society today. The increasingly prevalent phenomenon of experiments in communal living sometimes begin in the non-work aspects of life, but they often come to embrace the total quality of members' lives. Hours of work, decision-making processes, means of compensation, and the relation between work, study, leisure, worship, and celebration are all thrown into question. The experiments may succeed or fail to encourage play throughout a person's life, but in any case their aims are fundamental and touch all sides of a person's life.

Likewise, the phenomenon of Black Power arose in the non-work sphere of life and is aimed at decreasing the self and social alienation of black people and increasing their self-esteem and playfulness. One of the major influences of this movement, however, has come in its impact upon the quality of jobs available to black people. Its focus has not been to encourage play in given jobs, but to get black people better jobs.

The point of citing these examples is not to defend black militants or hippies. Whether their efforts are ultimately wise, successful, or in the common good is not here at issue. These examples point out, rather, that social inventions which aspire to influence the fundamental qualities of a man's leisure will also tend to have an impact on a man's life on the job.

For industry (and other work-organizations) to encourage play in men's leisure but not at work will be as self-defeating as the Russian Czars' intermittent and uncertain attempts to encourage industry and education in Russia during the nineteenth century without reforming their political autocracy. The Czars hoped to preserve themselves, but the contradiction and friction between the pluralism which accompanied industrial and educational development, on the one hand, and the monolithic power inherent in the concept of Czar, on the other hand, led to alternating bursts of repression and rebellion until the final revolution.

In 1964, when we originally interviewed the respondents in this

study, it might have appeared melodramatic to compare the relations among jobs, leisure, and politics in American society today to those among industrialization, education, and power in Czarist Russia. After the last half of the 1960's, however, it should be clearer that the scale of the issues—not the causes, conditions, or specific factors—is comparable. Our society will survive only if it is able to balance the opportunities for play in men's work and leisure.

Whether correct or incorrect, whether well understood and well expressed or not, there is an active and potent sense of criticism abroad in our society today about the level of play our institutions, personal relations, and social habits encourage in men's lives. There is a sense that men are capable of qualitatively higher degrees of playfulness. There is also a sense that society can transcend and transmute its present form to become more encouraging of play. Such a combination of individual and social change would be historically unprecedented.

Since playfulness can neither be forced nor given, ordinary political change—a change in the weighting of external pressures of group on group—could not accomplish such a transmutation. Clearly, each person would have to explore his own experience in order to begin to identify the quality of active play in himself and in order not to confuse it with his self-satisfaction or his self-image. And each person would have to explore his experience with others in order to begin to understand how play can be encouraged and in order not to confuse such a process with adherence to or rejection of any particular pattern of behavior. Individual and social transmutation would become inseparable.

Whether such a transmutation can happen, how it can happen, and when it can happen are not issues which this study deals with or clarifies. That its character would be transactional rather than manipulative, and that it would reach all parts of men's lives, both the theory and data of our study indicate.

If, on the basis of this analysis, we return to the questions we asked ourselves in our first chapter—in which we discussed the economics of future automation—we encounter some unexpected

answers. The reader will recall that we found economic and technological forecasting impossible without some sense of the relative values of consumption and production, of work and leisure, in our society. Automation, we believed, would not appear economically feasible insofar as it replaced labor until the leisure it would make possible was valued in our culture. We argued that a man alienated from his personal aim would find his consumption and thus his free-time controlled by production-pressures unrelated to the human potential for play. In Chapter 9 we translated the concept of alienation from one's personal aim into a low score on our measure of leisure involvement. In this chapter we showed that low leisure involvement is associated with a low job rating. The lowest job ratings (in our study and, we believe, generally) are associated with mechanical assembly lines—processes which could technically be automated—whereas automated jobs tend to yield higher job ratings. Consequently, we can conclude that assembly-line type jobs create the alienation which leads to the disengagement of leisure and, thus, that such jobs militate against the very process of automation, even though automation would be associated with more playful jobs. For automation would also lead to more free time, and more free time is resisted by those who do not experience the liveliness of leisure.

Let us review how this string of arguments, definitions, and findings fits together. Most generally, we find that leisure will not be valued unless a man's work becomes valuable—that is, playful. But our present mechanical technology and bureaucratic organizational forms create alienating jobs which are associated with low leisure involvement. Thus, circularly, our present level of technology and organization are part of the barrier to automation, rather than merely an obsolete precursor of it. Or to put it another way, mechanical technology and bureaucratic organization are no mere neutral, efficient tools which may be turned to solving what problems men will; rather, their very realization of manipulative efficiency in men's jobs discourages play and all the life values which flow from it. The alienation resulting from such technology becomes the dominant influence in men's lives, and their consump-

tion itself becomes controlled by the production-process—whether in terms of expensive and temporary recreational titillators, upon which men become dependent, or in terms of work-extending hobbies.

The problem of encouraging play is fundamental for a culture. Cultures are born in a burst of playfulness, but so far as we know from history their maturation is linked to rigidification. No culture has yet consciously faced and permanently solved the problem of encouraging play. Nor has any culture heretofore faced this problem so starkly. Cultural vitality and political power have generally degenerated gradually over centuries. We, by contrast, find our very power a threat to our vitality.

For, since the fifteenth century a curious combination of disintegration and development has been occurring in our culture. All unifying, traditional values and common reference points have disintegrated: Europe is no longer the physical center of our culture; the Catholic Church is no longer the spiritual center; the political and economic aspects of culture have become ends to themselves, substituting increased power in place of contribution to the vitality of society as their criteria of success; science, too, has broken from subjugation to all superstitions except its own. At the same time, paralleling this disintegration, each separate strand of the cultural web has been stretched towards its limit in thought and action in separate efforts to entwine the world within one frame of reference. Until the reaching of the limits, this stretching can contain a playful, exploratory quality, but near the limits the common emphasis on force rather than exploration and the mutual alienation of the strands become more evident. At the limits of extension the lack of a common, conscious sense of intention becomes dangerous.

We must learn to distinguish the essential liveliness within ourselves and our culture, which represents our intention to play, from our regard for manipulative power. What these words would mean in terms of action is neither obvious nor calculable.

As we enter the 1970's, men have played on the moon while others died on earth. Is this contrast but another example of exten-

sion without intention, a grisly irony indicative of our escapism, our need to get away from it all, to get away from consciousness of the consequences of our social behavior? Or is it a pure and hopeful, if still externalized, example of play, a first step in common human exploration, a new perspective on ourselves?

Three Men's Politics

Men's politics, we have hypothesized, are influenced by their leisure involvement to reflect a concern for the common good. However, the indices of concern for the common good will not easily be traced in political activities and ideologies since any one activity or ideology may be chosen for a variety of motives.

In this chapter we will examine the material we gathered on three men's politics, so that the reader can have before him some specific examples of the knowledge we gained about the men we interviewed. In the following chapters we will present first a quantitative analysis of the politics of these 209 men and then a textual analysis of some of the patterns of ultimate faith we find in their ideologies.

John Kadar*. John Kadar operates a radio drill at the machine tool company in Columbus, a job which he finds "mostly monotonous." At 45 he is married and has children. His family comes from Hungary, although he was born and raised in Ohio. His father was also a machinist. Kadar finished high school, spent a couple of years in the service, and has held his present job for 23 years.

His favorite free time activity is "playing the horses." He also belongs to three private clubs. "They're to drink at. You have to have a key to get in."

Kadar is not interested in his community, nor does he feel that there is much community spirit around where he lives. As to influence, he feels he has none: "I stay away from that sort of

* Kadar is #25.

thing," he bites off shortly, as though influence were poisonous. He talks politics a little, but not with people who disagree: "I know I can't change their minds," he reports flatly, as though there were no possibility of *his* changing *his* mind or learning something new. He does not read the editorial page in the newspaper, nor does he engage in any activity for a political party or candidate during or between elections. He votes "mostly in presidential elections." He knew the three leading contenders for the 1964 Republican presidential nomination (Goldwater, Rockefeller, and Scranton), as well as the two senators from Ohio and the President of France.

Kadar understands democracy to mean "the form of government—the way things are going." He thinks the US is a democracy: "There's plenty of work." In these brief utterances, he includes within the term *democracy* not only a political system—"the form of government"—but the social climate—"the way things are going"—and the economy—"there's plenty of work." Again and again, when we asked men about their definition of democracy, we found that they referred to social or economic factors rather than, or in addition to, political factors. Those who defined democracy in political terms alone were, according to our count afterwards, a minority. This finding could be regarded as a popular parallel to scholarly arguments that democracy is viable only under certain economic and social conditions. The reader will recall, for example, the discussion in Chapter 4 about the importance of "cross-cutting cleavages" in defusing conflict and permitting compromise rather than a tyranny of the majority in a democracy. However, there is a distinction between the scholarly argument and the position of these men. The scholarly argument posits a dynamic relationship among social, economic, and political factors, whereas these men do not regard the factors as separate at all, but rather as confluent.

The confluence of social, economic, and political factors in these men's thought also provides a context for the scholarly findings that only persons among the more politically active elite in America support Constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties for factions with which they disagree deeply. For many of the men whom we in-

interviewed presumably, if America were not "a situation in which matters seem to be going ahead pretty peacefully" (as one man defined democracy), then they would not necessarily support the Constitutional foundations of the political structure. Such an action might not be wise, but on the other hand it might not be unwise—it could conceivably concur with historical or ontological limits to the validity of our Constitution. In either case, however, these men would be the pawns of forces of which they were not conscious, since their confluent view of factors prevents them from being aware of relational influences among the factors.

There is another aspect of the comments of a number of men which Kadar voiced quite directly. This was a sense of distance and passivity in relation to "the situation," "the way things are going." The very cosmic generality of their terms communicates this distance. But Kadar also added: "I don't pay too much attention because there's nothing I can do." He reiterated this feeling when asked who runs the government. He replied, "I don't. The parties pick on one another. If something is wrong, they yell about it and put it right." Kadar's comments convey the impression that all this activity occurs at a great distance from himself, not affecting his life at all. Here again, as in his tendency to see separable factors as confluent, we note a lack of reference to relational exchange. His comments are reminiscent of Arendt's quotation at the beginning of Chapter 7, in which she attributes such impressions of distance to the lack of conscious contact between our thoughts and observations, on the one hand, and our own experience, on the other hand. Kadar gives no hint that there is any contact or exchange between himself and the political system he describes. Yet he is a part, a member, an agent of that system.

As we will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 15, the overt political disengagement which Kadar expressed was relatively rare among the men we interviewed, but many of them conveyed a more covert social and personal disengagement in their views of themselves and the world.

It may be conceptually helpful to note here that according to our theory of play the true opposite of disengaged distance, such as Kadar manifests, is not immersion in an activity. For, immersed,

one loses oneself in the activity. In the case of immersion there is no conscious sense of differentiation between oneself and the activity, whereas in disengagement there is no conscious connection. By contrast, engagement or conscious contact involves both a sense of differentiation between self and activity and a sense of exchange between the two. In our theory of play this complementary duo is expressed by the concomitant processes of questioning exploration and committed involvement. We would maintain that disengagement not only prevents committed involvement, but also inhibits discerning exploration (for one must enter and dwell within another truly to know him). Similarly, immersion not only prevents impartial questioning, but also inhibits helpful commitment (for one must distinguish and support the essential rather than the ephemeral or defensive or self-contradictory in another in order genuinely to help him). Kadar's distance is unplayful because it is disengaged; that is, because it implies total lack of contact between himself and the world rather than a perspective for interaction with the world.

Rounding out Kadar's responses to our questions about his ideology, we found that he does not believe there are any groups in the country which have too much power. After all, such a feeling would imply contact and discrimination rather than disengagement. And in telling us how much control the government should have, Kadar is consistent with his other views, although it required further probing for us to understand how consistent. He told us, "I think it should control things. It's the only way to get things done. Anything that helps the poor I'm for."

At first we were not sure where Kadar's concern for the poor entered into the picture. It seemed inconsistent with his disengagement. Upon further questioning, it turned out that he identified himself as poor and seemed to feel that the government could "build amusement parks" to divert persons like himself. But he seemed to be pressed beyond the usual boundaries of his thought (or beyond what he took to be publicly acknowledgeable) by our quest for greater specificity and returned to more opaque generalizations when we asked what he thought a perfect society would

be like. "I don't have any idea," he said, looking up briefly and then back down. "Most of us can keep going. We help ourselves, too, if we help the poor."

One can read into these comments a passivity so total that it robs the man, finally, of any personal vision of an ideal which could arouse his commitment. At most, he may privately fantasize about a benevolently totalitarian government which, without directly touching him or bothering him, would take on the burden of organizing his leisure for him. To state the fantasy so baldly too clearly suggests the self-surrender it involves, so the fantasy remains verbally unformulated, no more than implied. Verbally formulated, the fantasy calls forth the same uneasiness that many people experience when Huxley writes of his "brave, new world," or Skinner proposes "Walden II," or Marcuse warns of the possibility of "the total welfare state" and "the administration of leisure." One senses that a uniquely human quality is missing in such utopias (or, more accurately, infernos). In terms of our theory of play, it becomes clear that what is missing is the exploration and commitment, the search and discovery, the suffering and joy, of the growth of conscious person-world contact. In his comments about government control and a perfect society, Kadar's political ideology has once again offered us an example of a man whose extreme unplayfulness permeates his political thought and worldview.

Manuel Ortega*. Manuel Ortega is a very different sort of man. He grew up in Providence, Rhode Island. His father, a college graduate, was a house painter. Ortega also went into the paint contractor business after finishing high school, but gave it up and came to Detroit in 1948 because painting was a seasonal occupation and he could not support his large family on it. Now 48 years old, he and his wife have ten children.

He is a member of a company pool of workers who move from plant to plant as the need arises. He describes his job as monot-

* Ortega is #143.

onous: "A child could do it. There's no chance to advance anything, no incentive." When the interviewer asked him whether he could keep his mind on other things while on the job, he replied, "Yes. In fact, I just made up a song."

Ortega's free time is characterized by his statement that, "I made up my mind when I was younger that I would learn all I could about new things." He reads "anything that stimulates the imagination—textbooks, science fiction, encyclopedias. Right now I'm interested in electronics." He likes to make things out of wood, and also fixes cars for his neighbors. On Sundays the family goes on a picnic, out fishing, or to the zoo. On Saturday night "we have a family conference. If the children have questions or suggestions, we thrash it out." He is a member of the Masons.

Ortega lives in what he describes as a blighted area. He feels there is no community spirit, and he himself is not interested in the community because there is "nothing to do. I'm going to move out. Before it was the only house big enough for my family." He has influence with a few neighbors, he says. He has worked with the mayor and is known at his office, so he talks politics a lot and will talk with anyone who knows something about it. He reads the editorial page of the paper, votes but has missed a couple of primaries, and knows ten of thirteen answers on the political information test.

"There are several types of democracy," he feels. "The British have theirs, we have ours. My version is where you are raised and taught by the principles of democracy as they run: every man has a right to speak freely and do what he wants to do, as long as he respects others." When he thinks of government, he thinks of laws. He believes the national government is the central authority to be resorted to if the state cannot take care of a problem.

The reader can already see the difference between Ortega's and Kadar's thought. Ortega's thought is considerably more articulated, informed, and specific than Kadar's, and is focused on political structures and processes rather than regarding them as confluent with social and economic factors. This greater ideological articulation occurs in parallel to greater political activity and greater leisure involvement than Kadar. Ortega's active sense of relation to

politics is probably most convincingly illustrated by his personal acquaintance with the mayor's office, but one could deduce it from the articulation of his opinions as well. For example, in response to our question about whether any groups in America have too much power, he pointed out: "The committees in Congress can bottle up anything. And the CIA can get money to do what it wants to; nobody has any authority over it." These are not pieces of information and points of view that are picked up by scanning the headlines of newspapers alone. One senses a familiarity with the process by which bills are acted upon in Congress, an awareness that the appropriations for the CIA are often hidden under expenditures for other departments. Even these matters can be picked up easily enough, but they do not tend to be remembered unless a person feels some sense of study and commitment in relation to politics. Although Ortega views these particular processes as somehow illegitimate, his familiarity with them gives his criticism a constructive rather than an utterly condemnatory and self-dissociative quality.

What would a perfect society be like? Ortega conceives of it as including "a lot of ideas of democracy and a few from the Communists. But mostly it would be like right here." This comment could epitomize the practical orientation and low moral tension which scholars regard as necessary for the "democratic personality" (see page 56). He has a sense of ideals to work towards actively, yet at the same time he remains essentially satisfied with his present situation. He seems less eager to discuss his ideals at length than he seemed in the case of actually existing political structures and processes. We are not introduced to colorful visions or covert fantasies. His words are energetic but flat when disconnected from his physical presence. They seem to function more as an aspect of his activity than as an expression of his imagination.

These interpretations are risky, built, as the reader can see, on mere hints of behavior. But the hints do seem to coalesce into a coherent configuration for this single man, while at the same time conveying a spirit we felt in quite a number of interviews with men whom we found to have high levels of both leisure and political involvement.

Frank Booth*. Frank Booth is 63 years old. He was to retire two weeks after we spoke to him. He had been at the chemicals plant near Chicago for fourteen years and still felt that the job had variety to it: "You never know what to expect next." Before that he was supervisor in a number of plants throughout the Midwest. His father was a Baptist preacher. Booth went through high school and afterwards studied math and mechanical drawing at home.

Of his free time he says, "To maintain a house doing shift work is all I can do. After shift work for fourteen years, I can say I don't know where I've been, where I am, or where I'm going." To us, such a reaction was not surprising, given the constant adjustments in one's life routine demanded by changing shifts and irregular holidays. Yet we found that relatively few of the men at the chemicals plant ever mentioned this inconvenience. Consequently, complaints like Booth's came to sound like covers for a lack of self-respect and to presage a lack of play and low leisure involvement. Certainly this seemed to be true in the case of Booth.

He would watch television if there were any good programs, but "I usually get outvoted (by the family), so I get bored." He reads *Reader's Digest* "whenever I have time." He no longer belongs to any organizations. He generally goes to the Southwest on vacations and plans to retire there: "You might say I'm a rock-hound."

The spirit of his community is nationalistic spirit, he says. "Most of them are first generation Americans—very clannish. I can't stand them." He himself is not interested in the community because he has "no interest in the people. There's too much chiseling and cheating." With regard to influence, "as a Republican I have none. There are not enough (Republicans) around." He talks politics with his wife, but "with most neighbors I wouldn't want to be because they get quite abusive." However, he does like to talk politics with those who disagree: "I delight in being in an argument." He always reads the editorial page of the newspaper, never misses an election, and years ago used to contact people during campaigns. He knew eight of thirteen answers on the political information test.

* Booth is #209.

What democracy should mean, according to Booth, is equal representation. "Officials should be elected according to ability." The US is not entirely a democracy, however. "There's too much double-dealing in politics. The man with the least conscience can join a machine." Booth's strong references to "chiseling" and "double-dealing" in politics were quite frequently repeated by the men we interviewed in the Chicago area, but very rarely by men in Columbus and Detroit.

Like Kadar's, Booth's responses tended to be highly general, although they were colored by imagery and hyperbole. Thus, the federal government does not simply have more control than he would like; as he expresses it, "It's got its finger in so many pies that the citizen can't do anything without having to tell Uncle Sam about it and get his permission." What does he think of when he thinks of the word "government"? Again we are offered opaque generalization. The government "could be a good thing and everyone should be interested in it. The average citizen thinks it's hopeless even in a little town. I guess it's human nature." Who runs the government? "The State Department or the Supreme Court—one of the two. For us it's bad; for the world in general it's good to make Uncle Sam's sons and daughters pay the bill for their pleasure." This vision of the rest of the world lolling in luxury at his expense rounds out Booth's sense of victimization by his job, his neighbors, politicians, and the system as a whole.

One might think that Booth could easily imagine a better life, but when asked what he thinks a perfect society would be like, his political alienation is curiously counterpointed: "It would be awfully boring. . . . There'd be no change or challenge to it—whether always a cloudy sky or bright and sunny. It's sudden changes that make it interesting." Perfection seems more hellish than heavenly. It would be externalized (concerned with such things as the weather) and static, rather than personal and dynamic, as Booth imagines it. He seems to conceive of excitement as being generated by tension, friction, and explosion between incompatible matters outside himself, rather than by accepting contact with the flow of one's own experiencing. Such explosions are bad in that they can be destructive and impede routine affairs, but on the other hand they are welcomed diversions. It is a tenuous, uncomfortable bal-

ance. Only uncontrolled explosion prevents stasis. In one sense it is lucky for Booth that he lives with people he "can't stand" because he delights in argument.

In Booth's world as in Kadar's, contact and exchange do not seem to be regular, accepted qualities. Kadar's passivity and disengagement is Booth's perfection, a perfection he would like to avoid. Booth's ideal is the clearest of these three men, but it is negative.

A Comparison. What are we to make of these activities and ideologies? Are they related to one another, influenced by men's leisure involvement, educational background, or feelings of political efficacy? Can we trace the difference between concern for the common good and concern for the factional good among these men?

Let us examine some of the background factors and the ratings which vary among these three men, in order to ask the questions about their political activity which the next chapter's analysis will be devoted to answering.

	Age	Job Mobility	Educ.	J.R.	L.I.*
Kadar	45	Stable	9	4	3
Ortega	48	Down	12	2	8
Booth	63	Down	12	7	2

	Age	Job Mobility	P.A.	P.Info.	P.Effic.	P.Alien.
Kadar	45	Stable	3	6	1	0
Ortega	48	Down	8	10	2	0
Booth	63	Down	6	8	0	2

* For the purposes of correlating leisure involvement with political activity, the political activity component of the leisure involvement rating is omitted.

We note that while leisure involvement and political activity seem to covary in the cases of Kadar and Ortega, Booth is relatively

low in terms of leisure involvement yet high in terms of political activity. Perhaps a mediating variable is Booth's age, for the reader will recall that political activity increases with age among these men. Another way of explaining Booth's high political activity may be to distinguish it from Ortega's. We note that Ortega's high political activity is associated with membership in organizations, a sense of personal influence with neighbors and the Mayor's office, and feelings of political efficacy. In short, there is evidence that, in addition to talking, reading, and voting "at" something called politics, Ortega actually senses contact and exchange between himself and others. By contrast, Booth does not belong to any organizations, does not feel influential with his neighbors, and has no sense of political efficacy.

Booth's high level of political activity despite his sense of political inefficacy is an example of the pattern we proposed to look for (page 94)—the pattern of using politics for the displacement and projection of personal tensions rather than for attaining the common good. Booth's low leisure involvement is in line with our prediction that such men play little. To the interviewer, Booth's strong dislike of his neighbors, his "delight" in arguments, and his feeling that people in other countries are living lives of pleasure at his expense bespoke (by the energy and tone of the statements as much as by their content) a higher level of psychological tension than either Kadar or Ortega expressed. We will of course have to refer to our entire sample in the next chapter to see whether this distinction between types of political activity can be made systematically.

Another distinctive feature about Booth is his political alienation. We will want to check our entire sample to see whether such alienation seems related to low leisure involvement (i.e. personal alienation) or to Chicago's local political culture. In Booth's case both hypotheses appear plausible.

We have already begun to draw a picture of the varying world-views which suggest themselves through the words of Kadar, Ortega, and Booth. In Chapter 15 we will return to an analysis of the political ideologies we found among the men we interviewed.

The Link Between Leisure and Politics

The reader will recall from Chapter 9 the difficulty we found in predicting definite relationships between leisure involvement and political activity.

In terms of measures used in previous studies and in correspondence with their findings, we expect to find increasing education correlated to increasing political activity. Table I indicates such a

TABLE I. Education Associated with Political Activity

Education	No. Respondents	Avg. Political Activity
under 12	87	4.5
12th grade	96	5.2
over 12	26	6.3

correlation, and an analysis of variance shows it to be significant beyond the .001 level.

We also expect job rating to be correlated to increasing political activity, since our job rating measure, although derived from our theory of play, corresponds closely to increasing levels of occupational prestige, which have been shown before to be associated with increasing political activity. Keeping education constant, we find in Table II that this expectation is also met (the correlation beyond the .001 level of significance).

On the other hand, we predicted that increasing leisure involvement would *not* be directly correlated to increasing political activity because persons with low leisure involvement might nevertheless have a high level of political activity, projecting their personal

TABLE II. Job Rating Associated with Political Activity, Holding Education Constant at the 12th Grade Level

Job Rating		Avg. Political Activity
0-2	19	4.4
3-5	28	4.9
6-8	52	6.0

alienation onto the political structure. This negative expectation is also confirmed: at no level of job rating or education is the association between leisure involvement and political activity significant.

Let us turn now to the task of distinguishing political activity aimed at the common good from political activity on behalf of a factional good. For the reader will recall that, according to our theory, increasing leisure involvement will be associated with increasing political activity aimed at the common good.

In the comparison between the types of political activity engaged in by Ortega and Booth in the previous chapter, we noted that there were several sources of evidence that Ortega was actually engaged in political work and exchange with others while Booth was not, despite his high level of political activity. In Ortega's case one sensed a continually developing dialogue between himself and others, leading him to inform and extend himself while at the same time informing and extending others. In Booth's case one sensed a static monologue, little concerned or in touch with external facts or other persons. In particular, we found that Ortega had feelings of personal influence and political efficacy while Booth did not, and that Ortega belonged to several organizations while Booth belonged to none.

If we can now show that *in general* feelings of personal influence, membership in organizations, and sense of political efficacy are associated with high levels of both leisure involvement and political activity but are not associated with increasing education, we will have established a link between leisure involvement and political activity aimed at the common good. Table III, on the following page, shows that the percentages of men feeling no influ-

TABLE III. Percentages of Men Who Feel Influential and Who Belong to Organizations at Different Levels of Leisure Involvement, Political Activity, and Education*

		Leisure Involvement			Political Activity			Education		
		0-2	3-6	7-9	0-2	3-6	7-9	under 12	12th	over 12
Influence	<i>no</i> **	53.2%	41.3%	16.2%	85.7%	37.4%	26.5%	41.3%	46.2%	20.0%
	<i>yes</i>	31.9%	36.9%	74.1%	9.5%	41.0%	59.2%	38.6%	34.9%	76.0%
	(no.)***	41	100	29	20	108	42	69	75	24
Organizations	<i>zero</i>	61.7%	39.8%	22.6%	57.1%	43.2%	32.6%	42.9%	45.5%	30.0%
	<i>two or more</i>	17.0%	19.6%	45.1%	4.8%	21.5%	28.6%	20.1%	21.8%	20.0%
	(no.)***	38	76	22	13	89	30	54	63	15

* The chi square statistic performed upon the relationships between influence and leisure involvement, influence and political activity, and organizations and leisure involvement shows them to be associated beyond the .001 level of significance. The associations of influence and organization to education are not significant, nor is the association between organizations and political activity. However, the latter changes in the predicted directions.

** The *no* row includes men who said they could not tell or they doubted they had influence. The *yes* row includes feelings of influence within the community or the larger political system. The percentages do not add up to 100% because about 20% of the men said that they could get something done in the community if it were necessary. We did not feel that this group could fit, logically, under either the *yes* or the *no* column.

*** The total number will not be 209 because of the three categories of influence and organizations, the middle category—*influence in cases of necessity and membership in one organization*—is excluded from this analysis. However, the percentages listed are based on totals which do not include all three categories.

TABLE IV. Leisure Involvement and Political Activity Averages for Different Levels of Political Efficacy, By Company

		Leisure Involvement			Political Activity		
		s.m.	a.l.	c.w.	s.m.	a.l.	c.w.
	0	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9	4.3
Political	1	3.9	3.8	4.5	4.4	4.4	5.8
Efficacy	2	4.6	4.3	4.7	4.6	5.6	6.7
	3, 4	5.5	3.5	5.7	5.3	6.0	8.0

ence and belonging to no organizations both decrease radically with increasing levels of both leisure involvement and political activity. At the same time, the percentages of men who feel they *do* have personal influence and who belong to two or more organizations both increase radically with increasing levels of leisure involvement and political activity. On the other hand, increasing levels of education do not yield uniformly increasing percentages of men who feel influence or belong to organizations.

And when we turn to our third mediating variable—political efficacy—we find a similar pattern. Increasing political efficacy is shown in Table IV to be uniformly associated (in 23 of 24 cases) with increasing leisure involvement and with increasing political activity. Table V shows that there is, however, no clear association between increasing level of education and increasing percentages of men who feel politically efficacious.

These findings suggest that, while increasing education is asso-

TABLE V. For Different Levels of Education, Percentage of Men at Each Degree of Political Efficacy

		Education		
		under 12th	12th grade	over 12th
	0	24.8%	27.8%	11.0%
Political	1	37.8%	31.2%	51.8%
Efficacy	2	27.1%	32.1%	18.5%
	3, 4	10.3%	8.9%	18.5%

ciated with increasing levels of political activity in general, it is not necessarily conducive to political activity directed towards the common good. Instead, one deduces that education is sometimes used to rationalize political activity in the service of factional goods. One is reminded of Eric Hoffer's contention that the intellectual may well remain savage at heart and is led to question the long-term results of current methods of education.

More central to this study, however, is the support that these results lend to our hypothesis that high leisure involvement is associated with political activity directed towards the common good. The support is not strong enough to be called confirmation, for the relationship we have shown is only indirect. Increasing leisure involvement and increasing political activity have both been shown to correlate with changes in three mediating variables.*

We can seek more support for our general hypothesis relating high leisure involvement to political activity based on concern for the common good by recalling another aspect of Booth's political activity. The reader will recall that, although Booth felt no sense of political efficacy, he nevertheless had a high degree of political activity. We hypothesized in Chapter 9 that a person with such a combination of scores is not engaged in political activity directed towards the common good and would therefore tend to have a low level of leisure involvement. This hypothesis was borne out in the case of Booth. Now, turning to our entire sample, we find nine men in our sample (including Booth) who have no sense of political efficacy, yet score six or higher on our political activity rating. The average leisure involvement rating for these nine men is 2.7. The reader will immediately note that this average is far below the average leisure involvement for the sample as a whole. A more

* A further qualification is also necessary, for feelings of influence are one of the four factors in our rating of political efficacy. And another of the factors in our rating of political efficacy—talking politics with those who disagree—is also one of the five factors in our rating of political activity. Thus, there is a slight overlap among some of our measures which makes them less than totally independent of one another.

stringent and telling comparison, however, is between the average of these nine men and that of the other men who score zero on our index of political efficacy. For, Table IV has already shown us that men with no sense of political efficacy have the lowest average leisure involvement within our sample. Is high political activity under these conditions an additional indicator of self-estrangement and low leisure involvement, or is the relatively low leisure involvement of these men merely a reflection of their low political efficacy? In other words, is this a new source of support for our hypothesis, or merely a reintroduction of evidence already presented in Table IV?

When we turn to the other 41 men with a score of zero on the index of political efficacy, we find that their average leisure involvement is 3.5, substantially higher than 2.7. Applying a test which tells us whether this difference is more pronounced than would be likely by chance, we find that the difference is significant beyond the .05 level. We can conclude that the low leisure involvement of the nine men we have isolated is more pronounced than would be expected if it were merely a function of their lack of political efficacy.

This evidence corroborates our theory in a different way. Rather than showing a relationship between high leisure involvement and concern for the common good in politics, it isolates political activity *not* conducive to the common good and shows it to be associated with *low* leisure involvement. We have already presented an example of the opinions of these nine men in the person of Frank Booth. We shall include several more examples here, which appear to us to involve more fanciful projection upon the world, more tension, more blatant contradiction, than was expressed by most of the men whom we interviewed.

Personal Projection Into Politics. George Day (#59) comes from a little town near Columbus, Ohio. He was one of about 20 men we interviewed who lives there, but he was the only one to mention that the previous town manager had been corrupt: "The new manager says the other one threw out all the records." He explained that there was a division between the east and west ends

of the town in a fight over the location of a new high school. "They (the officials) don't want to find out what the people want. When they do, they don't print it." As to influence, Day felt he has "no more than anybody else and that's nothing. Just a few have got it—nobody else—and they won't give it up. Don't like the Town Council but they win anyway. There's no use talking about it if you can't do anything."

Of Negroes he said, "I saw too much (in the army). They give it to you once they're in authority." At another point he judged that "There's a lot of corruption—the Communists they find in government. You can believe what you read because they wouldn't print it otherwise." In answer to our question about who runs the government, he was uncertain: "I'm not there; I couldn't tell you. You don't know. It's like the town—the city manager is supposed to run it, but does he?"

As one listened to Day, one was inclined to believe that he was engaged mainly in some sort of verbal pyrotechnics. His alternation between information and hammer-blow opinions was rhetorically effective, but when one searches for any coherence among his opinions—other than a sense of alienation—one is thwarted. Can we trust what is printed or not? Day presents diametrically opposed opinions within minutes of one another. Who is involved in political decisions? At one moment, the town manager is in control but corrupt. The next moment the entire town is split over an issue of control. But the citizens are apparently powerless, for the *elected* Town Council which is not liked (whether by anyone besides Day is left delicately ambiguous) is next attributed control over matters.

Another one of these men (#172) felt that "Mrs. Johnson might have something to do with it (running the government). Mrs. Khrushchev runs theirs. My vote doesn't count anything. . . . Regardless of what you think, I'll vote this way anyway." The first sentence is offered tentatively, the second blandly, as commonly acknowledged factual support for the first. The third sentence tumbled out as the harsh result. But apparently this result startled the speaker himself, for he glared angrily at the interviewer, as though the interviewer might take advantage of this revelation, and

proceeded to defend the value of his autonomous vote, which was not about to be influenced by any argument the interviewer might make.

When he thinks of government, this man thinks of a "freedom that other countries don't have." But he also thinks there is "a lot of waste. Foreign aid—a lot of it is going to waste. On Vietnam all of it is being wasted. Same with Cuba. We should have wiped it out." Again, as with Day, one senses a nice, neat, absolute quality to this man's opinions—and a violent quality too. They are both rigid and brittle. They do not invite discussions of a sort which would lead to stretching and change. One imagines the man would feel diminished, weakened, broken by change in himself.

Another (#166) expressed the opinion that Wall Street runs the government. "We're a minority, and a lot of people don't go out and vote, so you wonder. Wall Street couldn't control if everyone voted. But they could do things in Washington that we wouldn't know about." This man, who was on an assembly line, transferring parts from one belt to another, talked repetitively and with a glazed look in his eyes for over ten minutes about the demanding quality of his job. "It's a funny thing about these jobs—the timing and rhythm must be good. You've got to have perfect timing and rhythm. It just comes naturally. . . . Oh, you've got to concentrate all the time." No other man on the assembly line spoke in similar terms or at similar length about the job. We could only attribute this digression to an utter inability to accept the reality of his job. There was no sign that the man was mentally retarded—a condition which could make such a job genuinely challenging.

A fifth man of these nine was more tentative about his opinions (#133). "The political system is not democratic. The parties are in tight circles—back room caucuses. Hand picked men run for office. The man in the street has nothing to say about who runs, except for councilman or dog catcher. That's the impression I have—may be wrong." When he thought of government, he seemed overwhelmed by "bureau upon bureau and all that red tape—taxes—politics big and small—and hundreds of thousands working for the government." The question concerning too much power he hesitated to answer "because it's just like making an accusation."

He felt that "the giant corporations have the most influence" in running the government. His thoughts about a perfect society were similar to those of a number of other men, but seemingly more intense and absolute. He did not simply say, "There's no such thing as long as there's two men to fight (#27)." Instead he said, "It would be a lot different. There'd be no need for police. There'd be honesty. That's not possible, human nature being what it is. That destroys it right off the bat. Without trust there's suspicion. That ruins everything."

This man does not exhibit the tension, violence, or contradiction of the others. It is as though he himself were the impersonal, undemocratic machine that he repeatedly sees in the world at large—in political parties, government bureaucracy, and business corporations. But he also speaks for "the man in the street" as well as for the alien controller in himself. That is, one hears a weak and forlorn but nevertheless persistent identification with the positive possibilities of human personhood. He uses the words "honesty" and "trust." But they are not the controlling factors, "human nature being what it is." As with the other men of these nine, there is no sense in these words that change is possible. Even a clear observation of the relationship between the alien and the personal within him would no doubt be thwarted in this man by his sense that it represented "an accusation."

A sixth man expressed a strong opinion about talking politics (#214). "I try to avoid it. I can't change anybody and they can't change me." Here the theme of change as anathema is stated most explicitly. Its logic is carried to the extreme of disengagement, illustrated by Kadar in the last chapter. Contact is avoided. Other men express their reluctance to engage in political discussion more laconically. For example, "That's something I don't do much. Someone flies off the handle pretty quick (#55)." Here, avoidance of contact is justified empirically rather than given the quality of a natural law.

The other three of these nine men expressed no opinions that appeared to us extraordinary. In our review of the comments of all the other men we interviewed, we could find no others whose comments seemed to involve so much obvious fanciful projection, vio-

lent tension, and resistance to change, as the ones we have here detailed. However, this finding should not be given too much weight, for we had already isolated these nine men and were possibly biased towards overinterpretation of their comments and towards downplaying the implications of others' views. Moreover, as the following chapter will show, the world view of these nine men emerges as common to most of the men we interviewed, though in most cases it was more implicit.

Since these nine men all have high ratings of political activity and low ratings of leisure involvement, it is not surprising to find that when they are excluded from our computation of related increases in leisure involvement and political activity their association becomes significant at the .05 level, with education held constant at the 12th grade level.

This excursion into the opinions of nine men completes the evidence about the relationship between a man's leisure involvement and his politics. No one of the pieces of evidence is convincing alone, for each suffers the defect of being indirect or of referring to a small portion of the sample. But taken together, they gain strength from their consistency. They all support the hypotheses which we have advanced.

They indicate, first, that the factors associated with the extent of a person's general level of political activity are different from those associated with political activity directed towards the common good. They show, further, that the amount of a person's political activity does not indicate the extent of his concern for the common good. The measure that seems most clearly associated with political activity directed towards the common good is our measure of leisure involvement, derived from our theory of play. Moreover, it appears that the political activity which is most manifestly *not* concerned with the common good is that which is associated with a *low* level of leisure involvement.

Political Alienation. A persistent problem for members of any political system who are concerned for the common good is whether persons who feel politically alienated from that system are merely personally self-estranged and inaccurate in their beliefs about the

political system, whether they are symptoms of political disintegration within the system, or whether they are the most aware and committed of citizens serving the common good.

We find some corroboration that personal alienation is related to political alienation among the nine men whom we isolated earlier as having low leisure involvement but high political activity. Seven of the nine have feelings of political alienation, whereas only three of every ten men in the rest of the sample expressed feelings of political alienation. More broadly, the average leisure involvement of politically alienated men in each company is lower than the average leisure involvement of the men in each company who did not express political alienation. These findings seem simultaneously to lower the credibility of the third possibility—that the politically alienated men are the most concerned for the common good—for *this sample*, since we have shown that low leisure involvement tends to be associated with political activity *not* conducive to the common good.

TABLE VI. Percentage of Men from Each Area Who Are Politically Alienated

Area	Total No.	No. Pol. Alien.	% Pol. Alien.
Columbus	72	18	25%
Detroit	71	18	26%
Chicago	65	31	48%

Other evidence indicates that the character of a local political culture is related to political alienation. Table VI shows that political alienation is almost twice as prevalent among the men in Chicago as among the men in either of the other two areas, despite the higher average leisure involvement among the men in Chicago than in either of the other two areas.

Another indication that Chicago affects men's attitudes towards politics is portrayed in Table VII. The men in Chicago are shown to derive their sense of political efficacy from the two items related to personal initiative rather than from the two related to government responsiveness, whereas in Columbus and Detroit both

TABLE VII. Number of Men in Each Area Whose Political Efficacy Derives Either from Personal Initiative or from Belief in the Responsiveness of the Government

Area	Personal Initiative	Government Responsiveness
Columbus	20	18
Detroit	18	18
Chicago	30	4

sources contribute equally to different men's sense of political efficacy. This finding indicates that the political culture of Chicago is eroding these men's sense of political efficacy, but that their higher job ratings and leisure involvement tend to counterbalance such erosion. We would expect to find, extrapolating from these results, that workers in Chicago with job ratings equivalent to the Detroit assembly line workers would feel consistently less politically efficacious than their counterparts in Detroit.

The political alienation associated with the Chicago area influences the views of the men who live there not only in terms of local political issues, but also in terms of their view of the national government. Table VIII shows that more men in Chicago than in the other two cities feel that the federal government generally has too much control over men's lives. Subanalyses of this data show that, although increasing job rating, education, and leisure involvement are all associated with a growing sense that the government has too much control, in all cases the men in Chicago are largely responsible for this trend and maintain their sense that the government has too much control no matter what their levels of education

TABLE VIII. Men Who Believe the Government Has Too Much, Too Little, or the Right Amount of Control, by Area

Area	Too Much	Too Little	Right Amount
Columbus	19	15	26
Detroit	6	19	36
Chicago	26	6	19

and leisure involvement. Thus, we find that men's political activity in relation to the national state may be influenced not only by apolitical, personal projection, but also by local political considerations which may not apply to the national system.

In sum, not only the personal, interpersonal, economic, and sociological factors referred to in Chapter 9, but also the character of the local political culture can cause political alienation. Although there seems to be a tendency in our sample for political alienation to be associated with personal alienation, political alienation is still more clearly associated with the particular, local political culture to which the men in Chicago belonged. What it is about the local political culture that encourages or discourages general political alienation we cannot determine within the limits of this study, having gathered no empirical data on the nature of local political systems.

Overall, this chapter provides some empirical support for the proposition reached theoretically at the end of Chapter 7 that personal and political alienation are dynamically related. We have shown that personal alienation (low leisure involvement) is associated with political activity not directed towards the common good. On the other hand, we have shown that a local political culture can lower men's sense of political efficacy, and lower political efficacy is associated with personal alienation.

Models of Man in the World

Politics is not only a web of immediate action and current opinions. A man's politics are always carried out within the framework of his ultimate beliefs about what is possible among men. These beliefs may not be formulated explicitly, but they emerge as the implicit assumptions which link various opinions or behaviors to one another.

When men are highly verbal and intellectual these implicit assumptions are sometimes difficult to see because they may be contradictory to the explanations, justifications, and relationships which such men formulate for themselves in an attempt to provide coherence to their behavior. Most of the men we interviewed, however, were not highly verbal and intellectual, in this reflective sense, and their comments arrange themselves easily into patterns of fundamental beliefs.

We first encountered such patterns in the persons of John Kadar, Manuel Ortega, and Frank Booth in Chapter 13. Their words would not have formed such clear patterns, however, were they not supported and supplemented by those of other men. Pieces of these patterns are brought into focus by different men, so it becomes impossible to determine how many men reflected each pattern, or how consistently and intensely they reflected it. Instead, we will concentrate on describing the patterns, especially the one we met most frequently.

Kadar, Ortega, and Booth were representative of the three patterns of ultimate belief we found among the men we interviewed. The reader will recall that Kadar suggested through various comments an extreme disengagement from others and from the state. This sense of disengagement seemed to be accompanied by a sense

that such lack of contact and exchange was a natural and appropriate condition. Its fundamental, ontological significance for him was emphasized by the fact that change—and any concept of the perfect society—seemed neither implicitly desirable nor explicitly imaginable to him. This pattern is a highly consistent representation of the world as chaotic—one of the two world views we outlined in Chapter 5. For, to imagine and wish for perfection requires a sense that order and value are conceivable and possible in the universe. In a chaotic universe, however, to desire or imagine perfection is to engage in futile nonsense.

Very few men seemed to be such totally disengaged atoms as Kadar. About ten others expressed a similar sense of disengagement and distance from politics, using phrases such as: “It (the government) hasn’t affected me one way or the other (#101).”; “I’m too busy doing other things to worry about who wants to run things (#155).”; “I’ve never been that interested in government. It can do everything it wants to (#225).”

At the other end of the spectrum were men like Ortega, for whom engagement, dialogue, and learning seemed to be processes basic to their behavior and their thought. Behind such patterns lies an implicit faith in the universe as ordered—as making possible relationship, exchange, and development among its different parts. That we should rediscover the fundamental axiom of our study in the ultimate beliefs of men of high leisure involvement and political activity directed towards the common good is hardly a coincidence. For the measures by which we identified them are intended to identify play—the process of conscious discovery, exchange, and relationship characteristic of an ordered universe. And, since play involves the heightening of consciousness, it is not surprising that its general form should itself become conscious and be reflected in men’s comments. But we cannot extend our discussion of this pattern of ultimate belief beyond our own initial discussion in Chapter 5 because relatively few men we interviewed expressed it at all. Those who did rarely did so in more than superficial form.

If we try to determine how many men in our sample reflect this world view, we come up with a few comments on the order of, “I think it’s worthwhile (to discuss politics). You can’t go wrong—

you can't learn too much. An individual is not right every time (#251)." We also find that fewer than one-third of the men in our sample claimed to discuss politics with those who disagree with them. Our impression is, then, that even the upper levels of leisure involvement in our sample represent only the foreshadowings of man's possibility for play.

If these two patterns of ultimate belief are relatively rare among these men, does another pattern suggest itself? It does decidedly, and it was illustrated by Frank Booth earlier. The reader will recall the view that emerged from his comments—a view of a universe in which units are basically static and separate, but forced together into an order that is sometimes violently disrupted. This alternation between forced order and violence is inherently imperfect. The only perfection which Booth can imagine is a bland sameness in which the tension between forced order and violence—the tension that reminds him that he is alive—is utterly dissolved. Such a perfection would be hellish from the point of view of the living, for its greyness is the greyness of death.

This world view matches the entropic theory of the universe. According to the theory of entropy, the universe is basically chaotic matter, tending always towards further dispersion and chaos. Life and order, according to this theory, are only occasional, local phenomena in the universe, created and maintained in tension with the general tendency of the universe. The creation and preservation of life and order itself tends to contribute to the chaos of the universe as a whole (for order-creating machines are never 100% efficient—that is, they use more potential energy than they succeed in converting into order). And when the energy source of a local area (e.g. a star) is used up, the end of the orderly configuration is heralded by a series of violent bursts.

The individual units in Booth's world also behave in consonance with certain current physical theories concerning the possibility of mutual approach and sharing among atoms. In general, we know that only certain atoms with complementary electron structures can approach one another and share electrons. And if the proximity among atoms is forced and the autonomy of an atom destroyed, a violent explosion occurs. In Booth's world closeness and sharing seem to carry with them a similar risk of explosion.

But we have suggested that this world view of alternating forced order and violence, of avoidance of close association, and of hellish entropic perfection is common to many of the men we interviewed. Rather than continuing to use Booth as an example, let us sample other comments that seem to fit this pattern.

Generally, there are three realms of human experience which can conceivably be shared—experience with inanimate objects and lower forms of life, experience with fellow human beings, and experience with spiritual forces. Of the three the latter two, which can be categorized broadly as politics and religion, are most deeply personal. How do the men we interviewed treat these two areas of conversation? “Actually, there’s two things I don’t talk about much—politics and religion. People’s minds are made up, at least if they’re like me (#3).” This attitude bespeaks an atomic, static universe rather than one in which there is playful exchange and growth. “What they do about politics is their business. What I do is mine (#41).”

Why do these men not discuss politics? “Someone flies off the handle pretty quick (#55).” “I like to argue, but not with friends. It causes hard feelings. People that I don’t care about, I’ll argue with all day (#233).” They will react strongly to what they perceive as threats to their autonomy in forming and preserving their opinions, for they own little of themselves—they are free to make few decisions. “I think everybody ought to vote the way he wants to. Everyone’s got his own head, I hope (#65).”

Their world is an atomistic, chaotic world, in which men meet one another only by colliding. “I try not to (discuss politics). It’s best not to—like religion. I have to live with them; as long as I have to, it’s best not to discuss politics (#243).” “I figure it’s best to leave politics and religion alone. I mean it’s hard for the community (#263).” In this world, friends are people “who you hardly ever see and (who) leave you alone.*

These comments characterize the relationship between the possibility of violence and the avoidance of close association among

* This is the way 90% of the men in two plants described friendly employees. Argyris, Chris, *Integrating the Individual and the Organization*. p. 302.

these men. Now we will turn to the relationship they see between forced order and entropic perfection. Entropic perfection would be a lifeless, uniform grey, a frozen stasis.

"It would feel like hell if people were perfect. People would have no ambition. There'd be no reason to have a governing body—there'd be no crime (#146)." "It would be monotonous: no squabbles; nothing to do (#165)." "I'd never get along in a perfect society. If we all thought alike and did alike, things would be going too smooth. It would cause a lot of unemployment because you wouldn't need the police or fire department (#139)." "There wouldn't be the challenge and excitement of the two-party system. There'd be no differences, nothing to discuss. . . . If there are no challenges, the creative spirit dies (#164)."

In a chaotic universe perfection is not the sharing of differences, but their obliteration—sameness. Luckily, such a dull condition does not appear possible to some of these men, since, as we noted above, they guard their autonomy zealously.* "There'll never be (a perfect society). There are too many nationalities. This is a melting pot. You'll never get them to see eye to eye on a way of life (#243)." "There'll never be one: people will always be different (#134)." "You'll never find one because no two people are the same. There'll always be greedy or lazy bastards like me (#140)."

This third world view is the world view which seemed to us to be predominant among the men we interviewed. It is a view of a fundamentally chaotic universe in which an alien life tension still exists. The order which life imposes upon the random chaos is constantly threatened by explosion—explosion either from forced proximity or from the tendency of matter towards dispersion and entropy.

This world view is dignified not only by its parallelism with certain current scientific theories, but also by its accuracy in reflecting the life experience of these men. Let us recall that even in the case of the men at the chemicals plant, whose jobs received the highest ratings for playfulness in our study, *their primary*

* In practice this autonomy appears to be a matter of what might be called marginal idiosyncrasies, such as pet phrases.

opportunity to participate creatively in their work occurs when something goes wrong. Under these conditions, is it surprising that they should regard perfection as hellish?

These men are frozen into a position by contradictory tensions. They do not wish for more forced order, for they are the pawns of forced order. They fear violence, for it may bring total chaos. They abhor perfection, for it is lifeless. They resist personal change, for they see it as diminishing their autonomy. The result must be a balance of ambivalent avoidance—a calculated, uncommitted indifference to any particular value.

Businessmen and social commentators, blacks and radical students, have often bewailed men's resistance to change in recent times, as change increasingly becomes the only constant in economic and social life. But so long as men's work is no more than labor and their leisure no more than recreation—so long as the experience of playful change is foreign to them—resistance to change will follow logically from their view of the world.

As a man's experience in the world teaches him to apply this third world view more and more rigorously to new events, the very possibility of playful change will vanish. For there is no category of playful change in the third world view. All change is either forced, violent, or entropic and in all cases to be resisted rather than approached. Thus, a practitioner of the third world view will tend to distance himself from the experience of playful change as well as from other forms of change, attempting to interpret play as a veiled example of one of the other forms. What is more, his interpretation is often enough confirmed, since most of us are deeply ingrained with the methodology of forced change. Even when we develop some sense of playful change and hope to encourage it in our encounters with others, we will often switch unawares to techniques of forced change when we meet with resistance. Then the most explosive irony of all begins to enact itself: the attempt to force another to play.

In a world of tense ambivalence and calculated indifference, playful exploration occurs, at most, rarely and distortedly. Such a world, created partly as a self-fulfilling result of holding the third world view, prevents us from exploring alternatives to the puritan work ethic—alternatives which may nonetheless be forced upon

us by unpremeditated and uncontrolled social changes. The increased tempo of forced change and the resistance which it evokes leads to violence, according to the logic of the third world view. This logic and the web of experience from which it derives provide a context for the view that the mass man of the twentieth century tends toward violence in his political expression.¹

Such a tense and potentially violent balance is our heritage so long as play, with the leisure involvement and concern for the common good which derive from it, is discouraged. But by now it must be clear that no ordinary political program will encourage leisure and concern for the common good. For to encourage play itself demands a transvaluation of values. Personal exploration, discovery, and verification of values is itself a process foreign to the third world view.

At the outset, such personal exploration presents itself as an optional opportunity, demanding a risk and a commitment from each explorer. He has some sense that his exploration must take him beyond the emotional boundaries and intellectual definitions of forced order. He has some sense that he is in search of rhythm—in search of a dynamic order encompassing his whole life and thus reaching beyond his adequate conception at any given moment. He senses the inadequacy of his words and dreams to represent his search, yet knows his search must find expression. And when he truly understands his inadequacy—in thought, feeling, and inner sensation—in intention and in behavior—he experiences an active question within himself, a new alertness and presence to the mysterious transformations of his moment-to-moment life, a calm, unfolding rhythm of such a different order than that to which he has been trained to answer that he will flee from consciousness of it time and time again.

Even this beginning, however, lies beyond the bounds of this study.

NOTES

1. Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1932).

Appendix I: The Ratings

MACHINE TOOL COMPANY

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
1.	36	2	1	10	6	4	4	9	6
2.	40	1	2	8	6	4	5	3	3
3.	45	1	1	12	7	5	4	7	4
4.	42	1	1	13	6	7	7	5	7
5.	38	1	2	12	6	3	3	6	1
6.	26	2	1	9	4	3	5	2	3
7.	44	1	1	10	7	7	4	7	5
8.	41	1	1	12	6	6	7	5	4
9.	26	0	1	11	7	5	4	4	3
10.	24	1	1	11	5	7	7	5	6
11.	43	1	1	12	6	6	9	9	2
12.	46	0	1	11	7	5	6	6	3
13.	42	1	1	12	4	4	3	5	6
14.	27	1	1	12	6	6	4	8	6
15.	33	1	1	12	7	7	9	4	5
16.	53	1	2	8	6	6	3	8	2
17.	27	1	1	12	3	2	3	4	3
18.	35	1	2	12	6	5	6	7	6
19.	47	1	2	8	7	7	8	4	5
20.	42	1	2	14	6	5	4	8	4
21.	36	1	1	12	4	7	7	7	5
22.	49	1	2	12	6	8	6	10	8
23.	44	2	1	9	4	6	4	4	7
24.	44	1	1	12	7	7	7	10	3
25.	45	1	1	12	4	3	4	6	3
26.	29	1	1	12	7	6	3	6	4
27.	40	1	1	17	5	6	7	7	7
28.	25	0	0	12	4	6	4	7	3
29.	39	1	2	12	4	2	2	7	2
30.	31	0	0	12	4	5	4	7	6
31.	34	1	1	12	5	6	8	9	7
32.	43	1	1	16	4	4	8	10	8
33.	35	1	1	13	4	6	4	1	3
34.	40	1	1	13	4	4	4	9	6
35.	30	1	1	11	4	2	2	4	2
36.	32	1	1	12	4	5	4	8	7
37.	38	0	1	8	4	5	5	7	5
38.	25	0	0	12	4	6	4	7	3

MACHINE TOOL COMPANY (cont'd)

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
39.	39	1	1	8	4	7	4	8	3
40.	26	1	1	12	5	8	4	3	2
41.	34	1	2	12	3	3	4	0	3
42.	31	0	2	7	3	5	2	1	2
43.	31	1	1	13	4	5	4	6	4
44.	44	2	1	10	3	3	1	3	1
45.	35	1	1	9	3	4	4	6	5
46.	50	2	1	12	3	4	5	10	7
47.	25	2	1	12	3	4	5	10	7
48.	46	1	2	8	4	4	4	2	3
49.	39	1	1	10	3	6	6	8	4
50.	32	1	1	9	4	4	8	9	4
51.	32	1	0	19	3	7	9	9	6
52.	40	2	1	11	4	5	1	4	2
53.	31	1	1	12	3	3	4	8	3
54.	35	1	1	13	3	5	9	9	7
55.	30	1	2	8	3	4	3	3	2
56.	25	1	1	12	4	6	4	2	1
57.	32	1	1	12	3	4	4	5	3
58.	27	1	2	12	3	6	7	9	5
59.	35	1	1	10	6	6	4	4	6
60.	27	0	0	12	5	8	7	10	4
61.	37	1	2	10	4	6	5	3	3
62.	25	1	1	12	3	4	8	0	2
63.	26	1	1	12	4	5	5	12	7
64.	32	2	1	11	3	4	3	3	1
65.	34	1	1	9	4	5	5	0	5
66.	47	2	2	8	4	5	5	10	5
67.	39	2	2	8	3	8	6	8	4
68.	50	1	2	9	4	8	10	1	3
69.	43	2	2	13	3	5	7	5	6
70.	27	1	1	12	4	4	6	6	3
71.	27	1	1	10	5	6	8	2	3
72.	47	1	1	11	5	6	8	11	9

AUTOMOBILE COMPANY

101.	55	1	1	10	4	6	4	7	7
102.	54	1	1	10	4	5	5	6	5
103.	55	1	1	10	4	5	3	10	7

AUTOMOBILE COMPANY (cont'd)

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
104.	52	1	1	12	4	5	3	6	6
105.	53	1	1	8	4	5	3	10	5
106.	58	1	1	6	4	7	7	9	6
107.	34	1	1	9	1	4	4	8	3
108.	55	0	0	0	4	7	4	0	2
109.	36	1	1	5	1	6	5	6	7
110.	29	2	1	12	4	5	8	7	6
111.	49	1	1	12	2	6	6	7	7
112.	55	1	1	7	2	6	8	5	6
113.	57	1	1	9	0	5	5	6	6
114.	53	2	2	12	4	3	2	4	4
115.	56	1	1	8	2	4	3	6	5
116.	23	1	1	12	0	6	3	6	6
117.	22	0	1	11	2	3	8	4	4
118.	51	1	2	11	4	7	6	6	6
119.	36	1	2	12	1	5	5	9	6
120.	57	1	1	12	4	5	6	8	5
121.	57	1	1	8	4	4	3	7	5
122.	52	2	1	9	4	3	8	8	4
123.	43	1	1	12	4	3	2	1	5
124.	47	1	1	12	2	4	7	7	6
125.	42	1	1	10	2	3	3	7	3
126.	45	1	1	10	0	5	4	9	7
127.	54	1	2	8	2	2	5	3	5
128.	51	1	2	12	2	5	4	9	7
129.	61	1	2	10	2	6	6	4	3
130.	42	1	2	13	2	4	7	9	5
131.	47	2	2	12	0	5	7	3	3
132.	50	1	1	12	1	3	4	8	6
133.	39	1	0	5	0	3	4	4	4
134.	43	1	1	12	3	4	10	8	5
135.	53	1	2	8	0	3	10	6	7
136.	28	2	2	15	0	3	3	6	3
137.	28	1	2	13	0	5	5	3	1
138.	43	1	2	12	0	2	6	10	4
139.	36	2	2	12	0	2	2	7	4
140.	36	2	2	12	0	2	2	7	4
141.	44	1	1	11	0	4	1	7	4
142.	28	2	2	12	0	3	2	3	2
143.	48	2	1	12	2	2	10	10	8

AUTOMOBILE COMPANY (cont'd)

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
144.	36	2	1	12	0	3	2	6	5
145.	23	1	1	12	1	5	2	1	0
146.	23	2	1	13	2	4	7	4	3
147.	35	1	1	14	0	5	3	7	5
148.	50	1	1	12	2	3	6	1	3
149.	45	1	1	10	0	7	4	9	3
150.	44	2	2	8	0	3	4	3	4
151.	40	1	1	10	2	5	4	10	8
152.	52	2	1	12	0	1	5	5	4
153.	43	1	1	4	3	5	5	7	6
154.	41	1	2	10	0	2	4	3	2
155.	31	1	1	12	0	1	3	9	4
156.	31	1	2	10	3	4	1	1	3
157.	32	1	1	12	0	1	3	9	4
158.	31	1	2	11	0	2	8	7	5
159.	40	1	1	11	0	2	4	2	6
160.	31	2	2	15	0	2	7	9	5
161.	52	1	2	10	0	2	7	9	5
162.	53	1	1	10	0	1	3	8	4
163.	46	1	1	8	0	3	2	6	5
164.	46	1	2	9	1	3	7	9	7
165.	48	1	1	12	1	7	5	7	7
166.	52	1	1	11	1	4	5	8	6
167.	58	1	1	8	1	6	6	6	6
168.	53	2	1	8	4	4	4	4	3
169.	51	1	1	10	1	7	3	5	3
170.	57	2	1	10	4	5	10	7	6
171.	41	1	1	10	1	5	4	7	4
172.	53	1	1	10	1	4	1	8	6
173.	57	1	1	9	1	5	5	4	6

CHEMICAL COMPANY

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
201.	42	1	1	11	7	4	6	8	5
202.	54	1	1	12	7	3	8	13	9
203.	39	1	1	12	7	4	10	7	5
204.	51	1	1	12	6	7	5	10	6
205.	44	1	1	12	8	8	6	1	6

CHEMICAL COMPANY (cont'd)

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involve- ment	Leisure Involve- ment	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
206.	37	1	1	11	7	4	5	9	3
207.	59	2	1	12	8	5	2	6	6
208.	34	1	1	12	7	4	8	9	8
209.	63	2	2	12	7	6	3	8	6
210.	44	1	1	14	7	8	9	11	8
211.	58	1	2	8	7	7	4	2	3
212.	52	2	1	13	7	8	8	8	7
213.	44	1	1	12	7	3	6	8	7
214.	54	1	1	12	7	5	3	12	6
215.	42	1	1	12	7	4	5	10	7
216.	56	0	2	12	7	5	5	11	5
217.	39	0	1	12	8	5	11	6	8
218.	57	1	2	12	7	8	3	6	6
219.	48	1	2	10	7	4	0	4	0
220.	44	1	1	12	7	6	11	12	10
221.	60	2	2	13	7	6	5	8	8
222.	38	0	1	12	7	8	4	8	6
223.	46	1	1	10	7	6	5	8	5
224.	42	2	2	12	7	7	6	11	5
225.	47	1	1	11	7	4	4	6	5
226.	50	1	1	12	7	4	7	7	7
227.	48	1	2	13	7	6	5	8	6
228.	41	1	1	12	7	2	8	10	7
229.	55	1	1	10	7	5	5	5	4
230.	55	1	1	8	7	6	7	12	8
231.	39	1	1	12	7	6	6	7	8
232.	51	1	0	10	8	7	5	7	7
233.	33	1	1	12	7	8	5	8	4
234.	43	1	2	12	7	4	6	9	4
235.	40	2	1	14	7	3	4	5	4
236.	43	1	1	12	7	4	5	7	3
237.	37	1	1	12	7	5	8	5	5
238.	45	1	1	12	7	3	7	12	8
239.	47	1	1	10	7	5	10	12	10
240.	50	1	1	12	7	4	4	7	4
241.	56	1	2	11	7	5	3	9	4
242.	52	1	2	12	7	7	6	10	7
243.	57	0	1	12	7	3	3	8	5
244.	47	1	2	12	7	6	8	11	8
245.	40	1	1	13	7	4	7	7	9

CHEMICAL COMPANY (cont'd)

	Age	Pre- vious Job	Father's Job	Educa- tion	Job Rating	Job Involvement	Leisure Involvement	Political Infor- mation	Political Activity
246.	61	2	1	12	7	6	6	6	4
247.	31	1	1	12	7	6	4	7	4
248.	60	0	2	12	7	5	5	11	8
249.	61	1	1	8	7	6	6	8	5
250.	52	1	2	14	8	6	9	11	10
251.	62	1	2	8	7	6	3	3	7
252.	55	1	0	14	7	4	10	12	9
253.	34	1	1	12	7	2	8	10	9
254.	28	1	2	12	7	3	9	5	3
255.	44	2	1	14	7	2	5	7	7
256.	38	1	1	12	7	7	8	8	6
257.	34	1	1	12	7	2	3	6	5
258.	39	1	2	12	7	4	8	9	4
259.	48	1	2	12	7	3	2	7	4
260.	60	1	1	12	7	6	9	10	7
261.	55	1	1	12	7	3	4	8	7
262.	38	1	1	13	7	4	2	8	6
263.	53	1	1	12	7	6	4	6	5
264.	48	2	2	12	7	5	6	5	6
265.	41	1	1	12	7	2	6	8	7

Appendix II: The Pilot Study

A pilot study was undertaken in New Haven in the spring of 1964. Subjects were interviewed in their homes, so that the job ratings are based on their own descriptions of their jobs and not upon our observations. The job involvement and leisure involvement scales are substantially the same as in the final study. Despite introductory letters and subsequent telephone calls the subject refusal rate was approximately forty percent. Nevertheless, the results were encouraging and played an important part in shaping the final study.

Each dimension is rated from 0 to 2. The higher the number the greater the extent of the dimensions measured. In the case of job ratings, unlike the main study, the higher the rating the less playful the job.

**JUXTAPOSITION OF JOB RATINGS, JOB INVOLVEMENT RATINGS, AND
LEISURE INVOLVEMENT RATINGS, SHOWING A TENDENCY FOR INCREAS-
ING PLAYFULNESS IN THE JOB TO CORRELATE WITH INCREASING
LEISURE INVOLVEMENT.**

Job Rating	Job Involvement	Leisure Involvement
12	1	4
11	0	1
11	0	5 None Greater
11	1 Only One	3 Than 5
10	1 Greater	2
10	2 Than One	2
10	1	0
7	3	9
7	3 Only One	6
7	2 Less Than	7 None Less
6	4 3	7 Than 6
6	3	7
6	3	9
1	4	8
1	4	6

JOB RATINGS	Subjects														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Lack of ownership and separation from finished product:	0	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
2. Lack of control over conditions of employment, job security:	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2
3. Inability to influence major decisions:	0	2	2	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
4. Lack of control over pace of work:	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
5. Lack of control over quantity—existence of quotas:	1	1	2	0	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
6. Lack of control over technique:	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
	1	10	6	1	6	1	11	7	10	7	11	7	10	11	12

JOB INVOLVEMENT	Subjects														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Can he name something in work itself which satisfied him?	2	0	2	2	2	2	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0
2. Can he think about other things?	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	1
a. If he doesn't and doesn't want to, he is involved. 2	4	1	3	4	4	3	1	2	2	3	0	3	1	0	1
b. If he does he is not involved in job but is able to compensate. 1															
c. If he doesn't because he can't he is most uninvolved. 0															

LEISURE INVOLVEMENT	Subjects														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Presence of dominant interest:	1	0	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	0	1
2. Amount of activity—is he busy?	1	0	1	2	1	2	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	0	0
3. Interest in community:	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
4. Absence of indiscriminate T.V. watching?	2	0	1	1	2	2	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	2
5. Absence of false future:	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
	6	0	7	8	7	9	3	7	2	6	5	9	2	1	4

Appendix III: Unrated Interview Questions

The following questions were asked in the interviews but were not included in any of the rating scales:

1. Where was your family from?
2. What do you think about the salary and your chances for promotion?
3. Can you think of another job paying the same as your present one which you would rather have? your old job?
4. If you had your choice what famous person would you most want to be like (or whom do you most admire)?

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